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Introduction 
 
Empirical phenomenon 
 
 
The present study will explore how the German right-wing parties assemble 
ideology based frames out of the mainstream media coverage that they re-post on 
Facebook.  
Social networks deserve close attention for many reasons. They provide means 
for collaborative and easy production of multimedia content. A Facebook profile is a 
unique online space that possesses properties of mass media, mail exchange service and 
a personal dossier. It enables messaging, offers lots of apps, games etc.; the other way 
round, it connects, it entertains, it informs. While other social networks - Twitter, 
LinkedIn etc. - prefer to focus on particular features, Facebook provides the fullest variety 
of them. Facebook has become the leading source of political news to the youngest 
generations in the US and it is on it´s way to achieve the same dominant position in 
Germany (Tippelt & Kupferschmitt, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2015, 2015a).   
Not only can citizens register a profile and run it as an electronic mass medium. 
A lot of organizations, political actors, celebrities etc., interested in promoting their public 
image, turned to Facebook in a hope to reach bigger audiences at a lower price. Among 
them are political parties.  
This fact altered the old relationship between politicians and media significantly. 
Previously, media decided, which politicians to write about and how to write about them. 
Nowadays, a politician can select news outlets that he is going to quote on his Facebook 
page, thus, increasing incoming traffic of the respective web-site and making the outlet 
more visible online. Of course, the politicians choose news that advocate their political 
standpoints. Re-posting the media coverage on Facebook, the politicians use media as the 
witness of their public recognition.  
The fact that the right-wing extremist parties post news, borrowed from the 
mainstream printed press, is worth studying for  the following reason. it I is widely known 
that the right-wing parties in Germany are stigmatized and almost completely banned by 
the mainstream media (Bornschier, 2010: 173). Despite this fact, the Facebook profiles 
of the former contain lots of links to the articles in the influential German newspapers and 
magazines, such as Der Spiegel, FOCUS, die Welt etc. The phenomenon could potentially 
catalyze the growth and the strength of this movement, since the choice of proper 
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formulations can convince Internet users that the parties do raise important questions and 
propose suitable solutions. 
The articles are not written by the owners of the Facebook pages, but by the 
journalists, who are not necessarily supportive of the right-wing scene. Nevertheless, one 
would expect that they were of a great interest for the owner and not chosen randomly.  
This raises the following, preliminary research questions:  
• What are all these articles about, that right wing parties select from the press? 
• Is there any aggregate topic or theme that bridges them all?  
• Or is there any implicit and not quite obvious meaning in them?  
• To what extent is this meaning rooted in the official documents of the parties? 
Do these news transmit the right-wing ideology?    
• Is there any link between the most common topics and the most widespread 
right-wing individual attitudes that the sociologists have found among the 
German and European population? 
In attempt to embrace all these questions and to give proper answers to them, the 
present study makes use of the framing theories and framing analysis. In a search for a 
universal explanatory model, the doctoral thesis tries to connect isolated brunches of 
social and mass media studies to make the research field more coherent. 
 
 
Linking frame theory to social media research 
 
The empirical study is based on a research model that represents a combination 
of different theories and approaches in communication science. The framing theory 
occupies an important place in this model.  
The rightFig.1. demonstrates, where the motivation for the doctoral thesis comes 
from. left part of the Fig. 1. shows the empirical phenomenon of the selection of news 
and the re-posted media coverage. that is a result of such selection The right part of the 
Fig.1. illustrates, to what extent different theories and research fields contribute to the 
interpretation of the empirical phenomenon. The framing theories and the studies on 
political communication have bigger weight, since they play a more important role in the 
research design. The main theoretical elaborations are based on it. The other research 
fields provide some inspiration; they are ranked in accordance with their contribution to 
the research design and the research model. 
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Figure 1. Empirical phenomenon and theoretical approaches of the present study. 
 
The studies on social media and the framing research have found little touching 
points so far. The latter basically explores cognitive structures in the media content, and 
unveils either their origins, or their effects. The social media studies have shown a little 
interest in the content produced in social media, but mainly in the motives of users’ 
engagement in social networks, thus, considering content creation as a form of users’ 
engagement. (see Part I) The efforts of the social media scholars demonstrate the lack of 
emphasis on the content, and too much emphasis on the personal motives as well as a rare 
interest in the content published by commercial or non-commercial, including political, 
organizations. This tendency does not take into account that organizations do post content 
because of the users and for the users.  
Further, the Fig 1. includes the studies on ideology. Communication science 
demonstrate here some potential for new discovers. The representation of ideology in the 
mass media is often considered as a quite solid structure. The present study aims to show 
ideology in the media coverage as a result of the struggle between different powers. These 
powers influence the decision of the person or actor controlling communication on the 
choice of the news that are going to be published or re-posted. The result of the frame 
building process can be a complicated mix of different ideas, so that one cannot 
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necessarily identify one single ideology in it. This process can be influenced by both 
ideologies of political actors and personal attitudes of the Facebook users. The present 
study will concentrate more on the former kind of the influence, but take into 
consideration the latter one as well.  
 
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
The Fig.1. demonstrated that the present study has dealt with a multifaceted 
empirical phenomenon and involved different theoretical approaches. For this reason, it 
was not quite simple to decide about an optimal structure of the thesis and about the 
sequence of the theoretical chapters. Since the empirical data was collected on Facebook, 
the thesis opens with the discussion of this social network (Part I). The author of the thesis 
describes the technical interface of Facebook to introduce existing studies on Facebook. 
The Part I addresses such questions as a social nature of the Facebook communication, 
information seeking and information consumption, and how political parties make use of 
that special meaning that Facebook has for the users. The Part I has shown, what kind of 
a potential Facebook presents for the radical political parties, if they use it as the 
mainstream parties do. The Part II explains relationships between the mainstream press 
and radical parties, and outlines peculiarities of the radical communication online, which 
is supposed to compensate the missing attention from the mainstream media. The Part II 
emphasizes the importance of the online communication for the radical political actors, 
and shows the niche of the Facebook communication. The Part III addresses theoretical 
approaches that helped to embrace the empirical phenomenon, and brings them into one 
model. The Part III outlines main ideas of the frame theory and introduces the cascading 
activation model (Entman, 2003) of political communication and frame building. The 
cascading activation model undergoes few modifications that help to embed Facebook 
communication into it. In the end, the Part III turns to the definition of the right-wing 
ideology and to the media studies on ideology to clarify the relationships between 
ideology and media frames, which is important not only as a theoretical elaboration, but 
as a legitimization of the methodology of the present study. The Part IV and V sketch the 
recent developments of the right-wing political movement, including ideological changes 
and new political actors, and explains how the new developments contribute to the 
steadiness of unchangeable core statements of the right-wing ideology. The Part IV 
introduces a model that embraces such statements and that helps to interpret the results 
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of the framing analysis in the present study. The Part V discusses the peculiarities of the 
modern German right-wing parties. The Parts I to V has addresses all existing studies that 
have to do with Facebook, radical communication and the right-wing ideology to the very 
extent that was sufficient to formulate research questions in the Part VI. The Part VII 
describes the empirical study that is based on the previous theoretical cosiderations. This 
Parts explains data collection and data analysis, and outline results of the analysis. The 
Part VIII delivers answers to the research questions and clarifies a theoretical contribution 
of the study. The media news that the right-wing extremist parties re-post on their 
Facebook pages are selected in such a way that they create a news coverage consisting 
exclusively of the media frames that favour those or that statement of the right-wing 
ideology. The study reveals, first, how these frames are maintained on the micro level, 
or, the other way round, the origin of the slots-values-configurations and how they are 
being configurated. Secondly, the study consideres the phenomenon of the re-posted 
media coverage as a part of the cascading activation (Entman, 2003) that embraces entire 
political communication on the national level. The study places the empirical 
phenomenon within the model of cascading activation, and addresses necessary 
modifications. The Part VIII concludes with the limitations of the present study as well 
as with a proposal for the future research. 
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Part I. Facebook and political communication 
 
Introduction 
 
The first Part will try to describe Facebook as a specific environment of political 
communication, the environment of a social networking website. Social networking 
websites, or social networks, are “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) 
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of 
connections and those made by others within the system” (Boyd & Ellison, 2007, p. 211).  
Until now, the literature on the right-wing extremism on Facebook was scarce 
(Brinckmeier, 2012). The literature on Facebook use by political parties delivered a few 
elaborations (Elter, 2013; Goh & Pang, 2012; Gulati & Williams, 2013; Larsson, 2015; 
Morin & Flynn, 2014; Siri et al., 2012). My critique of the latter is twofold. 
First of all, it fails to consider communication as a social process. In these papers, 
the communication on Facebook looks like a mechanical transmission of information that 
has no social meaning behind them. In general, the papers on Facebook political 
communication have neglected the nature of this social network, and what makes 
Facebook so special and what distinguishes it from other online communication channels. 
Oddly enough, the reason of such failure lies in the trivial approach to the technical 
features of Facebook. None of the above mentioned scholars pay any serious attention to 
the navigation system of Facebook profiles, to the diversity of social interactions that this 
social network enables., so it remains unclear, what makes Facebook a unique mass 
medium (if at all) The scholars never try to bridge technical interface, personal motives 
of Facebook use, and the strategic interest of political parties, and what kind of leverage 
Facebook can be for the latter. Content analysis used to be a common method that the 
scholars applied to the political communication on Facebook, with the needs of the party 
as the starting point for the code book (see, for instance, Goh and Pang (2012).  
I argue that such research design failed to explore the “sociality” of social 
networks. The needs of the parties are clear without any Facebook data, the nature of the 
parties competitionexplains it good enough. The Facebook data cannot bring anything 
new if the code books are based on the strategic goals of the parties. The data analysis of 
the posts made by political parties should start with the understanding of users’ motives 
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for Facebook use to prove that they do use Facebook to participate in politics, and that 
the motives of users can be a source of influence for the radical political actors. If the 
party has managed to create a small piece of content that has a potential to influence users 
- since this content is able to touch their deep feelings and psychological drives - then this 
is the very content among all the information flood that the parties produce daily which 
is worth to be studied at all. It does not make sense to ask research questions addressed 
to all the content that the parties post, because users consume information selectively, 
experience information overload and many of the posts will not be read at all (Glynn, 
Huge, & Hoffman, 2012). Consequently, it is not necessary to include into the data set all 
the content that the parties publish. But it does make sense to separate posts that include 
specific statements that can have influence over voters (=users) preferences. So, the 
research questions should be asked about the expectations of the potential voters of a 
particular political party (the right-wing parties in this case), about the extent to which 
the parties’ posts match with the users expectations, and what the parties try to do to meet 
these expectations. 
For this purpose, the Part I discusses Facebook´s technical interface, social 
interactions behind it, motives for Facebook use, Facebook use and identity, news 
consumption on Facebook, and make an inference about the role of Facebook in political 
communication. 
 
 
Chapter 1. Facebook interface and social interactions behind it 
 
 
1.1. Facebook: a map 
 
After the first wave of very enthusiastic papers declaring the enormous 
democratic potential of social networks (Barlow, 2007, 2008; Benkler, 2006; Bohman, 
2004; Slevin, 2001; Rheingold, 1993), the more pragmatic approach seems to establish 
its dominance among scholars (Dahlberg, 2007; Dean, 2010; Dijck, 2012; Gerhards & 
Schäfer, 2010; Hindman, 2008; Morozov, 2011). Many scientists agree that the Arab 
Spring etc. have been a side effect of Facebook communication and that the main motives 
for using Facebook are rather intimately personal than political. This has led to an 
explosive amount of publications investigating the link between Facebook profile and 
personal attributes (Bouvier, 2012; Bryant, 2008; Burke et al., 2011; Lampe et al., 2012; 
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Quan-Haase & Young, 2010; Ross et al., 2009; Sheldon & Honeycutt, 2008; Sheldon, 
2008; Toma, 2013; Toma & Hancock, 2011; Zywica & Danowski, 2008). This research 
direction has brought fruitful results shaping the path for the future discussion as the next 
Chapter will show.  
That does not mean that political communication on Facebook plays no role in 
politics at all. It only means that Facebook empirical data must be treated with caution 
and that Facebook data alone cannot provide the whole picture of political 
communication. Political communication on Facebook does involve users into politics, 
but not quite directly.  
Social networks “literally translated a social code into a technical one”, Dijck 
(2012: 162) writes. The social behavior, like making friends, staying in touch with them, 
discussing common interests, expressing approval or disapproval of any ideas, events or 
happenings, was transformed into the form of visual online interface. Let us look into it 
more precisely. 
For a user, the Facebook life starts with the account registration. The user 
chooses a profile name that can be his real name and surname as well as some surrealistic 
nickname. The user fills in a standardized questionnaire with autobiographical data and 
launches the profile. From then on, millions of people can see it. Users add each other in 
their friends’ lists. Although this social network was not a pioneer one, Facebook was the 
most successful in translating the world-of-the-mouth into the online algorithm, and 
enables a channel for information spread. A good analysis of this information spread 
requires a clear understanding of the structure of this public space and of the instruments 
that are available for users.  
The unity of two interfaces constitutes what is known as “Facebook profile” - 
the personal profile that the other users see, and the newsfeed where the user see the 
activity of the others. They play different roles1.  
 
 
1.1.1. The personal profile 
 
The personal profile visible for other users consist of three parts: the upper 
banner, the timeline, and the outline. 
                                                
1 The description of the Facebook interface in the present Chapter was completed by the author. There 
are other sources that can be consulted upon the Facebook interface and functionality, for instance, 
Bucher (2012a,b) Glynn et al., (2012). 
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The upper banner appears as two pictures and a row of links below them. The 
picture on the left - the profile picture - portrays the owner of the profile and is supposed 
to be his personal picture, despite many prefer to post substitutes. The cover picture is a 
big picture in the upper middle of the profile and is supposed to provide such a 
background to the profile that could tell something about the user, his interests, hobbies, 
and his current mood. Both pictures can be uploaded by the user from his personal photo 
archives. The upper banner includes a row of links to access user’s list of friends, 
uploaded photos, videos and extended personal information. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Personal profile on Facebook 
 
 
The timeline looks like a tape, a chronological record of anything that the user 
wanted to make public. It is a kind of personal diary and takes the biggest part of the 
profile. It consists of posts:  entries that can include attachments of different format. Posts 
can be: (1) status updates (or simply statuses): text entries describing any thoughts, 
observations, feelings, impressions, or other ideas of the user; (2) photos or pictures 
(photo files) with status update, tag, or location, as well as without any additional 
information; (3) video with the same type of remarks on them or without anything. A tag 
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is a mark with the name of the person on the photo. Location is a geographic position 
specifying where the photo was made. Locations can be posted as status updates without 
any other content attached. They show what places the user has visited. Status updates 
can come in the form of emotions that must be chosen from the list elaborated by the 
Facebook team, whereas simple text updates are subject to the user’s creativity. The user 
can also publish links to the internal Facebook-based or external online content of any 
kind. Any content, posted on someone’s timeline, gets a unique link, which can be copied 
from the browser and published by other users on their timelines.  
The outline that starts under the upper banner and runs down on the right side of 
the timeline includes short abstracts from autobiography, digital archives stored by the 
user on Facebook (photos, videos etc.) as well as extended personal information. The 
biographical abstract encompasses such information as date and place of birth, places of 
residences and employment in chronological order, information about education, and 
marital status. Nonetheless, the user does not have to fill in all fields. The next block 
below the outline is the abstract from the friends’ list. The content of this abstract is 
unstable and subject to automatic change in accordance with a logic that remains unclear 
and is uncontrollable for the user.  
Below one can see the block with selected photos which were published by either 
the user or by his friends with the user tagged on the photos. The next section includes 
selected videos that the user has previously published on his timeline and that were saved 
in his profile. Photos, videos, notes (another type of text entries) as well as locations are 
saved in the digital archive connected to each Facebook profile. 
Below the videos there are few abstracts from different lists. Those lists include 
favorite movies, books, music, sports, etc. The lists demonstrate the circle of the user’s 
interests. The abstracts from these lists on the outline are also subject to the change 
uncontrollable for the user. The full versions of lists can be accessed through the links in 
the upper banner. The lists are collective products of all Facebook users: if one adds a 
new movie or sport art, they are added in the lists visible for all users, and the next users 
can choose the added interest from the list. This logic is very interesting in the light of 
collective aggregation of public knowledge. Next sections include groups, memberships 
and selected notes: text entries that are stored in a separate digital archive.  
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1.1.2. The newsfeed 
 
By loading the newsfeed the user accesses updates in his social network. 
(Bucher, 2012a,b) The newsfeed itself is a record of the posts published by his friends. 
The newsfeed is an information source and a communication tool . Each post - as well as 
posts made by the user himself - has three magic buttons: “like”, “share” and “comment”. 
They all embody the simplest types of social behaviour: expressing an appraisal, sharing 
information and participating in public conversations. When the user clicks on one of this 
buttons, his action becomes visible for other users. His friends can see what kind of posts 
he has given his appraisal to, what kind of posts he has commented on and what kind of 
conversation he has taken part in.  
 
 
Figure 3. Newsfeed. 
 
The posts can be sorted either in chronological order or by they popularity - the 
amount of attention of other users, which is counted as amount of likes, shares, and 
comments below the post. 
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The next Chapter discusses the importance and personal effects of the 
information disclosure in the personal profile and in the newsfeed.  
 
 
1.1.3. The control panel 
 
The control panel is located to the left from the newsfeed. The control panel 
includes communicative tools such as quick access to the private conversations (section 
“messages”), photos, and lists of friends, lists of groups, apps, interests, forthcoming 
events and pages.  
The user has a possibility to compile lists of friends and to sort his friends into 
groups. He can use lists either to sort posts on the newsfeed and read only posts left by a 
particular group of people, or set the visibility of his own posts, so that some friends can 
see it, whereas the others cannot.  
The public space of Facebook provides an opportunity to create and join 
different groups. A groups has a unique profile, similar to a personal profile, with a cover 
photo and a timeline, where each group member can post something that the others can 
discuss. Different groups have different aims, but they all enforce information exchange 
and are supposed to help people in finding like-minded people. Some groups have more 
pragmatic aims, for instance, to help people sell, buy or exchange something, find job, 
promote a brand etc. 
Apps or applications are small software packages integrated into Facebook. 
They can be games, dating tools etc.  
Right below the apps there is a headline “interests”, which includes the profiles 
of persons that the user is subscribed to. Some persons activate the button “subscribe” in 
their profiles if they want to let people receive their status updates without becoming 
friends with them. By accessing the list of such persons through the control panel, the 
user can see another newsfeed: with the posts published by selected persons. 
Events are happenings like parties, birthdays, concerts etc. that were created by 
other users in a form of an event page that plays a role of information release about the 
event as well as an online invitation. In the “events” section the user can see all 
forthcoming events that he has created or going to take part in.  
In the very end there is a list of pages that the user is subscribed to. Subscription 
in this case can be initiated by “liking” the page. By clicking on this section the user can 
access a newsfeed which includes only the posts from the pages in the list. Pages are very 
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similar to personal profiles. Pages are supposed to be profiles of organizations or public 
persons, like politicians, movie stars etc. In a nutshell, they are owned by those, who are 
interested rather in spreading information than in receiving it or communicating with 
friends.  
 
 
1.1.4. The size of the public 
 
Until now it was often mentioned that publishing posts enforces information 
spread. However, the information on Facebook does not flow freely and posts published 
by any user are rarely visible to all users. Information flows are restricted by settings that 
the user can adopt to his needs and his willingness to share and receive information. To 
each kind of information on his personal profile the user can apply an adjustable mode of 
publicity. The user can create lists of friends that can see his posts and share different 
posts, photo, videos, facts of his biography and other updates with selected groups of 
people. Completely public mode - making posts available for everyone, even for non-
users - is also possible and often used by public persons or organizations that are 
interested in attracting as many readers as possible. But ordinary people try to keep some 
kind of information private, sometimes including their names, and do not share their 
updates with big audiences.  
Therefore, privacy settings can be of two types: what I see and what the others 
can see in my profile. Privacy settings not only demarcate the intimate from the public, 
but also represent the mode of communication that the user prefers. This mode can be 
more or less open, oriented toward a narrow circle or toward a global audience.  
 
 
1.1.5. Conversations and visibility 
 
It does not matter which part of Facebook profile - personal or the newsfeed - 
the user is currently looking at, there is a small tool that is always there: the chat. It is 
located on the right side of the interface and shows the availability of the user’s friends 
for chatting. In other words, it shows who is online and who is not. The chat provides an 
access to the messages saved in the “messages” section. Two or more users can take part 
in the conversation.  
The chat is not only a way to talk to people, but also a way to show others his 
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availability for communication.  
 
1.2. Social reality behind the algorithms  
 
Few scholars have tried to systematize this abundance of buttons and tools as 
well as social interactions that the users take part in when they use particular sections of 
the technical interface (Kietzmann et al., 2011).  
A pragmatic approach to social networks postulates that these networks did not 
invent any new communication patterns, but rather provided a new technical platform for 
old ones. Dijck (2012: 165-166) gives a remark that social networks make some unspoken 
social rules public. For instance, the predecessor of Facebook, a local Harvard web site 
FaceMash, also created by Mark Zuckenberg (Dijck, 2012: 165), where the male students 
could rank the attractiveness of the female students by giving scores to the photos of the 
latter, has become a space for “publication and manipulation of heretofore informal 
conduct” (Ibid).  
Social networks are unique, but not because they offer new communication 
patterns or social rules and not because they mechanize any existing rules, but because 
each of them provides an online space for a limited set of social codes and communication 
patterns.  
 
 
1.2.1. Functionality and sociality 
 
Kietzmann et al. (2011) have tried to classify types of social behaviour that got 
new life by means of computer algorithms as well as to find out a scheme for comparing 
the effects of different social networks on the basis of the functions that are available for 
users. A function means that a part of the technical interface enables particular type of 
social behaviour to be performed at a social networking website.  
Kietzmann and his colleagues distinguish seven types of such functions. 
Different social networks (YouTube, Facebook, LinkedIn etc.) favour different functions, 
but provide all seven.  
1) Identity. The core of all social networks is a unique user profile that implies 
“conscious or unconscious “self-disclosure” that means that “users reveal their identity” 
and publish “information that portrays them” (Kietzmann et al, 2011: 243).  
2) Conversations. “Users communicate … for all sorts of reasons.” (Kietzmann 
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et al, 2011: 244).  
3) Information sharing is a way users “exchange, distribute, and receive content” 
(Kietzmann et al, 2011: 245). It is important that by the content we understand “objects 
of sociality their users have in common”, “objects that can mediate their shared interests”, 
as well as “personal objects - experiences and observations” (Ibid).  
4) Presence. “Users can know if others are accessible”, can know about their 
locations and travel experiences, about their online availability for conversations (Ibid).  
5) Relationships. This function implies that “two or more users have some form 
of association” (Kietzmann et al, 2011: 246) and includes maintenance of existing 
relationships as well as expansion of friendships networks.  
6) Reputation. In online social networks “users can identify the standings of 
others” (Kietzmann et al, 2011: 247). For this reason, the users actively try to enhance 
their online reputation, and publish content that shows them from the best perspective. 
7) Groups. “Users can form communities” (Ibid). Group membership can also 
refer to the fact that users “label their contacts, without these contacts being aware of it” 
(Ibid).  
 The authors emphasize that the functions are not mutually exclusive (Kietzmann 
et al., 2011: 243). It is easy to notice that, for instance, identity can be revealed in 
conversations and conversations can help in maintaining or expanding relationships. 
Identity and reputation are also inseparable. The differences between social networking 
websites lies in the leading position that one or another function occupies in the technical 
interface.  
 
 
1.2.2. Uses and gratifications of Facebook 
 
Of course, there are other attempts to systematize social interactions that users 
experience on Facebook. Communication science scholars have adopted some findings 
from psychology and elaborated the uses and gratifications theory  (Park et al., 2009) that 
is the most popular approach in Facebook studies (see, for instance, the literature review 
provided by Caers et al. (2013)). The main postulate of this theory is that people use 
media to satisfy their psychological or social needs and that people obtain gratifications 
from using particular media.  
As it follows from the same review of Caers et al. (2013), scholars mostly tested 
the assumptions of the U&G theory on relatively small samples (less than 500 users), with 
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the exception of the study conducted by Park et al. (2009), whose team worked with the 
sample of 1715 Facebook users.  
Park et al. (2009) have suggested their own classification of the motives for 
Facebook use. Their classification partly overlaps with those of Kietzmann et al. (2011). 
Kietzmann and his colleagues exploited qualitative methods and considered the entire 
social network as a unit of analysis. They compared few social networks to reveal the 
building blocks that are essential for each of them. Park and his colleagues have applied 
quantitative methods (survey, factor analysis) and considered Facebook user as a unit of 
analysis. Despite the differences in their research designs and in the main theoretical 
approach - sociological versus psychological - both research groups obtained similar 
results that makes these results trustworthy. 
Park and his colleagues differentiate between four groups of motives. The factor 
analysis has shown that such motives as seeking support, need for a group affiliation, 
conversations, relationship maintenance and expansion cohere strongly and represent the 
need for socialization (Park et al., 2009: 730). This factor has the biggest factor load and 
is the most important for Facebook use. The factor number two represents the 
entertainment character of Facebook. Users often turn to Facebook to have fun or kill 
time. The identity factor is only on the third place in this ranking. And the last one is the 
need for information, or information seeking factor (Ibid).   
The next Chapters will explain that, theoretically, political actors can customize 
the content that they publish on Facebook, so that it meets the motives of the users. The 
satisfaction of the users’ needs can make political messages more persuasive - which is 
dangerous in case of the right-wing extremist parties. 
 
 
Chapter 2. The political face of Facebook: users and parties 
 
 
2.1. Political activity on Facebook 
 
 
As was pointed out above, the elaborations of both Kietzmann’s and Park’s 
teams were very close to finding the connection between technical and social facets of 
Facebook. Nevertheless, they avoided to link particular features with motives for their 
use and did not employ technical vocabulary like the one that was described in the section 
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“Facebook: a map”. Their colleague Macafee (2013) has overcome this gap in his study 
of motivations for political Facebook activity. The research questions have explored the 
following types of activity (Macafee, 2013: 2769): 
 
a. posting ‘‘comments’’ on walls posts about political issues, campaigns, or 
candidates,  
b. posting links to political news stories,  
c. posting ‘‘status’’ updates about political issues, campaigns, or 
candidates,  
d. ‘‘liking’’ political causes, candidates, and parties. “ 
 
On the basis of the survey data from 209 respondents, all university students, 
Macafee has conducted factor analysis to reveal the incentives behind each type of 
political activity. We leave aside the question whether these activities can be treated as 
political ones. Let us be realistic and accept that, roughly speaking, the content creation 
is the only really possible activity on Facebook that can produce any artifacts. The main 
assumption of this Facebook study was that this content creation activity is meaningful 
for the users and perceived by them as a kind of political engagement.  
The factor analysis has brought interesting results. Unfortunately, Macafee did 
not make any theoretical elaborations based on them and simply listed the factors. For 
this reason, the terminology from two previous papers (Park et al., 2009; Kietzmann et 
al., 2011) will be employed to describe conclusions made by Macafee (2013: 2772). 
 
 (a) Commenting on what politicians have posted is driven by such needs as 
information sharing, information seeking (“Find out what others say about the 
comment”), influence over other users, need for entertainment. Identity as a need for self-
disclosure has a negative factor load and is never an incentive for posting ‘‘comments’’ 
to the updates of political actors.  
(b) Posting links to the content on political topics is motivated by the need for 
self-disclosure, the need of having conversations with others, and the need for 
entertainment. Information sharing is never an incentive for posting links (negative factor 
load).  
(c)  Posting a status update (news, comments to political events, own ideas) is 
inspired by the need for information sharing, entertainment, self-disclosure and the need 
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to meet like-minded people. 
(d) Liking a politician’s page is driven by the need for conversations and opinion 
exchange, for entertainment, and self-disclosure.  
Macafee completes his paper with the remark that the political engagement on 
Facebook is multidimensional (Macafee, 2013: 2773), and that diverse motivations cause 
different types of online engagement. It explains the failure of many studies (see, for 
instance, Gil de Zúñiga (2012); Vissers nad Stolle (2014); Warren and Wicks (2011); and 
the review of Boulianne (2009)) to prove any linear model that could predict the link 
between offline and online political engagement: there is no single reason why people use 
Facebook to participate in politics, as well as there is no single reason why people engage 
in offline political activities. 
 
 
2.2. Facebook identity and politics 
 
This section will discuss which role Facebook plays for their identity formation. 
It is important to understand the role of identity and information disclosure to support the 
significance of the data used in the present study. 
Part II will show that the right-wing extremists use online media actively and 
strategically to strengthen their influence. They utilize different online platforms or create 
pages on existing platforms, register profiles in social networks. By doing this, they try 
to provide their potential supporters with a space for conversations and information 
exchange, and give them a sense of group identity and group affiliation. The previous 
sections demonstrated that such strategies completely match with the essential motives 
that underlie Facebook use, and could attract new supporters or encourage old ones. These 
motivations are the trigger points that the right-wing extremists could potentially exploit. 
Moreover, since many right-wing organizations often try to deliver the content in an 
entertaining form (Glaser, 2009), they might be particularly interested in using the 
potential of Facebook.  
Bouvier (2012) in his study on the display of national identity on Facebook 
emphasizes that personal profiles and timelines are very important for self-presentation. 
Thanks to the variety of the privacy settings, self-presentation on Facebook can be 
directed towards particular audiences and, therefore, be selective: not all the self is 
presented to everybody. Self-presentation as a process includes all kinds of activities that 
are visible for other users. The timeline is of a special importance. The online artifacts 
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that were not created by the owner of the timeline, like links to the external content, online 
magazines, online news, videos, etc., play the same role as the content created personally 
by user (Bouvier, 2012: 41). These artifacts were not in the focus of the study, but it is 
easy to imagine that the adherents of the right-wing extremism do share the content 
created by the right-wing organizations on Facebook and that this kind of content is very 
important for them as a part of their self-presentation and helps them to maintain their 
online (nationalist) identity. Bouvier proves that Facebook can boost national identity. 
Hypothetically, it can enforce political engagement of the followers of radical nationalist 
movements, despite the influence of Facebook is not decisive for the outbreak of such 
movements.  
For his analysis of identity display Bouvier uses a categorization scheme 
provided by Machin and Van Leeuwen (2010) and Van Leeuwen (2013) ((Bouvier, 2012: 
45)) and known as social actor analysis. The national identity is constructed in a process 
of contrasting Self and Other, in-group and out-group members, or locals and outlanders. 
This perceived contrast between in-group and out-group legitimizes prejudice, hate and 
alienation of particular groups based on their nationality or ethnicity (or sometimes social 
status). This contrast can be emphasized as a part of self-presentation on the timelines by 
posting and re-posting the content describing foreigners or ethnic minorities. This is 
exactly the case of the German right-wing parties. They post a lot of news articles 
describing foreigners in the negative light. They choose these articles from the 
mainstream press and post links to such articles, available online. Users, who are 
subscribed to the pages of the right-wing parties, re-post this content on their timelines. 
Therefore, the results of the studies on personal right-wing attitudes can be a starting point 
for a research supported with Facebook data on the shared content from the mainstream 
press.  
Bryant (2008: 2) says that “discourse that dominates society” also dominates 
Facebook. It means that how users present their identity on Facebook is not completely 
an entertaining activity, but their real sense of identity and who they are and who they are 
not.  
Morin and Flynn (2014) have studied the Facebook page of the American Tea 
Party. They found that the Party provides users with a space for discussions and identity 
maintenance. The researchers applied the social identity approach to the content that was 
posted on the page by the Parties and its followers. Their results confirm that the identity 
maintenance on Facebook happens by emphasizing the differences between in-group and 
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out-group members.  
 
2.3. Political parties on Facebook: recent studies 
 
The scholars seem to be disappointed by oppositional politicians and political 
parties because the latter clearly underuse social media. Social media were seen as 
essential channel to reach voters and supporters. The fact that incumbents and ruling 
parties use Facebook more often and more strategically than the challengers, have 
surprised many (Goh & Pang, 2012; Gulati & Williams, 2013). The mainstream 
politicians rarely use social media outside the election campaigns (Elter, 2013). Besides, 
even those, who take social media seriously, do not try to make anything special out of it, 
but rather digitalize their offline behaviour (Elter, 2013; Larsson, 2015). There is a lack 
of dialogue between users and politicians, since the latter do not see such dialogue as their 
primary goal. Larsson (2015: 460) says in this regard that the social media scholars have 
moved from the innovation thesis to normalization thesis. This means that Facebook is 
not considered as providing any innovative opportunities for political engagement, but 
rather as a slightly different new format for the old communication patterns practiced by 
politicians.  
Not many scholars track down the motives of political parties. The scholars 
classify these motives - usually named “functions” (Goh & Pang, 2012; Larsson, 2015) - 
by means of the content analysis of the posts that parties publish on their Facebook pages. 
A function of the post can be described as a main purpose of the message, what the 
message was posted for, what kind of reaction is expected from the users. 
Interestingly, Morin & Flynn (2014) got the same results in their study of the 
users’ comments on the party’s posts. Tab.1. compares how different scholars define 
functions as well as how functions of users’ comments and parties’ posts coincide. 
On their Facebook pages politicians focus on informing, sending information, 
or, roughly speaking, on the one-way communication, despite some parties can maintain 
dialogue with voters (Elter, 2013). The emphasis on the informing function do not 
contradict with the users' motive of information seeking, but, by prioritizing this function, 
the parties loose many touching points with voters that they could have exploited. From 
Tab.1. one can see that only three functions are provided by both parties' posts and users' 
comments: expressing support for the party (or a candidate), attacking or criticizing 
opponents, and media surveillance.  
The studies in the Tab.1. were chosen for several reasons. In the first place, these 
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conceptions help to build the link between the Facebook studies and the studies on the 
right-wing communication online (see Part II). Moreover, these scholars elaborated clear 
and generalizable research designs; the content analysis had a clear aim and classified 
messages in accordance with their functions. Besides, the data evaluation was properly 
reported. 
The results show plainly, for what purpose the political parties may use 
Facebook as well as what distinguishes Facebook it from mass media, like, direct contact 
with the audience, interactivity, opportunity to monitor and criticize media coverage, stay 
in touch with users, create and elaborate the right-wing discourse in cooperation with 
them. 
 
 
Table 1. Functions of the Facebook posts published by politicians or political parties 
(Goh & Pang, 2012; Larsson, 2015; Morin & Flynn, 2014). 
Authors of the 
study, year of 
publication, pages 
Goh & Pang, 
2012: 32 
Larsson, 2015: 
461-463 
 
Morin & Flynn, 
2014: 122-127 
Country and time 
span 
General elections 
2011 in Singapore  
Norwegian party 
leaders on 
Facebook during 
the 2013 ‘Short 
campaign’  
Congressional 
elections 2010 in 
the USA, the Tea 
Party 
Functions Exclamation 
(expressing 
support for the 
party) 
 Encouragement of 
the candidate; 
encouragement of 
the party 
Raise issues 
(talking about 
elections issues) 
Informing 
(“providing policy 
statements and 
discussions” (2015: 
462)) 
 
Responding to the 
posts of others 
  
Media 
surveillance 
(discussing 
publications in the 
mainstream 
media) 
 Attacking media 
(criticizing 
publications in the 
mainstream media) 
Political 
participation 
(mobilizing 
voters) 
Mobilization  
(mobilizing voters) 
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Rally and 
campaign updates 
Campaign reports  
Other    
 Critique  
(on campaign 
opponents) 
Attacking the 
opponents, Obama, 
Republicans 
 Personal   
 Acknowledgements  
 
The results of these three studies also demonstrate few intersections. All three 
selected studies confirm that the case study as a research design can deliver generalizable 
results. This is another argument for the choice of the qualitative research design for the 
present study. 
 
 
Chapter 3. Political news on Facebook 
 
 
3.1. News consumption and information seeking on Facebook 
 
 
Beside the need for self-disclosure there is another option that political actors 
could use to influence the audiences on Facebook. This need is not the number one for 
the Facebook users, but it constitutes a good part of the Facebook activities. (Bitkom, 
2013; Mitchell et al. 2013; van Eimeren & Frees, 2014) It has two faces: active and 
passive consumption of information. Passive consumption refers to the consumption of 
news in the newsfeed. Active consumption refers to the information seeking (Park et al., 
2009).  
Hille and Bakker (2013: 668) compiled an overview of studies on the news 
consumption in social networks. These studies agree upon the popularity of Facebook as 
a source of news and a channel for sending out news (both social news and media news). 
Users enjoy exchanging news on social networks, since the latter provide opportunity to 
discuss issues. Conversations and opinion exchange are important for personal 
relationships. 
Depending on the examined segment of users, information seeking can either be 
an independent motive for Facebook use (Park et al., 2009), or a part of complex 
motivations that give meaning to the online engagement of users (Chen, 2015). Chen 
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(2015: 30) has shown on the example of female bloggers that information seeking on 
Facebook can be inseparable from such motives as information sharing, opinion 
exchange, learning, self-disclosure, and relationship maintenance. Chen performed a 
factor analysis of the survey data, and found out that all these motives constitute the factor 
with the biggest factor load. The results of Chen’s study correspond with those of Burke 
et al. (2011), who have shown that passive news consumption on Facebook is important 
for maintaining social capital since learning about others and staying informed about their 
updates helps users to get to know each other better. Therefore, information consumption 
definitely corresponds with socializing motives. 
Besides the news produced by the mainstream media, users like to exchange 
social news - information about their private updates - as well as to communicate their 
information needs on Facebook. Lampe et al. (2012) proved that users use Facebook to 
get information about “everyday uncertainties”, routine situations (Lampe et al., 2012: 1). 
By posting a question in a status update, users address their networks of friends asking 
them to provide information and advice. Users do perceive Facebook as a trustworthy 
source of information and recommendations because they believe in the high quality of 
social capital that Facebook mediates.  
 
 
3.2. Facebook users and mainstream media 
 
Relationships between Facebook users and mainstream media are twofold. 
Mainstream media use Facebook to reach new audiences and to low distribution costs 
(Hille & Bakker, 2013: 666). Facebook users use Facebook to give feedback to the 
mainstream media (Jacobson, 2013).  
Mainstream media of all kinds create Facebook pages and post links to their 
online editions. This enables media owners to promote their news outlets. Facebook users 
not only read news, but “like” and “share” it, thus, spreading the information among their 
Facebook friends and advertising the media for free. Hille and Bakker (2013: 664) call 
the latter process “audience distribution”. Facebook, they argue, has occupied a unique 
niche among different online platforms that have anything to do with news production 
and news distribution. In general, there are three types of such platforms. Citizen 
journalism refers to all kinds of online web sites that were created and are run by 
independent non-professional journalists. Participatory journalism refers to the online 
web sites that publish news created by professional journalists, but provide opportunity 
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for Internet users to discuss these articles anonymously and publicly, so that this user-
generated content is visible to all Internet users and becomes a part of the news coverage. 
Facebook represents a new form in this chain of evolutionary development of the news 
production. Facebook boosts news distribution among users and by users, and provides 
space for discussions with the difference that participants cannot stay anonymous (Hille 
& Bakker, 2013: 664-5). This classification of online news platforms by Hille and Bakker 
looks at Facebook users with little enthusiasm. The authors argue that users’ engagement 
in discussing professional content at any platform often harms the image of the news 
outlet and confuses other users, since the comments can be aggressive and the moderation 
takes time and causes additional personnel costs., if it takes place at all Besides, the 
journalists often hesitate to engage in conversations with users (Hille & Bakker, 2013: 5). 
Hille and Bakker conclude that Facebook users simply forward the information rather 
than create any new meaningful content. 
Jacobson (2013) delivered an opposite example. She studied a Facebook page 
owned by a popular TV show, and found out that the audience of the page has managed 
to influence agendas of the show. The topics that users addressed on Facebook page on 
the previous day, were adopted by the editors of the show as a topic for the TV discussion 
on the following day. Jacobson does not elaborate about the possible reasons of this 
“miracle” that could be merely the willingness of the producers to have the finger on the 
pulse of the target audiences and not the influential power of the latter.  
Regarding the printed press, Hille and Bakker (2013) found out that the social 
media strategy of the mainstream media has no correlation with the offline success of the 
news outlet. Together with the illustration provided by Jacobson (2013), it shows that the 
relationships between social media users (including Facebook users) and the mainstream 
media are rather chaotic and any effect exhibited by one side over the other is a matter of 
individual circumstances. 
 
 
3.3. Limitations of the news consumption on Facebook 
 
 
Describing the state of research Casteltrione (2014: 30) gives a list of Internet-
caused phenomena in mass communication. Information have become more specialized 
(the phenomenon of specialization), which means that the online content addresses 
narrow topics or only selected aspects of broader issues. Information is often oriented 
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towards specific audiences. This phenomenon is called segmentation. Single events or 
entire issues are delivered in such a manner that few aspects are emphasized while the 
entire picture remains unclear, so that the users receive only fragmented information from 
the story. This leads to the fragmentation of information. An online community, formal 
or informal, receives fragments that defend a particular perspective on the issue or event, 
whereas another community receives information that advocates another point of view. 
In the absence of any counterarguments, communities defend polar positions without any 
critical reflection. Often users are not keen on getting any counterarguments - to save 
themselves from cognitively dissonant information. Polarization of the Internet 
population in its radical form, when users sharing opposite opinions do not even try to get 
in touch and talk, is known as echo-chambers (Sunstein, 2001).  
Bosch’s (2013) study of politically engaged South African students reports 
intriguing findings. The youths have demonstrated a high level of trust in both social and 
mainstream media as news sources (Bosch, 2013: 123). Still, television is the most trusted 
source. More than a half of the respondents do use social media as news provider, but, 
actually, social media occupy the last place in the ranking of the trustworthiness. The 
respondents indicated mainstream media as their basic source of domestic and 
international news on all range of topics (Bosch, 2013: 124). The minor role that social 
media still play in satisfying information needs can be explained by their inability to 
provide full range of news - which is simply not their primary aim of existence. 
Casteltrione used a representative survey with respondents of all age categories to study 
political news consumption and political engagement. He found out that UK and Italian 
citizens prefer to consume political news via online media (although, not excluding the 
use of offline media), and that Facebook is the main source of political news for them 
(Casteltrione, 2014: 32).  
 There are two principal limitations for social media as news sources. First, it 
does not make sense for users to turn to social networks for information if the same 
information can be obtained through mainstream media that are still more habitual for 
many, still provide more professional content, and nowadays have free online editions. 
Social media can be a place for creation, discussion and consumption of the authentic 
news content, which has to do with the alternative political scene, like social movements, 
and with marginal identities, like LGBT or radical right (Bosch, 2013: 126-128). The 
point is that social media provide a limited range of news and, thus, can avert users from 
using it as the main news provider. 
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The second limitation comes from the users’ incapacity to process all the news 
that are offered online. Information overload that users experience (Polat, 2005) activates 
the mechanism of selective exposure (Brundidge, 2010). Users become selective in 
reading and read less and only what matches with their own opinion.  
Casteltrione elaborated a news selective exposure model that should capture 
peculiarities of news consumption on Facebook (Casteltrione, 2014: 43). In accordance 
with this model, selective exposure on Facebook can happen directly and accidentally. 
Direct way of exposure means that the users look for and consume information that 
coincides with their interests and opinions. Accidental way means that users become 
unintentionally exposed to information that they would not otherwise looked for. That 
happens, for instance, when users read the newsfeeds of their friends. Therefore, the 
duality of online selective exposure becomes clear: users choose, which news to read, as 
well as choose their gate keepers (or opinion leaders (Karlsen, 2015)), who will supply 
them with the news. As a result, “citizens may … become dependent on external 
institutions for organising and understanding such information” (Percy-Smith (1995) 
cited in (Casteltrione, 2014: 29)).  
 
 
Conclusion: why Facebook pages are important for radical political communication 
 
 
The first Part provided an overview of the Facebook interface and the studies 
that explore the social nature of it. The overview has shown that Facebook rather creates 
a new space for the social practices and communication patterns that have been existing 
for ages than to create a new type of social interactions that would be impossible offline. 
The studies on the motives of Facebook use have shown that these patterns include all 
routine encounters between people: talking, showing approval or disapproval, staying in 
touch, exchanging ideas, self-disclosure etc. Facebook has become an extension of the 
everyday life, and political activity also belongs here.  
Political activity on Facebook can take different forms. Since the present study 
is interested in the characteristics of the textual content, posted on Facebook, Part I further 
concentrated on the information seeking motive, and then switched the perspective from 
the users’ demand to what the political actors offer. The literature has shown that some 
parties can be really interested in providing users with the content that satisfies their 
informational and even social needs. This adds value to the role of Facebook in political 
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communication. And the parties do use Facebook to monitor mainstream media, and often 
re-post news articles that their voters can discuss online (see Tab.1.). 
It becomes pretty obvious that Facebook can help political parties in finding new 
touching points with their voters (see Tab.2.). Facebook can be a good chance for 
oppositional parties, who exhibit little influence over the mainstream media. If parties 
properly use the functionality of Facebook, they can satisfy the needs that drive audiences 
to use this social network, and that will create a positive connection with the party. This 
is a real momentum for political actors in general, since traditional media cannot provide 
users with anything similar. The parties do not even need to do much to boost the 
sympathy of the audience. They just have to post some content and from time to time 
revive discussions on the page.  
The function of providing users with the news is integrated with the community 
management and can be a direct way to influence political attitudes of the users. By 
“community” one should understand all users that subscribe to the Facebook page of a 
political party, and who regularly read posts. They get the feeling of being a part of a 
specific community, since they not only passively receive news, but can actively discuss 
it and meet like-minded people (not necessarily ever seeing them offline). The users 
satisfy their need in conducting conversations with those that have similar opinion. The 
Facebook pages of the right-wing radical actors can become for many the only place to 
talk about stigmatized issues and express their opinions that are not tolerated in the 
society. By being a part of the community, the user enhances his feeling of identity. The 
Facebook page of the party provides an opportunity for self-disclosure, since by liking 
the page and by communicating his believes the user discloses his self-image which is 
one of the main drives for using social media.  
Facebook can help radical parties to overcome public ignorance. Still, it is not a 
universal cure against political weakness. Facebook pages can be very popular and 
influence public opinion directly by spreading information within the so-called 
counterpublics: communication systems that exist independently from the mainstream 
media and can produce extensive amount of authentic content. Social networks and 
Internet communication in general are the main building blocks of such communication 
spaces. But success in online communication is not a key to political success. If the radical 
party has a weak and loose structure, or faces financial problems, then successful online 
communication can only create expectations that won't be satisfied, and this will cause 
even more disappointment and decline in support.  
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Table 2. Users’ motives for using Facebook, and how political parties and traditional 
media can satisfy those needs. (own conception based on Goh & Pang, 2012; Larsson, 
2015; Morin & Flynn, 2014)  
Users' motives for using Facebook How parties can satisfy this 
need by launching a Facebook 
page 
Can traditional media 
satisfy this need 
community feeling of belonging 
to a community 
party can post some content, 
which users can evaluate and 
discuss; users can exchange 
opinions and ideas, communicate 
with each other 
 
meeting like-minded 
people 
no 
conversations discussing issues no 
meeting like-minded 
people 
no 
identity feeling of identity, 
understanding who 
you are 
party identification even without 
official memebership 
yes 
self-exposure users "like" the page or share the 
content that was posted on the 
timeline, and it becomes visible 
for other users; users take part in 
discussions and display their 
feelings and beliefs 
no 
relationships  staying in touch with new 
acquaintances 
no 
entertainment  information in an entertainng 
form helps to "kill time" 
yes 
information 
seeking 
information about 
political parties 
media survaillence (re-posts from 
the news outlets) or authentic 
content 
yes 
political news yes 
news about local 
community 
yes 
 
Media surveillance as a function of social media has a potential to alter the 
relationships between politics and media. Politicians got a new power over the media: 
they select media coverage that appears on their Facebook pages and can choose media 
coverage that favours them rather than criticizes. Or, vice versa, they can choose articles 
that show them in the negative light, and destroy the argumentation of the journalist 
without the latter ever being aware of it.  
Facebook pages can also provide radical political parties an indirect access to 
political communication by enabling manipulations with the content published by the 
mainstream media. The radical parties can challenge the mainstream political discourse 
by spreading their own interpretations of the news coverage, and selecting a very specific 
news coverage. 
The next Part will outline the peculiar characteristics of the radical 
communication online paying special attention to the German right-wing scene, 
nationalist, racist and other right-wing online communities worldwide. 
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Part II. Radical communication online and offline 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Part II aims to bridge the peculiarities of the right-wing scene with the role of 
the social media in political communication. The present Chapter will first narrow the 
discussion, and try to find out, what would be the niche of Facebook pages in the right-
wing communication. The previous Part has outlined the motives of political use of 
Facebook, and how political news consumption on Facebook differ from the consumption 
of political news from the mainstream media. The present Part will demonstrate, what 
drives users of the radical web-sites to spend their time online, and what kind of 
gratification the online media provide to them. This is necessary to understand, wheather 
Facebook can play a significant role in the right-wing radical communication.  
The previous Part has touched the relationships between social media, traditional 
media, and political parties that took a shape of the media surveillance. The present Part 
will deal with the relationships between traditional media and the right-wing scene, 
outline the local German context, and explain, why the online communication is not just 
a supplement for the offline one, but sometimes a substitute for it and the only channel 
for the right-wing actors to speak up. From this point of view, social media become an 
integral part of the communication strategy of the right-wing parties. The present Part 
explains, why it would be a fruitful approach to focus on the media surveillance and 
refrain from an attempt to embrace all functions and types of the content that is posted on 
Facebook pages.  
Another aim of this Part is to place the research question of the present study 
into the historical development of the studies on the right-wing communication. The 
review will show that the right-wing actors used to be among the earliest adopters of 
different innovations in communication, and supposedly have a good understanding of 
the potential of the social media. 
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Chapter 1. Right-wing extremism and traditional mainstream media 
 
 
Before starting to discuss the online presence of the right-wing political actors, 
it is necessary to address in details their relationships with traditional mainstream media, 
because these relationships are different from those between the media and the 
mainstream parties. The present section aims to show how the mainstream media depict 
right-wing actors and their political agendas.  
The literature provides four possible answers to this question. By paying 
attention to the right-wing actors, the media help them to break into the public discourse, 
even if the tone of the coverage does not favour them (Yilmaz, 2007). Describing the case 
of Denmark 1986 and how a single right-wing actor managed to get public attention, 
Yilmaz emphasizes that this happened in the first place thanks to the personal charisma 
of the Danish right-wing leader. Besides, the media did not popularize the right-wing 
argumentation, but rather granted both right-wing actors and their opponents a space to 
express their opinions on the immigration law referendum as well as an opportunity to 
criticize each other. Unfortunately, this study does not test the influence of the media 
coverage on the attitudes to the right-wing leaders among the population.  
That is what the study of Bos et al. (2011) does. Moreover, the authors consider 
the media coverage as multi-dimensional. Concentrating on the parties’ leaders, Bos et 
al. have measured the amount of media attention, the populist rhetoric and the 
professionalism of the leaders as depicted by the Dutch media, as well as the effects of 
the media on the audience perceptions of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
respective leaders. As a result, the scholars have discovered that the role of the media is 
ambiguous. The more often the right-wing leaders appear in the press, the more effective 
(as politicians) they are perceived. Of course, the more professionalism is assigned to 
them, the more effective they appeared to the respondents. On the other hand, if the media 
coverage was accompanied with the populist rhetoric, such as anti-elitist and anti-
establishment arguments, it had a negative effect on the audience perceptions of the right-
wing politicians (Bos et al., 2011: 193).  
The media can promote a positive image of the right-wing actors, and they can 
aid the growth of the right-wing movements by creating a right-wing-extremism-friendly 
discourse (Brosius & Esser, 1995; Jung, 2000; Udris, 2011). Possibly a general media 
discourse with prevailing immigration related agendas together with the emphasis on the 
problems of unemployment etc. may fuel xenophobia and boost support for the right-
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wing parties (Udris, 2011). A specific vocabulary on the related issues may encourage 
negative stereotypes (Jung, 2000; Gorp, 2005; Nickels, 2007), and  the media coverage 
of a single row of the right-wing violence that was not reported in an enough critical and 
reflective manner can be perceived by the audience as a sign of legitimacy of the violence  
(Brosius & Esser, 1995). The direct link between the news coverage and the outbreaks of 
the right-wing violence or electoral success of the parties has never been confirmed, but 
the media create a communicative opportunity structure by assigning high level of 
urgency and negativity to the immigration issues (Udris, 2011). That can be a moment 
when the demand for the radical political solutions emerges, and the right-wing parties 
can get public attention and therefore reach new potential voters. 
Nevertheless, the media have its own logic and follow their specific principle of 
news selection and issue interpretation. These principles are known as gate-keeping and 
framing. Framing of the news coverage is a dynamic process. For instance, whereas the 
study of Bos et al. (2011) has found that in 2006 the Dutch newspapers included the 
populist rhetoric in the coverage of the right-wing leaders, the study of Akkerman (2011), 
who examined the Dutch media coverage in 2007-2008, has not confirmed the presence 
of any populist rhetoric. Brosius and Eps (1995) have shown that the media can only 
provide a very distorted portrait of the right-wing scene, because the media tend to use 
stereotypes and follow trends that emerge as a result of a very few key events from the 
right-wing violence.  
The most enduring stereotype about the right-wing parties is a stereotype of "the 
controversal ousider" (Hartmann, 2006; Schafraad et al., 2012: 356; Weiß & Spallek, 
2002). For instance, the Flemish media have stigmatized the right-wing actors in the long 
run (1987-2004), but nowadays show them in a variety of roles and provide a rational 
critique on them (Schafraad et al., 2012). British and Dutch media show the right-wing 
actors in the negative light, but the variety of perspectives allow the readers to build an 
independent opinion on the causes and consequences of the right-wing extremism 
(Akkerman, 2011; Bos et al., 2011). Danish media grant everybody equal right to speak 
up, and a charismatic right-wing leader has a good chance to get public support through 
the media coverage (Yilmaz, 2007).  
The mass media in common can indirectly help the right-wing actors by creating 
discursive opportunities for them (Udris, 2011) as well as by reporting negatively about 
migration and asylum-related issues (Jung, 2000; Avraham et al., 2000; Nickels, 2007; 
Brosius & Eps, 1995; Gorp, 2005). News coverage of xenophobic assaults and related 
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events is no way a simple question, and can easily fuel anti-immigration debates (Esser 
et al., 2002). 
The German media often did not take the right-wing extremism enough 
seriously, and used to make sensations from the events in the right-wing scene (Cippitelli 
& Schwanebeck, 2004). The German media reflect poorly on the complexity of the 
phenomenon, and totally marginalize the right-wing scene by depicting the actors as 
criminals and full outsiders (Hartmann, 2006). Hartmann not only finds this unethical and 
unprofessional, but also dangerous for the public awareness of the right-wing violence 
(Hartmann, 2006). The weakness of the media critique appears as exploitation of 
stereotypes (Hartmann, 2006), and in the depiction of the right-wing party leaders as 
unqualified politicians or in the reluctance to provide them an active role in the news 
coverage (Weiß & Spallek, 2002).  
Whether or not media do help the right-wing actors to get more public weight, 
the right-wing leaders in Germany rarely play an active role in the mainstream news 
coverage, and cannot defend their political standpoints or raise their issues, even though 
the anti-immigration sentiments appear in the press from time to time, regardless of the 
news coverage of the right-wing scene. Since the right-wing actors do not have access to 
the public discourse, like immigration etc., they are forced to use other opportunities, such 
as World Wide Web and social networks, to fill in this gap.  
 
 
Chapter 2. Right-wing extremism online 
 
 
The aim of this overview is to corroborate the proposition that the right-wing 
movement uses or even creates an alternative public sphere as a response to the exclusion 
from the mainstream public discourse. This is necessary to bridge the exclusion and the 
role that the Facebook communication plays for the right-wing parties. The following 
review demarcates the niche that the Facebook could possibly occupy in the 
communication strategy of the right-wing parties. The review examines, what kind of 
features the online platforms can provide and which they cannot. Depending on this, the 
main drive for the Facebook use by the parties should become clearer. 
German scholars prefer hermeneutic methods to study the right-wing online 
communication. Single studies have an exploratory character, and either simply describe 
content of the web platforms, or try to match it with the context of the right-wing 
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extremism in Germany. Quantitative data plays only supporting role. The American 
tradition concentrates on testing theories and causalities, thus, giving preference to the 
quantitative methods and experimental research design. But together the findings of two 
traditions provide a fruitful picture of the Internet use by the right-wing scene. The 
German tradition focuses on right-wing extremism itself and how online media are used 
by the activists or parties, and, therefore, on actors of the right-wing scene; whereas the 
American tradition focuses on media, and their functions in the context of the right-wing 
scene.  
 
 
2.1. Right-wing extremism online: American tradition 
 
 
The American scientific tradition often uses the term “hate”, which often masks 
a confrontation between black and white, like the ideology of white supremacy or, simply 
speaking, racism as well as black separatism. Both ideologies promote separation of black 
and white races. “Hate” can also refer to anti-Semitic and Zionist, Islamist and anti-
Islamist sentiments.  
The literature reviewed here was collected continuously during the year 2014 
using data bases EBSCO Host and Science Direct. The search terms included 
combinations of the key words “right-wing extremism” (delivered almost no results), 
“hate”, “white supremacy”, “White Aryan Resistance” and the key words “online”, “e-
mail”, “blog”, “Facebook” and “Twitter” in the “abstract-title-key words”-fields. The 
combination of “hate” and “online” provided most of the results. The reference list of 
each paper was also checked to find other relevant studies.  
The literature can be divided into four categories: papers investigating radical 
identity in the online communities; papers investigating radical discourse as an instrument 
to maintain radical identity online, with both branches using content analysis; the 
literature studying persuasiveness of radical messages on the level of individual 
perception, that makes use of experimental design; and the literature that tries to 
conceptualize the radical online communication as a specific case of the counterpublics.  
The first branch of the literature is based upon the symbolic convergence theory, 
developed by Bormann (1972), who studied communication in small groups, and 
explored the mechanism of bargaining a common understanding of the social reality. 
Members of a community discuss their experience and create mythos to grant meaning to 
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it. The content of mythos, or phantasies, as Bormann called them, is dependent on the 
social context, in which the members find themselves.  
In 2003 Duffy (2003) published a paper about online communities representing 
four different “hate” ideological streams. She employed symbolic convergence theory to 
check, whether the community members managed to build a shared identity through 
symbolic interactions and creations of utopians. Duffy conducted a thematic (qualitative 
content) analysis of the community communication and offered an interested insight into 
the mythology of the international hate groups and their argumentation of the dominance 
of some social groups over others. Duffy splitted all communities into the following 
categories: those advocating fairness and justice (a pride of white people for being white 
is considered by the opponents as hate and that is discriminating) and those supporting 
their arguments with natural order and subordination of races. 
In the same 2003 Gerstenfeld et al. (2003) published another paper with a huge 
sample of 157 different “hate”-web-sites. Like in the study of Duffy (2003), the “analysis 
suggested that extremists appear to be using the Internet to create a collective identity” 
(Gerstenfeld et al., 2003: 40), but the authors also tried to classify this online 
communication alongside the functional and representational dimensions. Even though 
the results and the procedures of the content analysis are weakly reported and the 
categories, developed from it, are pretty much simplified, the paper certainly contributes 
to the understanding of the extremist communication online. For instance, the authors 
found that some content tend to provide “scientific” support for the racist arguments, 
whereas other content can directly advocate violence or contain racist slogans etc. This is 
the first link between representation and function in the research on the online extremist 
communication.  
In addition to the symbolic convergence theory, the social identity theory 
(Turner & Oakes, 1986) helped scholars to study a shared identity in online communities. 
The theory says that communities have two targets, self-enhancement and self-
distinctiveness (Douglas et al., 2005: 69), and that the communities can employ different 
strategies to achieve these goals (Ibid). All strategies can be described in two main 
categories: social creativity and social competition. Social creativity means that a 
community promotes among the members an image of their superiority in relation to other 
communities. This strategy can involve, for instance, white supremacism or racism. 
Social competition means an appeal to conflict and violence. Douglas et al. expected to 
find a prevalence of the social competition strategies, but the findings were opposite. 
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Studying the skinhead communities online, Campbell (2006) revealed that the 
Internet is not an extension of the offline identity, but rather a space where a particular 
(skinhead) identity is negotiated. This negotiation means “an attempt to create permanent 
contours between Self and Other” (Campbell, 2006: 290) and to formulate an “axis of 
difference” (Ibid). Campbell talks about two discursive strategies that sustain the logic of 
separatism and exclusion: “the demonization of the Other (making the Self possible by 
implicit contrast)” and “[the] promotion of the unique Self (making the Other negative by 
implicit contrast)” (Campbell, 2006: 273).  
How does the negotiation of a unique identity shape the entire communication 
of the online radical communities? McNamee et al. (2008; 2010) presented the most 
precise classification scheme of the hate groups’ communication online, linking the 
content of the message to the function of the message. A similar classification scheme 
was independently developed by Goh and Pang (2012) in their study of parties’ use of 
Facebook for campaigning purposes (see Tab.1.). The online hate groups demonstrate 
three layers in their communication strategies that are similar to the levels of abstraction 
in the right-wing ideology (Lenk, 2005): an ideal, legitimizing their hate, advocacy and 
education as their values and indictment as their tactic plan (McNamee et al., 2008) (see 
Tab.3.). 
Whereas the previous scholars have collected the data from the entire open web, 
Chau and Xu (2007) switch the interest from the WWW to the more personalized media: 
the blogosphere. The researchers did not concentrate on the thematic analysis of 
communication, but they compiled the rating of the biggest communities, so that it is 
possible for other scholars to make a conclusion about the dominating discourse of the 
anti-Black groups. Besides, Chau and Xu applied the network analysis and revealed the 
structure of communities. Supporting their research questions from the theory and 
findings of Gerstenfeld et al. (2003), they operationalized collective identity as network 
parameters, such as network density, clustering coefficient etc. That helped to reveal 
communication patterns within the communities. In their visualizations Chau and Xu 
(2007) show step by step that the communities tend to have several opinion leaders and 
two main poles with minor independent groups outside them.  
There are two more papers that must be mentioned in the “hate” literature 
review. Both papers are dealing with the individual level of “hate” analysis and utilize an 
experimental design. 
Glaser et al. (2002) investigated motives of ethnic violence and concentrated on 
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the perception of the threat of genetic incursion as one of such motives. The researchers 
manipulated messages on one of the racist web sites. They developed nine types of 
messages that are placed around two dimensions: thematic dimension, or an issue, and 
level-of-influence-dimension, ranging from local to national. For instance, regarding to 
an issue “interracial marriage” three levels of anticipation of the phenomenon are 
possible. A fake forum author can post a message about an interracial marriage as a 
personal, local or national issue. The scholars measured the level of advocating violence 
as a response of the forum participants to a particular type of message. The author found 
out that the issue of interracial marriage, in comparison to in-migration and labor market 
issues, provokes the highest level of aggression. The messages, compiled in a personal 
manner also got the highest rate of response. 
Lee and Leets (2002) supported their hypotheses from the dual processing 
theories, namely, from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Lee & Leets, 2002: 931). 
Similarly to Glaser et al. (2002), the authors developed different type of messages 
distributed alongside three dimensions. The messages differ in their receptivity 
(negatively inclined, neutral, predisposed), narrative (low vs. high) and explicitness 
(implicit vs. explicit) (Ibid). The messages were posted online. Responses from the forum 
participants were collected and coded. The persuasiveness and amount of 
counterarguments were measured. While the effects of highly narrative and implicit 
messages and low narrative and explicit messages clearly differ, the persuasiveness of the 
former is higher only right after the publication and the persuasiveness of the latter is 
lower, but has more long lasting effects. 
Contrary to the identity and persuasiveness studies, the conceptualization 
attempts inspired by Habermas (1992) and deliberative democracy theories (see, for 
instance, Dryzek (2002) have not demonstrated any significant generalizable findings so 
far, and were reluctant in developing a universal research design. Since all democracy 
theories have rather normative than positive character, the empirical investigations based 
on different democracy theories often start with contradicting assumptions. For this 
reasons, this branch of literature is addressed here very briefly.  
For example, Cammaerts (2009) discusses how online radical communities pose 
a threat to deliberative democracy by rejecting the compromise as a milestone of the latter. 
Soriano (2011) takes an antagonistic normative perspective and considers conflict as an 
essential part of deliberative democracy and with his empirical data - extreme discourse 
on the Muslim minorities in the Philippines blogosphere - proves the merit of political 
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confrontation and polarization of views in the online public spheres. The confrontation 
gives minorities a minimal access to the formation of public opinion, argues Soriano. 
The literature on the radical communication online is characterized by 
contradictory findings and an absence of a clear research program. Although the previous 
contributions to the hate groups communication online offer interesting insights and 
demonstrate methodological diversity and creativity, they provide little guidelines for 
studying highly organized and institutionalized extremist groups - political parties, that 
have a rationale rather different from the rationale of informal or even officially registered 
communities, since the parties take part in the elections and they have to fit their messages 
into the logic of political campaigning. Nevertheless, the summary from Tab. 3 and the 
contribution of McNamee et al. (2010) can be directly used for the content analysis of the 
online communication of the right-wing extremist parties.  
The Tab. 4 outlines the findings discussed in this section (Lee & Leets, 2002; 
Glaser et al., 2002; Douglas et al., 2005; Duffy, 2003; Cammaerts, 2009; Campbell, 2006; 
Soriano, 2011).  
 
Table 3. Themes of the Hate Group Communication Online (McNamee et al., 2010: 
265). 
Core 
category 
Subcategory Definition 
Education Reinterpreting history Reporting 
news  
Citizenship 
Legacy 
Messages pertaining to the educational aim of the 
group (e.g., beckoning members to act as teachers 
to others), and featuring an expressly educational 
tone (e.g., clarifying negative perceptions; 
disseminating positive information). 
Participation Waging battle 
Duty and solidarity Publicity 
Activism 
Messages that promote association with the group 
and involvement in political and societal affairs. 
Subtle and strategic stipulations for participation in 
these groups and activities are central to this theme 
as well. 
Invocation Anointed 
Superiority 
Obedience 
Virtue 
Messages that allude to and explain the group’s 
distinctiveness, authority, and influence over other 
groups as a natural right based on their divine 
appointment by god. 
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Core 
category 
Subcategory Definition 
Indictment Exposing the government 
Demonizing media/ 
entertainment industry 
Denouncing similar groups 
Messages centered on blaming other groups for 
causing or perpetuating their group’s negative 
status. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Dimensions of the content analysis in the scholarly literature on the right-wing 
extremism online. 
 
Author and year Dimension of analysis (representational 
level) 
Lee & Leets, 2002 Narrativeness: 
 low vs. high 
 explicit vs. implicit 
 
Glaser et al., 2002  Thematic; 
 Level of consternation (personal, local or 
national)  
Duffy, 2003  Social competition; 
 Social creativity 
Douglas et al., 2005  Injustice argumentation; 
 Natural order argumentation. 
  
 
The findings of these studies, especially those of McNamee et al. (2010), deliver 
a valuable input for the present research. In the first place, they provide an example of 
application of the grounded theory methods. The study of McNamee et al. (2010) shows 
how the themes of communication can perform different functions: it is an example of a 
content analysis that goes beyond the obvious meaning of the text. The Part on the right-
wing extremism will prove the significance of this finding, and show that the right-wing 
ideology has few pillars, each of them playing a different role. McNamee and her 
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colleagues give an example of the categories that are typical for the right-wing 
communication online. The study of Douglas et al. (2005) also reflects a division between 
ideological pillars as different kinds of arguments advocating specific attitudes, where the 
attitudes are overarching concepts that remains stable over time and across countries.  
Experimental studies (Tab. 4) can also be a source for the coding categories for 
the future content analysis. For instance, the study of Lee&Leets (2002) confirmed that 
the content can differ not only thematically, but also demonstrate differences on the 
“higher” level, like differences in the structure of the narratives and their complexity.  
The overview of these studies shows that the data analysis can take quite 
different directions. To choose the proper one, the local context has to be discussed 
closely before the data analysis will follow. The next section will address the German 
right-wing extremism online. 
 
 
2.2. Right-wing extremism online: German studies 
 
 
This section discusses different aspects of the right-wing online communication 
in Germany, including online platforms, target audiences, popular themes, networking 
potential of the Web, and few theoretical elaborations around the issue.  
Online editions of the right-wing printed press differ in the extent of their 
comprehension of the ideological diversity. Some magazines have a narrow focus, like 
Zündel that publishes only revisionist and anti-Semitist articles, whereas some are huge 
platforms for authors from all possible ideological streams, for instance, Junge Freiheit 
and Thule-Netz. Regarding their networking potential, there are two tendencies. Some 
online editions emerged as a result of the international cooperation, for example, 
Deutsche Heidnische Front. Some of them provide networking opportunities by 
incorporating links to the web-sites of the right-wing parties and associations, like Junge 
Freiheit (Tab. 5, own summary based on Bösche (2001)).  
The variety of topics contrasts vastly with a poor media coverage of the right-
wing extremism. But the recent check of these web resources has revealed that many of 
them do not exist anymore2. One should expect that the right-wing actors would miss 
                                                
2 
 The web-sites were accessed by the author last time on 13.03.2016. 
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these communication channels and try to replace it with another medium, maybe, with 
Facebook, or, maybe, that Facebook fun pages caused their degradation. 
In Germany, a need for the theoretical elaboration on the radical communication 
online has emerged from the practical task of youth protection.  The concept of “the 
experience world” (Erlebniswelt) were developed to embrace the empirical phenomenon 
of the right-wing communication online (Glaser, 2009). The German scholars have 
always been primarily interested in eliminating the influence of right-wing extremism on 
the vulnerable youth and preventing the latter from confronting with the online content, 
created by the radical activists or associations. For this reason, few state-funded 
organizations permanently monitor the Internet and prepare reports on the growth of the 
hate web, and check, whether any content should be treated as dangerous or even be 
banned for conflicting with legislation. These reports are available online at  - the biggest 
German database on the right-wing online presence. Many scholars have been using the 
reports of Jugendschutz as empirical data, as Glaser and the contributors of the 
compilation from 2009 did (Glaser, 2009). 
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T
able 5. M
ost popular topics in the online editions of the G
erm
an right-w
ing printed press (ow
n figure based on B
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The compilation of Glaser (2009) starts with the introduction of the Erlebniswelt 
concept (Pfeiffer, 2009a). The right-wing scene in Germany has developed a highly 
professional strategy to reach the youth, and successfully remains visible in all possible 
niches that can be attractive to youths: Internet, music, alternative cultures. Right-wing 
extremism as an experience world and as a youth culture offers young people exactly what 
they miss on their way into the adult world: orientation and identity. Since many people 
cannot find it by themselves, the right-wing actors rush to give it in the form of a simple 
world view based on the dichotomy “friend-or-foe”. The experience world of the right-
wing extremism offers a strong in-group identity, simple and clear values as well as the 
feeling of being different from the adults (Pfeiffer, 2009a: 37). The distinctiveness is also 
supported through specific communication codes and clothes (Pfeiffer, 2009a: 37-38). 
Describing the mechanism of the influence, Pfeiffer points out that in this Erlebniswelt the 
leisure activities are incorporated with political messages, and through the emotionally 
charged affective components they form particular political attitudes (Pfeiffer, 2009a: 37). 
The experience world has become an important mobilizing instrument for the right-wing 
scene. 
The web-based part of “the experience world” has undergone different stages, 
following the development of the technical innovations. The infrastructural developments 
have had social impact. Pfeiffer, talking about the way the right-wing scene has been used 
communication innovations for decades (Pfeiffer, 2009b), and comparing the US and 
Germany, emphasizes how the technical evolution started with e-mail subscriptions and 
matured into the complete multimodal platforms that enabled a shift from the narrow 
communication circles between insiders to the autonomous and well-structured counter-
publics with unlimited audiences. On the example of the now vanished big German right-
wing web-platform Thule-Netz, Pfeiffer shows how the right-wing actors can unite their 
efforts and almost overcome the marginalization and exclusion from the media and reach 
almost full autonomy. He defines four main important functions of the platform. Thule-
Netz used to be an alternative public sphere, which consolidates all right-wing actors, and 
helps them to promote their discourses. It helped to build an international network, to reach 
new audiences, and to avoid ban because of the anonymity of the users and moderators 
(Pfeiffer, 2009a, 2009c).  
Since the Internet offers opportunity to exchange any type of content, it has 
become closely tied up with the other part of the Erlebniswelt: the music industry (Wörner-
Schappert, 2009). Music videos are the widespread content of the right-wing online 
platforms. Music provides the youth with identity they look for. Through the lyrics they 
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learn the right-wing ideology that is served in the form of simplistic stereotypes. Young 
adults are proud of sharing knowledge about unique symbols and codes that ordinary 
people cannot understand. They get the feeling of belonging to a selected community, 
whereas the right-wing actors misuse music to propagate hate and violence. 
The works of Bösche and Glaser provide examples of the vague demarcation line 
in the online right-wing extremism research. The compilations are contrast in the formats, 
audiences, and contents that they study. Bösche looks at the professional media, that are 
aimed at the adepts of the right-wing ideology, and that offer a professional informative 
content. Glaser and his colleagues looks at the less formal formats, with the youth as a 
target audience and an entertaining-educating content as their product. But what these 
studies have in common, is that they concentrate on the thematic dimension of the right-
wing online presence, whereas there is a branch of the scholarly literature that is more 
attentive to the functional dimension, with few studies purposefully comparing technical 
features of different platforms and elaborating a theory that can explain technical 
preferences of the single actors. 
Proceeding with the youth as the target audience, Glaser and Schneider (2012, 
2013) talk about the qualitative changes that the Web 2.0. has brought. In comparison to 
the simple interface of the Web 1.0., the Web 2.0. has delivered the opportunity to use, for 
instance, the prohibited graphic symbols as emotional stimuli. The interactive character of 
the Web 2.0. that also enables a user-generated content facilitated coordination of the right-
wing scene. The culmination of the technical development - online social networks - helped 
to enhance the collective identity through the personal involvement of users 
(Mitmachnetz). The social networks become the platforms for the well-prepared public 
campaigns. The multi-modality allows to use formats that can ease information 
consumption and information processing, like videos, pictures etc. 
Busch (2008b) examines three popular social networks to show their potential for 
the right-wing communication online. He demonstrates how all three contribute to the 
discussion over the reinterpretation of the World War II. The Wikipedia provides space for 
long entries that require thinking and rational reflection; the YouTube allows to post videos 
of the right-wing music bands that explain the world history in short messages; and the 
social network Studi-VZ that helped to find like-minded people. The followers of the right-
wing movement do not hesitate to exchange contacts in the Web, even though other 
platforms, and not only in social networks (Pfeiffer, 2009c). 
Probably, the most important function of the online media is their mobilizing 
potential (Pfeiffer, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Brinkmeier, 2012; Busch, 2008a). From this point 
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of view, the online media help the followers to stay updated about street rallies and other 
events. Furthermore, on the example of the eCampagning, Busch (2008a) has shown that 
the identification with the movement boosts the motivation to participate, and the online 
media help to maintain such identity, because of the symbolic density of the content, or, 
the other way round, because of the reduction of the content to the small and short 
information pieces (Busch, 2008a: 445). The eCampagning helps to bypass the gate-
keeping role of the mainstream media (Ibid). 
Brinkmeier (2012) formalizes ideological stream as independent variable, 
connectivity (the connectedness of different media or their networking potential) and 
mobilizing potential as dependent variables, and compares web-sites, blogs, guest books 
and discussion forums of the German right-wing movement. He discovers that the HTML-
format (a web-site) is the most popular format, except for the anti-Semitic organizations. 
The second popular one is the blog format. The most active groups on the Web are neo-
nationalist and revisionist. The online presence is mainly used to mobilize, inform, and 
share personal sentiments and re-interpretations of the history. All platforms do not seem 
to provide an interactive environment, Brinkmeier argues. 
The study approaches a big data set, but provides a few elaborations. Why the 
HTML-format is number one only until it comes to the anti-Semitism? Because of the 
higher stigmatization of the theme? Besides, the author does not provide any analysis of 
the connectivity and mobilizing potential of different web platforms, depending on the 
organizational type, and not on the ideological stream. Even the differences between 
platforms is hardly explained. Moreover, the chosen platforms do not really differ in their 
technical features, what makes the comparison almost meaningless. HTML, guest books, 
forums and blogs are all consist of the long text entries (long if compared, let’s say, with 
the Twitter format), with no preview picture (like, for instance, on Facebook), but with 
possibility to embed a link or a video or enclose a picture in the main body of the message. 
The only difference, is that simple HTML-pages suggest little user-generated content, 
whereas, guest books, forums and blogs are based on it. 
The study also includes a framing analysis of the right-wing communication on 
the Web. Based on the literature on the social movements research, the author develops 
four categories: attribution of the problem, attribution of the causality, moral assessment 
and solution. Since foreigners and Jews appear to be the main causal agents, who are 
demonized most often, Brinkmeier conducts further analysis only in relation to these two 
groups. The author becomes three types of collective action frames, which all ideological 
streams prefer to exploit: criminality, competitiveness and cultural differences 
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(Brinkmeier, 2012: 619-635). 
The criminality frame refers to the emphasis over foreigners or Jews committing 
crimes or over their predisposition to it, and over the negative judgment towards them that 
they deserve because of their behavior. The competition frames highlights that the causal 
agents increase the degree of the social and economic competition and therefore present a 
threat to the native population. The cultural difference frame shows that the differences 
between the natives and the Others are natural barriers that makes the common life 
impossible and dangerous for the national identities. 
The German studies demonstrate a more narrative character than the American 
studies. This helps to shed light on the same phenomenon from the different perspectives. 
The German studies would provide a good input for the user-centered study on Facebook 
and right-wing extremism, since they do link the needs and motives of the users with the 
type of content and functionality that the right-wing actors offer online.  
The German studies have shown that maybe the format of the online platform 
influences the choice of the content. Different functionality means different audiences. The 
other way round, the owners of the platform adjust content to the type of the audience that 
they expect to be their main visitors.  
 
 
Conclusion: between media exclusion and users' expectations 
 
 
The present Part explains, why it would be a fruitful approach to focus on the 
media surveillance and refrain from an attempt to embrace all functions and types of the 
content that is posted on Facebook pages. The literature review delivers few 
methodological ideas, provides many examples of the application of the content analysis, 
and what kind of theory can be tested or developed with it. The review includes examples 
of the effective research design that produced interesting results, and of the studies that 
failed to link theory and empirics, or failed to report their methodology properly. Another 
aim of this Part is to place the research question of the present study into the historical 
development of the studies on the right-wing communication. The review will show that 
the right-wing actors used to be among the earliest adopters of different innovations in 
communication, and supposedly have a good understanding of the potential of the social 
media. The online communication within the right-wing scene in Germany is an enormous 
phenomenon; the web platforms are uncountable. They offer any kind of content, in all 
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possible formats and of all degrees of radicalization. The right-wing printed press also tends 
to possess an online edition, adding the value to the online presence of the movement.  
The mainstream media in Germany ignore the right-wing actors, or marginalize 
them in the news reports. This and few legal restrictions forced the latter to invest more in 
the online communication, where they have created a peerless “experience world”. It would 
be interesting to see, if the party communication on Facebook can be depicted as intensive 
and productive channel. It nevertheless makes sense to limit the empirical data, and try to 
link the problem of the mainstream media ignorance with the media surveillance as a 
unique function of Facebook.  
Moreover, a demand for the further research is caused by two problems that were 
identified among existing studies. Apparently, the German tradition is more interested in 
the deep exploration of the right-wing extremism as a local phenomenon, and less in 
producing theories or theory testing. It has caused an overwhelming amount of studies that 
are difficult to generalize. The “American” tradition seems to exploit the topic of the right-
wing extremism only as a material for testing theories. The studies leave an impression that 
it could be about the left-wing extremism or anything else. 
The study of McNamee et al. (2010) occupied a special place. It delivers an 
example of a clear and easily replicable research design, based on the grounded theory 
procedures. It also delivers fruitful and generalizable results, still closely focused on the 
right-wing ideology. The main idea behind this study was to show that the messages are 
centered around few functions that they perform. These functions link demands of the 
Internet users with what the radical actors offer online. The functions are similar to what is 
called uses and gratifications in the Facebook studies. For instance, the information seeking 
is one of the primary motives or functions. A need for discussion and identity are other 
drives that the radical actors try to satisfy by providing a space for online communication 
between their fans and by feeding them with the content that they are interested in. It is 
often a quite unique content, like, reinterpretations of the history, arguments for the 
superiority of the white race, critique on the government etc. (McNamee et al., 2010).  
Thus, the literature makes it clear that the right-wing actors are able to recognize 
the demands of their audiences. The practical implication is that the hazard that the online 
communication of the right-wing scene poses should not be underestimated. The second 
implication is that media surveillance can be considered not only as an instrument of the 
information spread, but also as an attempt to meet the expectations of the Internet users. 
The selection of the news coverage is therefore driven by the intention of the right-wing 
actors to overcome the exclusion from the mainstream media, and at the same time by the 
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intention to come closer to the audience and embed them into their world of meanings by 
matching the content with already existing right-wing attitudes on the individual level. The 
theoretical Part (as well as the empirical findings) will explain how these two motives are 
supposed to work together. 
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Part III. Constructing principles of political communication
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Now, that it has become clear, that media surveillance could be a powerful 
leverage for the right-wing parties in bringing up their standpoints, it is necessary to place 
media surveillance in the broader model of political communication involving all levels of 
the social system: politics, media, audience etc., and to find an analytical scheme that would 
catch the mechanism of media surveillance on Facebook. The concept of media 
surveillance must be able to reveal intentions of political actors as well as to unveil 
distinctive qualities of new media. Gate keeping theories help to understand the role of 
Facebook in the entire national communication system, the motivations behind the use of 
this channel by political actors, and a possible impact that Facebook pages of the right-
wing political parties can have. 
In the case of the right-wing political parties in Germany, the function of media 
surveillance is not so obvious. The parties cannot explicitly communicate their standpoints 
on Facebook, and they are not allowed to spread openly any radical or discriminating ideas. 
They have to make use of more sophisticated instruments of propaganda. For this reason, 
more advanced analysis is required. It is useless to examine themes, as in the studies of the 
online right-wing or hate communication. It does make sense to look into the complicated 
cognitive schemata that the right-wing actors try to spread by means of the media 
surveillance.  
The aim of the current Part is to depict frames as structures and connect the 
framing research with cognitive psychology as well as to outline the methodology of the 
empirical framing research. 
The following sections also discuss development of the media frames over time, 
and consider in details which stages the frame building processes include. An overview of 
the frame building research explains, what kind of variables are common in such studies, 
or, the other way round, what is changeable in the frame and what is stable. This shows the 
capacity of frames to communicate ideologies as complicated and coherent sets of ideas. 
The present Part will also connect elaborations on the gate keeping theory with the frame 
theory to understand the frame building processes in political communication better. 
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Chapter 1. What is frame? 
 
 
1.1. Salience versus equivalence framing: roots of the demarcation 
 
 
The number of the media framing studies has expanded so quickly that some 
scholars raised the question of the coherence and consistency of findings as well as of the 
uniformity of the conceptions and definitions. A controversy emerged around the 
demarcation line between the equivalence and salience framing research traditions 
(Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012). Scheufele and Iyengar argue that the explosive growth of 
salient framing studies is a confusing and false development and a retreat from the original 
equivalence framing tradition that was rooted in the cognitive psychology, and the only 
one that has truly scientific grounds (Ibid).  
The equivalence framing tradition is based on the premise that the mode of the 
presentation of information can influence the interpretation of this information. This means 
that there is a piece of information that is actually equivalent in any mode of presentation. 
The modes and the interpretations can be compared only if such equivalent information 
piece is there. The equivalence framing studies originated from the Broken-B-Experiment 
(Bruner & Leigh, 1955). During the experiment the digits “1” and “3” were shown to one 
groups of participants in the row of other numbers, and to the other group in the row of the 
letters. The context therefore imposed the way of interpreting the “Broken-B” as either the 
number “13” by the first group, or the letter “B” by the second group. But the pieces of 
information - one dash and one “3” - remained equivalent during the experiment. 
In the salience framing research the equivalence of the information piece no more 
plays a key role. The salience framing research supposes exploring the differences between 
contexts around the information pieces, and not the differences in the interpretations of the 
equivalent information. Nothing can describe the main premise of this tradition better than 
a quotation from Entman (1993: 52): 
 
“Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described”.  
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Another popular salience-focused definition of the frame was introduced by 
Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 143), who said that the frame is “a central organizing idea 
or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events…”.  The quest for the 
“organizing idea” gave birth to the further sub-direction of the framing research. If the 
context differs than somebody can make use of the differences between interpretations. For 
instance, political actors can try to frame ideas in such way that promote their standpoints. 
This research tradition overlaps with the discourse analysis, and can sometimes cause 
methodological confusions. The studies within the salient tradition often explore power 
relations, like the discourse analysis also does (Snow, 2004). Even the cascading activation 
model is all about power relations. From the other side, this brings communication research 
closer to political science, so that both disciplines can profit from it.  
The salient tradition scholars try to understand, why and under what circumstances 
“some aspects of a perceived reality” become more salient and whose interests are behind 
the selection choice. This tradition goes beyond the understanding of frames as instruments 
for information processing, or organizing knowledge and experience (Anderson, 1990). 
The frames are not simply cognitive structures that exist in vacuum. The framing research 
must reveal intentions, forces, and decision-making processes that involve journalists, 
politicians and other actors. The organizing idea is a result of a decision-making process, 
therefore, the media frames are seen as a subject of political influence. The task of the 
salience tradition is to compare such “organizing ideas” and make a conclusion about 
decision-making processes and factors that can have influence over it. 
The study linking media research and research on ideology can be a further fruitful 
cooperation between communication and political science, and bring new developments 
into the salience framing research tradition.  
 
 
1.2. Methodology of the salience framing research 
 
 
The implications of the demarcation between the equivalence and the salience 
framing are worth to be discussed in more detail. Tab. 6. illustrates methodological 
differences between two traditions.  
The equivalence framing is interested in the results of the manipulation of the 
modes of the presentation, or the context, premising that different modes still present 
identical pieces of information. Empirical studies in this tradition (column “Empirical data” 
in the Tab.6.) put the same piece of information (“information piece_1”) in different 
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contexts (“context_1” and “context_2”) and compare interpretations of the information that 
result from the different modes of the presentation (“interpretation_1” and 
“interpretation_2” in the right column of the Tab.6.). Such studies mainly deliver 
conclusions about the framing effects that the media frames have over the recipients. The 
salience framing studies can also compare contexts around the identical pieces of 
information (see, for instance, studies on the framing of the Euro policies (De Vreese et al., 
2001), and other studies on political communication (Matthes, 2009; Neuman et al., 1992; 
Saris
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& Sniderman, 2004; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). But they can take into consideration 
both different context and different key information. For instance, the studies on generic 
frames encompass framing processes of different topics (see, for instance, Semetko & 
Valkenburg (2000)). In the case of generic frames the scholars compare ideas (“idea_1”, 
“idea_2”, “idea_3”) behind the frames produced by the same political actors, and, 
therefore, compare political actors and their intentions, power relationships and strategies 
(column on the right in the Tab.6.). Scholars not only look at the variations in the contexts 
(“context_1” and “context_2”), and how the identical piece of information is surrounded 
by different contexts, but also at different key information produced by actors, and how 
political actors try to impose similar interpretations on the different information pieces 
placed into the different contexts. The meaning - or the “organizing idea” - should always 
be the same: that meets the interests of the political actors. 
The studies of Hänggli & Kriesi (2010, 2012) are the best examples of the 
methodology of the salience framing and its application in the political communication 
research. The authors compare three types of generic frames that the Swiss political parties 
impose on all issues that they discuss and that are adopted by the Swiss media. The 
substantive emphasis frame is built around the main political issues of a current campaign. 
The oppositional emphasis gives assessment to the substantive emphasis frames produced 
by the opponents, and the contest emphasis gives assessment to the opponents themselves. 
Thus, the ideas behind the contexts and neither contexts, nor any identical pieces of 
information are compared across frames. The study makes an inference about the 
campaigning strategies of the actors, and proves the hypothesis that the mainstream or 
oppositional character of the party should influence the choice of the framing emphasis. 
 
 
1.3. Frames and schemata 
 
 
Still, both traditions have a lot in common. They make use of the so-called 
“schema”: an analytical concept that has its roots in the cognitive psychology. The concept 
was adopted for the media research (Scheufele, 2003, 2004). It helps to systematize 
variances in the frames. Schemata can be applied to the objects of social reality, or to the 
relationships between them to catch their unique characteristics. In the first case the 
“information pieces” would encompass distinctive features of an object that allow to 
demarcate it from other objects. In the second case two or more objects are simplified to 
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the “information pieces”, and the other information piece depicts a kind of relationship 
between them. A “relationship” can express any type of ties between physical objects, 
events, broader phenomena etc., like influence, affect, harm, roughly speaking, any kind of 
causal or simple relation. In some case it can be an attitude of one object to the other, or 
emotions, or affiliations.  
The concept of schemata possesses a strong explanation power based on the 
introduction of the dichotomy of stable and unstable components that make up any single 
schemata. The stable components are called slots. Slots depicts features that are inevitable 
for a class of objects or relationships. For each distinct object or relationship, the slots are 
filled in with default values that can vary within the class. Together slots and default values 
- slots-values-configurations - constitute an aggregative standard for objects and relations. 
For instance, any birds has wings, but kiwis have weak wings, eagles have strong wings 
etc. Those are all simplest standards that recall knowledge networks in our memories 
helping us to allocate and process new information (Scheufele, 2004: 404). Fig. 4. 
illustrates this. 
 
 
Figure 4. Basic model of cognitive schemata (Scheufele, 2004: 404). 
 
Right-wing political actors might have an intention to create and propagate such 
slots-values-configurations that would reinforce respective attitudes. But different parties 
probably want to activate or impose different attitudes.  
 
 
 
 
  62 
Chapter 2. Gate keeping and framing 
 
2.1. The gate keeping model 
 
Gate keeping theory has its roots in a study conducted by Kurt Lewin on the food 
habits and buying behavior in the United States (Lewin, 1947). In communication science 
the two-horned picture of the paths that the food goes through to reach the plates of the 
family members has become a metaphor of communication channel, which is used in the 
research on the factors that shape news coverage (see Fig.5. (Lewin, 1947: 149)). In the 
original picture of Lewin there are two channels that are rather cooperative than competing. 
In the communication studies these two or more “pipelines” rather symbolize a contest 
between information sources. The focus of the Lewin’s study was on the decisions that 
have to be made on the different stages of the channel, so that the multiple input turns into 
a single output at the end of the channel. There are decision-makers that define what kind 
of the input will be let through the channel. The decision-makers are influenced by different 
factors that have to do with characteristics of the input, characteristics of the decision-
makers, traditions, and a broader cultural context.  
White (1950) coined the term gate keeping and made the path for lots of studies 
on the news factors. It would be almost impossible to provide an overview of all research 
directions, since the gate keeping theory gave birth to dozens of approaches. It is important 
to differentiate between perspectives on the news factors. For instance, the news value 
theory (Kepplinger & Bastian, 2000; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Lippmann, 1997) emphasizes 
characteristics of news - of the information on the entry - as factors increasing or decreasing 
its chances to be published. Other studies have revealed that organizational pressure and 
journalistic routines play significant role (Gieber, 1956). The third big research direction 
concentrates on actors: politicians, public administrations, candidates, political elites in 
general, and how they either provide direct input for the press, or try to influence the output 
of the media coverage in other ways. 
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Figure 5. The gate keeping model prototype (Lewin, 1947: 149). 
 
The actor-oriented tradition does not necessary place an actor in the center of 
communication processes. For example, the priming theory shows how the choice of events 
that are reported in the news can influence the assessment of the politicians’ professional 
competence by readers and TV audiences (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). The studies on 
priming consider political actors as playing a passive role.  
Elaborating on the study of White, Gieber initiated the division between the 
research direction that sees gate keepers (journalists and editors) as active decision-makers, 
and the direction that considers them as rather passive and struggling primarily with the 
time pressure. White’s starting point was the incapacity of media to publish all news which 
is the main motivation to sort out news. Aggregative models of media systems, such as 
arena model (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988; Ferree, 2002; Waldherr, 2014), indicate that the 
entire population of journalists in a given country has a limited attention capacity, and that 
only limited number of news can be reported at one time. One issue dominates news 
coverage, and is then replaced by the other, so that the media coverage experience news 
waves, or cycles of attention (Waldherr, 2014). A lot of evidence that such key events 
exhibit a huge influence was delivered (Brosius & Eps, 1995; Brosius & Esser, 1995; 
Scheufele, 2003; Scheufele, 2004). After a key event happens, the media become 
completely preoccupied with the latter, and it can even influence the coverage of the events 
that take place soon after it.  
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Still, many scholars see journalists as active gate keepers. 
The instrumental actualization theory, proposed by Kepplinger (1989; see also 
(Kepplinger et al., 1991)), postulates that the news selection is not only about being under 
pressure to make one decision and reject an alternative one, but about having a choice and 
having an intention, or predisposition or goal that defines the choice. According to 
Kepplinger, the news coverage of a contradictory issue is influenced by the fact that 
journalists may have a subjective opinion, and, therefore, tend to select events that can 
support a position that they defend.  
In the end, gate keepers are not wizards, but they do have power and they do have 
a kind of selective strategy. Media frames are the result of such (unintentional) strategy.  
 
 
2.2. Media frames, key events and political actors 
 
Priming and instrumental actualization are both about the ability of media to 
influence affective attitudes of the audience (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012). An approach that 
encompasses the power of the media to change all kinds of personal attitudes - affective, 
cognitive, behavioral - became known as the framing theory (Entman, 1993; de Vreese, 
2005; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012; Scheufele, 1999; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; 
Scheufele & Scheufele, 2010). From the journalist’s perspective, frames are one of the 
most powerful factors that shapes media coverage. Frames serve a cognitive filter that 
effects journalists’ choice of news.  
If the audience has no existing attitude to a new actor or an issue, the media can 
even impose completely new personal attitudes, as Scheufele (1999) argues. The recent 
study of Arendt (2013), based on both priming and framing theories, demonstrates that the 
choice of certain events can amplify xenophobic stereotypes on the audience.  
Still, news frames are not absolutely free from the influence of objective factors 
and can be challenged if any event of higher importance happens. The evidence for this 
was delivered by the studies of Gandiwa et al. (2014) und Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2015). 
Gandiwa et al. have revealed a spill-over effect that the framing of the other political event 
(land reform) had over the news framing of a natural conservation in Zimbabwean and 
international media. The framing of the second issue has been adjusted to the framing of 
the intervening event. 
Media frames of long-lasting political and economic processes are not static and 
demonstrate different level of complexity over time, with a clear increase in complexity 
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right after influential events take place. In the beginning the frames involve complicated 
explanations, surrounding a single issue with multiple and maybe incoherent arguments. 
Since journalists also need time to reflect on the new information (Kleinnijenhuis, 2015), 
the frames gradually become simplified, and show simple and understandable relationships 
between different aspects of reality, Stereotypes and clichés help it to happen faster. They 
can have different origins. For instance, media sensations, that attract a lot of public 
attention, like massacres and ay violence in general, can impose prototypes on the 
succeeding news coverage, and cause overrepresentation of the acts of violence in 
comparison with the real statistics (Brosius & Eps, 1995).  
A mixture of keys event and spill-over effect constitutes the news coverage of 
international politics. For instance, framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Dutch 
media has significantly changed after 9/11. The Dutch media used to report equally about 
Israeli- and Palestinian-caused violence, but then started to favor Israelis and report more 
about the violence from the Palestinian side (Obermann & Dijkink, 2008).  
Nevertheless, although crucial events do have influence over the framing of other 
issues, the framing of these crucial events - in accordance with the state of the framing 
research - is affected by further factors, as well as by political actors, since the latter are 
often the only trustworthy information source, especially, in covering international news. 
Anyway, if the state is involved, like in case of a war conflict, only the state administration 
can provide fullest information, and it often tries to send out as many media inputs as 
possible to shape public opinion on the conflict issue in a “right way”. Thus, state 
administrations tend to dominate news coverage as source quotes (Hayes & Guardino, 
2010).  
The longitudinal study of Glazier and Boydstun (2012) has shown that the media 
can have other frame sponsors, since there is a difference between the framing of the 
important events in the press releases circulated by the American state administration, and 
the frames in the news coverage. This difference decreases when a perceived threat to the 
national security occurs, like 9/11 has been a moment of almost full reliance of media on 
the framing disseminated by the Bush administration. In 2002-2003 the Bush 
administration used to be a most quoted source for the news coverage of the forthcoming 
invasion of the American army in Iraq, despite quoting presidential administration did not 
necessarily mean supporting the invasion (Hayes & Guardino, 2010).  
The German context of relationships between politicians, state officials and media 
coverage has been depicted in the study of Hagen (1993) on the news coverage of the 
census issue in 1987. Although the study does not address framing directly, it poses 
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research questions that shed light on journalists’ predisposition to support particular points 
of view on contradictory issues, as well as on the role of politicians, parties, government 
and other political actors in providing media with the arguments that are further transmitted 
to the audience. Hagen has shown that the balance in the selection of sources and arguments 
in the news coverage is distorted, and that newspapers tend to aid the point of view that 
they favor, and that they often loose objectivity. Politicians and state institutions are most 
often quoted in the news, which means that their opinions are mostly trusted, and that they 
exhibit the biggest influence over the news coverage (Hagen, 1993).  
 
 
2.3. Time dimension in the framing research 
 
 
Some studies take it for granted that, at least in the United States, presidential 
administration has a primary power over all other source of issue frames (Hayes & 
Guardino, 2010). The only question is, how quick these frames are adopted by the media. 
Reese and Lewis (Reese & Lewis, 2009; Lewis & Reese, 2009) analyzed the news coverage 
on the War on Terror (anti-terrorist policy after 9/11) in the US and found out that the 
adoption of the frames, formulated by the American state administration, went through 
three phases. Right after a key event took place, and the presidential administration or the 
state department made an official statement about it and the actions that the government 
was going to undertake in relation to it, the media tended to quote and/or paraphrase 
officials, politicians, or press speakers, so that the public still could get an idea of the origin 
of the frame in the message and keep thinking critically. The frame of the ruling elite was 
only introduced to the public. On the next stage - reification - the media started to use the 
language of the officials’ frame to describe the key event. On the last stage the frame was 
naturalized and used to describe not only the key event and his consequences, but “more 
general social conditions” (Reese & Lewis 2009: 788). Thus, the frame on the War on 
Terror had a spill-over effect on the news coverage of other issues. Reese and Lewis 
confirmed their findings with two separately published data sets: interviews with 
journalists and content analysis of news (Reese & Lewis, 2009; Lewis & Reese, 2009).  
In addition to the national media, the American presidential administration 
exhibits a strong influence over the Canadian government and Canadian media framing of 
the War on Terror, both of which, nevertheless, do not fully appoint the American frame, 
but also promote their own views on the issue (Valenzano, 2009).  
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The studies on the American media and their relationships with national political 
elites have introduced time dimension as a variable in the puzzle of the frame building and 
frame contestation. From the need to clarify the frame contestation and naturalization or 
rejection of particular frames, the cascading activation model emerged (Entman, 2003: 
417). Entman offers “four variables that, acting together, can explain the emergence and 
outcomes of frame contests. These are motivations; power and strategy (deployed by the 
administration and other elites); and cultural congruence” (Entman 2003: 421). With these 
variables he tries to encompass the incentives of political actors and journalists, as well as 
the internal characteristics of the frames. Motivations are incentives of the journalists to 
adopt the frame or to reject it; power and strategy are the outcomes of the incentive of 
political actors to impose the frame over the media and the public. Cultural congruence is 
the attribute of the frame, the extent to which it matches with the existing cultural 
stereotypes.  
The main innovation of the cascading activation model refers to the fact that 
Entman has arranged actors, journalists and media frames alongside the time dimension. 
The model shows different stages that the frame undergoes until it reaches the public. The 
hierarchy of the power to shape frames coincides with the position on the time dimension. 
Presidential administration, government and other ruling elites (dependent on the local 
context) provide the very first input for the frame building on all stages (see Fig.6.). Other 
elites can contribute to the frame building or introduce a contest frame, but since another 
one - the very first frame - already exists at this time point, the media have to exploit the 
first one. If they want to provide an alternative vision of the event or the issue, they still 
have to draw attention to the disadvantages of the first frame, so the latter is always there. 
The frame introduced by the opposition have a little chance to play a leading role just 
because of the fact that it has not been the first. The media frame emerges as a result of the 
contest between the leading and an alternative frame. The media adopt the frame offered 
by the actor on the highest stage of the “waterfall” with few minor changes. As an outcome, 
the media produce news frames and impose them (although not completely) on the public.  
As each scholar, Entman wanted to create a meaningful but concise model, and 
left apart few important details. For instance, after any key event happens, journalists need 
time to build an opinion on it, and it takes time before they naturalize any frame. In this 
regard Scheufele (2003) talks about the orientation phase that lasts right after the key event 
happens and the routine phase, when the frame is adopted and applied not only to the news 
coverage of the key event, but to any other similar event.  
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Figure 6. Cascading network activation 
 (Entman, 2003: 419) 
 
 
2.4. Cascading activation and radical political actors 
 
If we compare the visual illustrations of the Entman’s cascading activation model 
and the food-decision-model of Lewin then it becomes obvious - not surprisingly - that the 
former is the elaboration of the latter with the right part just “cut off”. Entman saw the 
frames produced and promoted by the oppositional political elites as being under the strong 
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influence of the frames produced by the ruling elite that is impossible to overcome. The 
cascading activation model does not consider alternative, oppositional frames as an 
independent input and does not take into account where they come from.  
Therefore, the cascading activation model demonstrates some improvement 
potential. In relation to the right-wing political parties and the gate keeping role that they 
play for their Facebook fans the following adaptation of the cascading activation model 
seems reasonable (see Fig.7. and Fig.8.). First, the alternative “cascade” must be added into 
the model as an independent information channel. Second, new and social media must be 
taken into account, since the public often relies on them as an important information source. 
This research model is elaborated for the present study, but applicable to other social media 
and other radical political actors.  
By using their Facebook profiles, the right-wing political actors provide an 
independent input for the frame building processes. The right-wing actors cannot directly 
influence either media, or news frames. They can either create their own content, or use the 
news coverage from the mainstream media and select news that implicitly advocates their 
political goals and that can help to promote their own frames. By sorting the news, the 
right-wing parties create a new input point in the “cascade”, and connect their alternative 
channel to the mainstream information channel. In the situation, when they cannot give any 
input to the mainstream media, they try to intervene in all possible ways, and create a gate, 
so that they can become gate keepers and control information flows. Those audiences, who 
do not look for the news actively, but rather prefer to subscribe to a “gate-keeper” and 
receive the news passively, are the main target of the radical political actors, namely, of the 
right-wing radical parties. 
The right-wing political parties is a new and understudied type of the gate keeper. 
It is rational to expect that they are especially preoccupied with forwarding arguments that 
could support their political standpoints. It is unlikely that the mainstream media coverage 
can demonstrate presence of the explicit right-wing arguments, but through the 
manipulations with the news it is possible to “highlight the aspects of reality” that would 
strengthen the positive assessment of the right-wing ideology. 
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Figure 7. Modified cascading activation model showing the role of social media and 
alternative elites (own figure based on Entman (2003)
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Figure 8. Modified cascading activation model showing the role of social media and 
alternative elites; red box highlights the processes that are in the focus of the present study 
(own illustration based on Entman (2003)). 
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Chapter 3. Elaborating a research model for the present study 
 
3.1. Ideology and media studies: the semiotic perspective 
 
Ideology was theorized by many influential scholars. The best known 
contributions were made by Marx (Marx & Engels, 1953), Althusser (2001), and Žižek 
(2008). Ideology belongs to social concepts that can have quite different meaning 
depending on the scholar one quotes. But, of course, all theories of ideology deal with the 
convincing power of ideas. In general, ideologies define our place in the social world and 
in the social relationships (Althusser, 2001). They give an idea of the proper social order 
(Ibid). Marx had the most negative concept of ideology: the social oder is violently imposed 
by the ruling minority upon a clueless majority in the form of the so-called false 
consciousness (Marx & Engels, 1953). Althusser proposed a more moderate, mostly quoted 
nowadays, especially in media studies, concept of ideology as a set of social practices 
(Althusser, 2001). Social practices are all types of behavior (including communication) that 
are prescribed by the social roles that people play in the society. By communicating or 
responding to any communication, each person participates in a social relationship that is 
a result of the dominant ideology. For instance, modern gender relationships and their 
representation in the media are the result of the patriarchal ideology (Fiske, 1994: 172-8). 
Žižek (2008) offered a rather constructivist concept of ideology as a fantasy. The concept 
of Althusser was used in the present study, since Facebook is about translating social 
relationships into digital codes (Dijck, 2012).  
Ideologies create a shared meaning of reality that would be understandable and 
acceptable for everybody (Fiske, 1994). Therefore, the ideologies legitimize a particular 
social order. The mass media promote ideologies by two types of argumentation: 
rationalization and justification (Fourie, 2001: 323). "Rational" arguments provide logical 
and wise reasons for a situation to happen, despite it was actually a result of social 
relationships rooted in a particular ideology. Justification means that reasons originate in 
some moral values. But both types of the arguments advocate such interpretation of the 
news coverage that fits into a particular ideology, since ideologies give birth to the social 
practices, and media rationalize and justify these social practices, and treat events, or what 
later become news, from the perspective that a dominant ideology offers.  
A presence of any ideological hints in the news coverage - and in the language in 
general - is not so simply recognizable. Here I have to go back to the three levels of meaning 
that Roland Barthes (1994, 2009) proposed for the analysis of the language, communication 
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and discourse. Each visual or textual message has three levels of meaning. The denotative 
level includes an obvious and literal meaning. The next level - the level of connotations - 
recalls the meaning that is less obvious and can require either some cultural knowledge, or 
social, or personal experience to exist. The highest level - the ideology - retracts the whole 
complex of ideas and “a system of representation in which people live their imaginary 
relationship to the real conditions of existence” (Fourie, 2001: 317). This level of meaning 
is the least manifested one. 
The present study is interested in exploring the way the re-posted media coverage 
transmits the right-wing ideology. This phenomenon has different facets. As a qualitative 
study, this research project does not test one single theory, but tries to embrace the 
phenomenon from a range of diverse perspectives that are, nevertheless, linked to a 
research model. The research model has three tasks. It discovers the role of the Facebook 
pages in the cascading activation, taking a macro perspective. Then it explores the frame 
building as a process during which the frames emerge or are produced. This requires a more 
micro level observation, with an attention to the frames as schemata and to their elements. 
In the end, the model takes a perspective of the right-wing political actors, and endeavors 
to reveal the factors of the gate keeping decisions by considering the parties as gate keepers, 
the Facebook page as a gate, and by linking the right-wing ideology with the external 
constellations of frames. 
Nevertheless, the study is not interested in all frames, but only in those that derive 
from the right-wing ideology. Besides, the data analysis will include only frames that are 
universal across different events. Such frames are called generic frames (De Vreese et al., 
2001). To ensure that the study results are generalizable, it is important to catch the frames 
that remain stable over time as well as independent from single events. Moreover, the 
frames should be universal across the media. This will prove that we deal with the 
manifestation of the fundamental and durable ideological standpoints, and not with the 
momentary ideas, or political views of a single newspaper.  
 
 
3.2. Right-wing extremism as ideology
 
3.2.1. Related concepts 
 
In general, all extremist ideologies reject democratic order, democratic state and 
democratic values. Left-wing and right-wing extremism, anarchism, communism etc. differ 
only in the kind of evil that they see as a cause of social decadence (Jesse, 2011). The 
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definition of the right-wing extremism is impossible without introducing few related 
concepts from the political thought of the XIX-XX centuries. The right-wing extremism 
has absorbed the many ideas that speculate about the relationships between individual and 
society, individual and the state, nation and the state etc. These ideas reject the value of 
individual, the value of a human that is postulated to be unquestionable regardless of one’s 
origin. Such ideas excuse discrimination and prejudice. 
In fact, Social Darwinism has emerged before the publication of the Darwin's On 
the origin of species by means of natural selection. Herbert Spencer, the English 
philosopher and sociologist, opposed social aid for the poorest, arguing that the nature has 
imposed "survival of the fittest”. This expression of Darwin is often misused by the 
extremists to legitimatize inhuman attitudes. The German professor of zoology Ernst 
Haeckel declared in his publication from 1868 that "the struggle for existence is also a 
category of social life" (Fenske, 1993a: 808). Some people are more valuable that the 
others, since they can better fight for survival and better conditions of life. "Weak" species 
should not be supported (Fenske, 1993a: 807-809). 
The struggle for existence is often treated as an explanation of the conflicts 
between nations. The extinction of the weakest nations is considered as the only possibility 
for the fittest to survive and prosper. Nativism is one of the concepts that provides a 
fundament for ethnical discrimination. Nativism as “the belief that states should be 
inhabited exclusively by members of the “native” group, [and] is the largest common 
denominator for the [right-wing] parties”, say Backes and Moreau (2011: 36). “One 
country, one nation, one ethnicity “ is one of the core statements of the right-wing ideology.  
Fascism in its broader meaning encompasses several political ideologies that have 
different political goals depending on the local and historical context, but, independently 
from any goal, fascism advocates dictatorship as the only proper form of power 
relationships. Fascism postulates that individual interests should be sacrificed for the 
collective ones. Therefore, fascism advocates strict social order and state interventions into 
all spheres of life, including the private life (Fenske, 1993b: 781-784). Fascism of the 
German Third Reich is known as National Socialism. National Socialism emerged as an 
elaboration of the fascist ideas that were incorporated with racism, anti-Semitism and 
Social Darwinism. National Socialism inherited authoritarian social order, and postulated 
that biological differences like skin color etc., is the main criterion for judging about the 
person's belongingness to the "fittest". Consequently, the value of people and nations are 
not equal, with some nations being more advantageous than the others. The former possess 
the right to govern the latter and decide about the right of the latter to exist (Fenske, 1993b). 
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Fascism and National Socialism should not be confused with nationalism, which 
has few meanings. From the individual perspective, nationalism means “a major loyalty of 
the individual to the state” (Borz, 2012: 177) as well as a strong affiliation to the own nation 
that causes discriminative attitudes towards people of other nationalities. Nationalism as 
an ideology advocates an exclusive right of the “native” nation to possess a certain 
geographic territory that should remain inaccessible for the outlanders (Schubert & Klein, 
2011: 200). Ideology of nationalism also argues that identification with the certain nation 
is an exclusive right of those possessing knowledge of a respective language and culture, 
and who were born by the parents of the respective nationality (Göhler & Klein, 1993: 611-
612). 
There are two more ideological streams that emerged after the end of the WWII, 
and that are important to the understanding of the basic arguments of the right-wing 
extremism. Ethnocentrism is rather a political statement that can be a part of many 
nationalistic ideologies. It postulates that the interests of the own nation are always beyond 
the interests of all others (Schubert & Klein, 2011: 91). All alone it seems quite harmless, 
but integrated into other ideologies it legitimizes any non-democratic methods, like 
violence and human rights violations. Neo-nationalism is the youngest right-wing 
ideological stream. The core statements of it replicates those of the National Socialism as 
well as advocates revival of the latter (Holtmann, 2000: 417).  
The right-wing extremism consolidated these ideologies and offers the coherent 
world view that in many countries successfully competes with democratic and liberal 
values. 
 
 
3.2.2. What is the right-wing extremism? 
 
 
Lenk (2005) has proposed that right-wing extremist ideology as a system of ideas 
has few levels. This approach clarifies the origins of the up-to-date agendas of the right-
wing parties through the exploration of the links between normative and strategic elements 
of the right-wing ideology. On the highest level, the right-wing ideology places an ideal 
order that must be reached. This includes authoritarian state and ethnically homogeneous 
society. On the middle level, there is a status-quo that the right-wing extremists find 
unsatisfactory and incompatible with their ideal order and the solutions that they suggest 
for changing the status-quo and imposing the ideal order. On the lowest level, there are 
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tactic methods of the right-wing extremism, including their communication and 
campaigning instruments.  
Pfahl-Traughber (2012: 8-10) suggests a dual definition that shows what the right-
wing extremism advocates, and what the right-wing extremism rejects. The other way 
round, there is a negative and a positive definition of the phenomenon that together 
encompass the complexity of it.  
Referring to Backes (1989), Pfahl-Traughber says that the right-wing ideology 
denies the value of human as well as equality and individual freedom. Therefore, it denies 
the value of human rights. Moreover, it especially highlights that people cannot possess the 
same political rights, and that a ruling elite should be granted an unlimited power.  
The ideology of inequality has its roots in nativism that postulates that a certain 
territory and related nature and climate gives birth to a certain nation, and this nation 
possesses exclusive rights over the territory, so that the newcomers are subordinated to the 
aborigine nation, usually, the nation that gave name to the country, and have less rights in 
comparison to the aborigines (Mudde, 2007; cited in (Liang, 2008: 3-4). The ideal society 
is ethnically homogeneous (Lenk, 2005; Pfahl-Traughber, 2012). As the next section will 
show, the intolerance and prejudice against foreigners as outsiders strongly correlates with 
the intolerance to the locals, who does not fit into the picture of an ideal society. Thus, the 
core idea of the right-wing ideology is that there are insiders and outsiders that should be 
treated differently, and the outsiders may be discriminated in the favor of insiders. The 
denial of human rights on the level of personal attitudes that is also known as the group-
focused enmity (Heitmeyer, 2012).  
The group-focused enmity, denial of human rights and individual freedom have 
evolved from the postulate of the unchangeable natural order that has placed some nations 
over the others. The world history and the historical path of a single nation is predefined 
and unchangeable; that’s why the relations of subordination cannot be challenged. At this 
point the right-wing extremism stands near to the fundamentalism3 and conservatism4 that 
                                                
3 
  Fundamentalism originates in the religious debates, and gradually became a kind of philosophy and 
argumentation style. As a philosophy, it postulates that modern developments, especially liberal values 
in economy, politics and social life, have been the wrong way for the human civilization and led to the 
emergence of such problems as poverty, loss of spirituality etc. Fundamentalism as a part of someone’s 
political standpoint suggests unwillingness to accept critic, denial of critical thinking. Fundamentalism 
rejects dialog and treats any opponent as a foe without trying to understand any argumentation. 
Fundamentalism stays close to the right-wing extremism because it rejects the spirit of modernity, where 
any kind of identity - ethnical, sexual, political - is a subject of a personal choice (Meyer, 2011). 
4 
  Conservatism as an ideology and philosophy opposes innovation, development, social and political 
change, and denies the fact that no state of art can be a perfect one, but only relatively good and suitable 
for the present epoch. Conservatism defends status-quo and preservation of the past (Bendel, 2011). 
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oppose social change and development.  
The right-wing extremism also rejects the rule of law5. The right-wing ideology 
argues that the state does not serve the interests of people, but is superior to the individual 
freedom and individual rights. For this reason, the right-wing extremism promotes 
concentration of violence and challenges the principle of distribution of power. 
Authoritarian state is one of the most important components of the right-wing extremism. 
It is difficult to provide a short and clear definition of the authoritarianism, but, very briefly, 
it suggests an overwhelming state control over society and economy together with non-
democratic decision-making processes. The authoritarian order supports and enables 
exclusion of a range of social groups from the political decision-making.  
These elements - denial of human rights and the rule of law, and authoritarian state 
- are the very fundamental ones for the right-wing ideology. Only a presence of both of 
them in the program of a single party or organization allows to label it as right-wing 
extremist (Pfahl-Traughber, 2012).  
The fusion of fundamentalism, nativism and extremism cannot get along well with 
either cultural or political pluralism. In a single country the right-wing extremism aims to 
monopolize political decision-making in the favor of the “native” nation. Extremist 
discourse does not leave space for political compromises and democratic practice of 
parliamentary debates and (fair) political competition. Since the right-wing parties are not 
enough strong to alter the democratic order in the Western societies, they propose a direct 
democracy as substitute for the party system, hoping in this way to get rid of their 
opponents. The right-wing parties often advocate the struggle against the party democracy 
by exploiting the argument of the bad performance of the established political parties 
(Minkenberg, 2011). In Germany, for instance, this argument found a wide support because 
of the phenomenon of political anomy: the surveys and panel studies have shown that the 
voters do not feel that the elected officials really represent their interests (Stöss & 
Niedermayer, 1998). 
                                                
 
5 
  “Absolute predominance or supremacy of ordinary law of the land over all citizens, no matter how 
powerful. First expounded by the UK law Professor A. V. Dicey in his 1885 book 'Introduction To The 
Study Of Law Of The Constitution,' it is based on three principles that (1) legal duties, and liability to 
punishment, of all citizens, is determined by the ordinary (regular) law and not by any arbitrary official 
fiat, government decree, or wide discretionary-powers, (2) disputes between citizens and government 
officials are to be determined by the ordinary courts applying ordinary law, and the (3) fundamental 
rights of the citizens (freedom of the person, freedom of association, freedom of speech) are rooted in 
the natural law, and are not dependent on any abstract constitutional concept, declaration, or guaranty.
 Source: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/rule-of-law.html#ixzz3qKC0voKg 
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The right-wing political actors often use rhetoric of dogmatism and stereotypes 
(Pfahl-Traughber, 2012; Busch, 2014). They highlight the monopoly over the physical and 
representational dimensions of political power: violence and public discourse. Inequality 
and ethnically homogeneous society are the core of this ideology.  
The right-wing extremism does not remain rigid, it changes and actively picks up 
the up-to-date political agendas to expand its electorate and to break into the public 
discourse (Minkenberg, 2011). One of the significant developments in the right-wing 
ideology is the ethnopluralist6 argument that advocates ethnical homogeneity (Minkenberg, 
2011). The ethnopluralism replaced racism and its old statement of subordination of the 
races with the new statement of incompatibility of the nations. Nations are equally 
valuable, but each has its own home and its own culture, and the cultures and nations should 
not mix with each other. 
Busch (2014) specifies the following features of the rhetoric of the right-wing 
ideological family. The right-wing parties deliver simple and stereotyped world view 
(Pfahl-Traughber, 2012) and make use of emotional reasoning and “political mythology” 
(Busch, 2014: 142). The main political myth is the friend-or-foe-concept that slightly varies 
from country to country. The friend-or-foe-concept is a logic consequence of the nativist 
ideas. The right-wing rhetoric places political power above political dialogue. It often 
advocates unconventional and illegal activities, highlighting the mandatory character of the 
individual participation in the welfare of the whole community (Pfahl-Traughber, 2012; 
Backes, 1989). 
One of the main fascist ideologists, Benito Mussolini (cited in Lenk (2005: 21)) 
gave the following assessment of the status-quo that he thought was wicked. The society 
is experiencing a decadence; it lives irrationally and comes closer and closer to 
apocalypses. This is a conspiracy against the nation; an unknown enemy wants to destroy 
it physically or demolish its culture. Mussolini depicts a clear horizon of his values. In the 
middle is the ideal of inequality: people and the leader are not equal; the nations and the 
people are not equal; the races are not equal; the sexes are not equal; and this is no grey 
zone or any exception. In the end, he provides the guidelines for the struggle for this better 
world. This includes homogenization of the nation; a strong and enduring mobilization with 
the highest possible individual commitment; violence as the instrument for conflict 
                                                
6 
  Ethnopluralism means “the concept of “cultural differentialism,” not claiming the superiority of any 
nationality or race but, instead, stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions.” 
(Bornschier, 2010:23). 
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resolution. With some minor changes, this is a manifest of the entire right-wing movement 
nowadays. 
This definition of the right-wing extremism determines a lowest common 
denominator for the party family. Upon this one can decide about the belongingness of a 
single party to the corresponding spectrum. Nevertheless, each party has specific 
arguments. The next Chapter will focus on the historical turn from the Old Right to the 
New Right, and what it means for the ideology, and how it influenced the modern 
ideological diversity within the party family. 
 
 
3.3. Right-wing ideology and right-wing (media) frames 
 
 
Scholars have tried to define relationships between (media) frames and ideology. 
Benford and Snow criticized many of these attempts and offered their own understanding 
of this relationship (see, for instance, (Snow & Benford, 2000, 2005a,b; Benford & Snow, 
2000; Snow, 2004)), which the present study will elaborate on. For Snow and Benford, 
both ideology and frames are meanings that are commonly recognized and accepted by a 
particular society, but that are not manifested in the textual (visual, audial etc.) artefacts. I 
will try to clarify their vision to the extent that is necessary to make the concept applicable 
to this particular study. This clarification is not exactly the concept of Benford and Snow, 
but rather my own extension of it that should support my method of the content analysis 
that was used in the empirical study. 
The ideology can be observed as a third-level-meaning in the news stories. Ideology 
is a normative picture of the world, and media frames shows how a certain news story can 
be embedded in this picture. In this sense, the frames are more instrumental and less 
abstract. They are also less independent from the up-to-date agendas. Ideology can exist 
over centuries, and media frames, even generic frames, have to be replaced with new ones 
from time to time, if they fail to relate news with ideology and place new facts into the 
normative picture. Media frames emphasize particular facts and relationships between 
them, whereas ideology gives them an assessment from the normative point of view.  
Some events or actions can look quite apolitical, unless a political party would pick 
up the story and re-post it. Then the story becomes a new meaning, ideology of the party 
“unmasks” causalities that stand behind events and actions that otherwise would seem 
trivial or harmless. The present study looks for the causalities that are exposed by such a 
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selection of news, and considers them as media frames that are right-wing supportive. 
Ideology stands above media frames, and can reveal itself in other cultural frames, 
like recipients’' frames, frames in the official documents of political parties etc. Ideology 
is not only present in the media coverage, but in a book, in a movie, in a political manifest, 
a press release, and all other communication channels.  
Whereas frames depict and explain relationships between facts and events by 
proposing causalities standing behind them, an ideology compares reality with an ideal 
world and give an assessment to the reality and to the discovered causalities, and can be a 
basis of more tactic measures that should be taken against the violations of the laws of this 
ideal world. 
The methodological application of these considerations is the following. The media 
frames must be considered as statements that can legitimize the normative prescriptions of 
the right-wing ideology. If a causality, emphasized by the frame, is supportive for the right-
wing ideology, then the frame must be acknowledged as a right-wing one. The Chapter 1 
of the Part VII (the empirical study) will discuss it in more detail. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The present Part has described few selected traditions in the media framing studies 
that can be useful for the current research. The media framing and framing research in 
general are very dynamic research fields, and they demonstrate few fundamental debates 
still going on. The scholars cannot find a compromise regarding a basic assumption of the 
framing analysis: is it about comparing different modes of interpretations (of possibly 
identical propositions) resulting from the different modes of representation, or is it about 
comparing differences between propositions that are not necessary identical? The second 
direction of analysis often turns one’s attention to the frame sponsors and their intentions 
in producing and imposing particular frames. The present study is rooted in the second 
tradition. It considers frames as structures, or schemata, or slots-values-configurations. The 
slots are the stable components, depicting objects, or their characteristics, or relationships 
between objects. If a slot if deleted, replaced, or added, then the configuration changes its 
meaning significantly. Replacement of the default values means a variation, but not a new 
type of schema.  
 For the present study it means: the right-wing political actors are supposed to 
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deploy a set of particular, only for them typical types of the slots-values-configurations. 
The default values in these configurations vary depending on the party.  
The Chapter 2 moves away from the single frames, and focusses on the entire 
political communication as a frame building process, and explains the role that Facebook 
pages of the right-wing political parties play in the cascading activation. The cascading 
activation model shows how the input from the mainstream political actors is translated 
into the media frames and then transmitted to the audiences. The present study elaborates 
on the model. Inspired by the gate keeping theory that concentrates on the single points 
that the information passes through the new research model argues that the Facebook pages 
allow the radical actors to break into the cascade. Although they remain unable to control 
the input from the mainstream political actors, the selection of the certain news can help to 
sort out arguments that favor radical parties. By choosing particular news, the right-wing 
parties assemble slot-values-configuration that encapsulate their ideologies. A strategic 
selection of the media news can transmit all main political standpoints of the right-wing 
parties. Still, the Facebook pages as the news gates are not completely controllable. The 
media limit the choice of the news, since they decide on the content to be published; the 
right-wing parties can only narrow it, but never expand. The parties find themselves under 
the pressure of the feedback loop from the audience: the parties have to take into account 
the expectations of the audiences, the other way around, the existing right-wing personal 
attitudes. Chapter 3 talks more about the input that the right-wing parties are expected to 
transmit. It discussed a common definition of the right-wing extremist ideology and 
explains that ideology and media frames place news stories into a normative picture by 
exposing causalities that are supposedly behind them, but that the media frames have more 
instrumental nature and shorter life. The next Part will show that the right-wing ideology 
(and, actually, all other ideologies) serve to connect the future, the present, and the past. 
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Part IV. Right-wing extremism and populism: theoretical backgrounds and recent 
findings 
 
 
Introduction: macro- und micro perspectives in the right-wing extremism studies 
 
The Part IV outnumbers the other parts of the dissertation, because it has a 
difficult task. After the first three parts ended up with the conclusion that Facebook is an 
ideal place for the right-wing actors to overcome the exclusion from the mainstream 
media, reach their potential adherents directly without any mediators, and broadcast their 
ideologies in a pure form, the present part will make the definition of the right-wing 
ideology more precise. This will make the whole discussion more concrete. The previous 
part described the technical components of the empirical phenomenon, and the present 
one will discuss ideology as the content of communication that Facebook is supposed to 
help to disseminate.  
The scholarly debates on the right-wing extremism include two perspectives: the 
ideologies that the right-wing political actors elaborate and spread in order to win voters 
and adherents, and the personal attitudes of the citizens, not necessarily voters of the right-
wing parties. For the present study it is important to understand both perspectives. The 
political actors are responsible for the historical developments and transformations of the 
ideologies. But ideologies do not emerge in a vacuum. They emerge when particular 
believes and attitudes became widespread and accepted by the (silent) majority. Political 
actors catch these moods, and translate it into their official statements. It remains 
unknown what is a primary process in this chain, and this question is not in the focus of 
the present study. It is just important to keep in mind that there are two streams - an 
upward one and a downward one - that create ideologies. This differentiation makes it 
easier to the role of the mass media as the mediators between political actors and citizens.  
The present Part will deal with these perspectives in the following sequence. The 
previous Part has already proposed a definition of the right-wing extremism, and 
demarcated it from other radical ideologies. The Chapter 1 of the present Part will explain 
the latest historical changes, and sketch the main standpoints that are typical for the right-
wing party family nowadays. The Chapter 2 will provide an idea of what is depicted as 
personal right-wing attitudes in the scholarly literature, and what are the possible reasons 
of individual acceptance of the right-wing ideology. The concluding section will explain 
  83 
how the findings from both perspectives can be integrated in the research design of the 
present study. 
The literature was collected throughout the years 2013 and 2014, using the 
snowball method. The very first search queries were conducted by using the key words 
“Rechtsextremismus”, “Rechtspopulismus”, “right-wing extremism”, and “right-wing 
populism”. Then the reference lists of the publications were checked, and further 
interesting publications were retrieved. Moreover, a lot of other sources were made use 
of to finish the literature review. First of all, the collection of the University Library of 
the Federal State of Saxony provided most of the books. Scientific databases EBSCO 
Host and WISO delivered journal publications and conference papers. The Google Search 
was a fruitful source of the literature, although required a lot of work to sort out irrelevant 
contributions. A lot of publications were found through the reference lists of the papers 
and books that were previously accessed, as well as through the established contacts with 
other scholars or as a result of attending scientific conferences and workshops. 
 
 
Chapter 1. Studies on the right-wing political parties 
 
 
1.1. From the Old to the New Right 
 
 
The literature differentiates between the Old Right that emerged in the Interwar 
Years and included the Third Reich in Germany and Italian fascism of Benito Mussolini, 
and the New Right that emerged after the World War II. Of course, the New Right 
inherited a lot of the core ideas from the predecessors, but also demonstrated a kind of 
innovativeness. 
Bötticher (2008) conducted a cross-temporal comparison of the New and Old 
Right by considering the right-wing ideology as consisting of the 6 basic pillars. 
Regarding the racist sentiments, the right-wing ideology still emphasizes the hierarchy of 
races and inseparability of race and culture. There is a shift from the perception of the 
very existence of Others as a threat towards the coexistence with them as a danger 
(Bötticher, 2008: 77). This shift demonstrates the drop in the radicalization, and a turn 
from extinction as a method to reach the ideal society to apartheid as acceptable solution.  
The interpretation of the world history has evolved as well. The right-wing 
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extremism keeps its fundamental principle of monocausality of historical developments, 
and postulates that historical paths of the single nations are completely predefined, since 
the nations were born in different natural environments, and their history is determined 
by the nature and the natural order of supremacy and inequality. The New Right also 
inherited the idea of history as a struggle for existence, but interpret it no more as a 
struggle of races for the physical existence, but as a struggle of cultures for intellectual 
supremacy, showing again the decline of a manifested radicalization (Bötticher, 2008: 
107).  
Other dimensions either did not change, or just absorbed few new ideas. For 
instance, the modern anti-Semitism did not abandon any of its sentiments, like conspiracy 
of Jews etc., but rather get a new inspiration in the form of the Holocaust denial and the 
disputes over the conflict between Israel and Palestine (Bötticher, 2008: 160-164). 
However, the New Right in Germany, the PRO Movement, refused from the anti-Semitic 
sentiments, and maintained a cooperation with the Zionist activists to fight against Islam 
(Backes, 2013: 154). The scholars consider this fact as a maneuver aimed to attract new 
electorate and improve public image of the right-wing movement (Ibid.).  
The New Right stands on the same position when it comes to the role of the state. 
Exactly like the Old Right, the modern right-wing ideologists propose the absolutism of 
the state and its full control over the citizens, including the interventions into the private 
sphere and supremacy of political power over the economic mechanisms (Bötticher, 
2008: 205-209; Antón-Mellón, 2013: 59). The New Right added a more “humanistic” 
element to the picture and placed family in the center of the right-wing ideal social order 
(Bötticher, 2008: 209).  
There has been a little change in the right-wing understanding of politics. Based 
upon the idea of inequality, the dictatorship is presented as the best form of governance, 
with a strong demarcation between the leader and his subordinates (Bötticher, 2008: 243). 
The right-wing worldview also advocates a one-party-system (Bötticher, 2008: 243) and 
military sentiments (Bötticher, 2008: 244-245). Since nowadays the right-wing parties 
remain mainly in opposition, the New Right has to fight for political power and not simply 
theorize about it, as the Old Right did (Bötticher, 2008: 245). 
The definition of the nation remains the least vulnerable point of the right-wing 
ideology (Bötticher, 2008: 134). Nation has a solid and unchangeable form; any 
alterations and social innovations, especially, the interpenetrations of nations and 
cultures, will lead to the decline of the nation and its physical extinction. Each nation 
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possesses a unique culture, and the cultures shouldn’t and can’t be exchanged between 
nations. For this reason, the nations should live separately and autonomously, and avoid 
any contact, including trading.  
The New Right emphasizes a decline of the European civilization (Antón-
Mellón, 2013: 56) that was caused by the Enlightenment, modernity and Christianity. The 
ideal Europe of the right-wing philosophers is pagan. Christianity is dangerous, because 
it promotes universality and equality (Ibid.). What’s more, the doctrine of human rights 
is considered as “the morality of herd” (Antón-Mellón, 2013: 56). The bourgeois society 
is advocates wrong values, like individualism and consumerism (Antón-Mellón, 2013: 
57). The New Right rejects individualism and promotes community, arguing that the 
welfare is only reachable through the strong personal commitment to the community and 
collective interests. Only such commitment can sustain cultures and cultural diversity 
(Antón-Mellón, 2013: 57). 
The sentiment of being in a conflict and fighting with some (often unknown) 
enemy alongside with activism and mass mobilization make up the main tactic plan of 
the New Right (Antón-Mellón, 2013: 58-59).  
In the first place, the New Right fosters the maintenance of a homogeneous 
society as a way to escape the decadence (Antón-Mellón, 2013: 59). Antón-Mellón 
sketches the “value horizon” (Lenk, 2005: 21) of the New Right (Antón-Mellón, 2013: 
59-60): 
 
“The first is the conviction that there are laws of nature that govern all living 
beings and can be extrapolated to individuals and human communities: selection, 
inequality and hierarchy are phenomena as natural as the land and the sea. The 
second is the paramount importance of the philogenetic information that human 
communities pass on from one generation to the next. The third is the idea that 
conflict is another of the laws of the nature: to fight is to live and weakness is a 
prelude to death.” 
 
This historical analysis enhanced a definition of the right-wing extremism. It 
explained the evolution of the lowest common denominator. Then, it has shown, which 
ideological components dominated at the different points of time and in various countries. 
Based on such variations, the scholars offered numerous typologies of the right-wing 
extremism, of which a few must be mentioned.  
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1.2. Typologies of the right-wing political parties 
 
Although no universal classification of the right-wing organizations exists so far, 
there is a kind of consensus between the most influential scholars regarding the empirical 
reality and the existence of the following groups within the modern right-wing party 
family: 
(1) the parties deriving its inspiration from the fascist past (Austria, Hungary, 
Italy, France, and Romania (Wodak, 2013: 26); Germany, Italy, the UK (Minkenberg, 
2011: 47-49); 
(2) racist and/or ethnocentric parties (Hungary, Greece, Italy, the UK (Wodak, 
2013: 26)); Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Denmark (Minkenberg, 2011: 47-49)); 
(3) religious fundamentalists, promoting Christian values (the US (Wodak, 
2013: 26); Denmark, France (Minkenberg, 2011: 47-49)), albeit, it is not quite logical 
concerning the historical roots of the right-wing ideology; 
(4) authoritarian populists (Austria, Italy (Minkenberg, 2011: 47-49)); 
(5) anti-Islamists (the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland 
(Wodak, 2013: 26). 
Bruter and Harrison (2011) elaborated an outstanding research design that 
involves both cross-temporal and cross-national comparisons, and makes use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Bruter and Harrison created a simple typology of 
the right-wing party family and tested it with 25 European parties, within a time period 
of 31 years (1979-2010). The typology includes only two dimensions: authoritarianism 
and negative identity. Therefore, each ideological program consists of 4 main pillars, 
since each dimension has two extremes. Some pillars can dominate and some play a minor 
role in a particular program.  
Roughly speaking, the authoritarian dimension deals with the role of the state 
and of the party. Following the common definition of the right-wing authoritarianism, 
Bruter and Harrison distinguish between two strategic goals and, respectively, two 
possible emphases of the right-wing programs: reactionary and repressive.  
In the center of the reactionary pillar there is an idea of the ideal society 
(“idealised civilisation or community” (Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 71)), or utopia. This 
ideal is to be reached, and it often lies in the past (Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 37), and the 
nation should revive this past, preserve old traditions to avoid getting into the worse 
situation. This ideological pillar includes such core statements as homogeneity of the 
nation; structured society and the minor role of an individual; family as the main building 
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block of the society as well as diagnosis of decadence of the status-quo. This pillar 
emphasizes traditional society, conformism, natural order and unchangeable character of 
the world history.  
The repressive conception of the authoritarian dimension refers to the methods 
of reaching an ideal society. It includes anti-democratic means, like transferring exclusive 
power to a strong leader; military sentiments, obedience. This ideological pillar promotes 
struggle and activism, highlights punishment and repression. Like in the reactionary 
conception, the argumentation is supported with the diagnosis of decadence. Those right-
wing actors, who are more concerned with the repressive conception, often emphasize a 
danger of growing criminality to legitimize the concentration of power that they advocate. 
The repressive pillar stresses the overwhelming role of the leader, who is the very engine 
of the party and of social shifts that would bring the society back from the apocalypses to 
the prosperity (Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 38-39, 75-79, 208-209). 
The negative identity dimension summarizes the policy of exclusion. As Bruter 
and Harrison explain: 
 
“Large segments of the literature have underlined the propensity of extreme right 
parties to exclude or oppose … The identification of an out-group is fundamental 
to this dimension of negative identity as featured in both the populist and 
xenophobic conceptualizations, albeit in different ways.” (Bruter & Harrison, 
2011: 79). 
 
Xenophobia simply means legitimization of exclusion on the basis of cultural 
identity. Foreigners, believers from other confessions, people of other races, and ethnic 
minorities are common targets of xenophobic attitudes (Ibid). Xenophobia will be 
discussed in details in the next clause that outlines recent findings in the personal attitudes 
studies. The reference to an out-group, or what Bruter and Harrison call negative identity, 
helps to enhance national identity, and plays a paramount role for the right-wing followers 
(Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 39-40, 79-87, 207).  
The other pillar of the negative identity dimension - a populist conception - is a 
result of the diagnosis of decadence. The populism emphasizes the confrontation between 
elites and the rest of society. As it was mentioned before, the right-wing extremism 
actually supports a hierarchical order. But, since the right-wing parties are mainly 
oppositional ones, they try to challenge their more successful political opponents as well 
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as to blacken the reputation of representative democracy (Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 38, 
87). For this reason, they adopted populist sentiments, but they do not oppose elitism as 
such, but only the ruling elites.  
In addition to the elaboration of this classification scheme, Bruter and Harrison 
have analyzed the electoral success of the right-wing parties in Europe, and compared it 
with the developments in the right-wing discourse, defined as the change in proportions 
between the ideological pillars in the manifests of the parties. They found that the 
emphasis on the reactionary and xenophobic pillars brings more success than on any other 
(Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 183). Moreover, the parties tend to use more populist strategies 
during the election campaigning and more xenophobic ones between the electoral cycles 
(Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 199).  
Whereas Bruter and Harrison strongly differentiate between xenophobia and 
populism as two different ideological pillars, many other scholars postulate that the 
xenophobic rhetoric is a sufficient part of the populism, and that the deviations within the 
party family can be defined as xenophobic attitude to particular out-groups, varying from 
country to country (see, for instance (Wodak, 2013: 26)). Yet the scholars like Wodak 
often collect diverse case studies under one cover (Backes & Moreau, 2011; Becher, 
2013; Bergsdorf, 2000; Bornschier, 2010; Decker, 2006; Geden, 2006; Hatleb, 2005; 
Häusler, 2008; Kitschelt, 1995; Mammone et al., 2012, 2013; Mondon, 2013;  Reuter, 
2009; Wodak, 2013), and even group them in accordance with their strategic ideological 
emphasize, but rarely elaborate a comprehensive classification. Thus, the contribution of 
Bruter and Harrison can hardly be underestimated and was used in the present study.  
 
 
1.3. The right-wing populism 
 
 
Since the modern right-wing extremism has adopted a populist rhetoric (Camus, 
2003: 238-239), many theorists started to use the term "right-wing populism" to describe 
the party family. 
 
"Populism can be considered to be an ideology that separates society into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups - "the pure people" versus "the corrupt 
elite - and that holds that politics should be an expression of the general will of 
the people (Liang, 2008: 5)". 
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Modern right-wing actors often make the conflict between the elites and the 
people to their central argument (Jamin, 2013: 42). The elite plays the role of a new out-
group that enhances the in-group identity, and, of course, possesses negative 
characteristics, such as laziness, dishonest, heterogeneity etc. (Jamin, 2013: 42). 
Depending on the local context and their aims, the right-wing parties can stigmatize 
different groups, for instance, economic, political and cultural elites (Ibid). This 
establishment is the minority, and, according to the idea of the dominance of collective 
interests over individual ones, the establishment must be oppressed by the people, who 
are the majority. In addition to this, the dominance of the people is legitimized by 
assigning them with positive characteristics such as hard-working, but powerless and 
exploited (Jamin, 2013: 42; Caiani & della Porta, 2010: 9). 
An interesting typology of the right-wing populism was suggested by de Raadt 
et al. (2004). Similarly to Bruter and Harrison, the scholars made use of both qualitative 
and quantitative content analysis and typical right-wing populist statements in the parties’ 
programs and deep interviews with the leaders. Based on the grounded theory methods, 
their analysis revealed 3 main dimensions (references to “the people’, to the direct 
democracy, and anti-establishment sentiments) with up to 4 variations within a 
dimension. The scholars were interested in finding a dominant dimension and a most 
common type of variation. Since they compared only 6 European right-wing parties, they 
could not conclude with any generalization, but their classification is a fruitful source of 
ideas for the future research and can be merged with that of Bruter and Harrison to get an 
overarching analytical concept.  
 
 
1.4. Classification dimensions 
 
 
The classification of Bruter and Harrison perfectly fits into the ambitions of the 
present study. Bruter and Harrison explored the competition between the right-wing 
parties, focusing on their ideological differences rather than organizational parameters. 
The authors proposed the following key thesis: there is a limited ideological space, where 
each party has to find its only possible proper position, following its aims, history and 
presence of other far right rival parties. The parties should not fail to occupy proper niches 
if they want to get voters’ support.  
Furthermore, Bruter and Harrison elaborated dimensions that are quite universal: 
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the hypotheses were tested on the huge sample that included the entire European right-
wing party family within a long time span. The results of such study can be generalized 
and used for the further research without major modifications. Two-dimensional space 
with four pillars illustrates differences between parties easily and in a comprehensive 
way. The most important argument for the adoption of this scheme is that the authors 
have proved with the correlation analysis that the choice of the dimensions was adequate, 
since no intercorrelations between ideological pillars that were considered as mutually 
suppressive were found.  
 
 
Figure 9. Ideological pillars and their shares in the political statements of the National 
Democrats and Republicans (Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 107). 
 
Few minor revisions are necessary. Bruter and Harrison stressed the demarcation 
between antagonistic pillars, since they were interested in linking electoral success with 
the position in the 2-dimensional ideological space. Bruter and Harrison calculated the 
proportions of all 4 ideological pillars for each party, and then chose two dominant 
proportions, and labeled the parties accordingly. In the end, the authors divided the 
sample into the four party families: populist-repressive, xenophobic-repressive, populist-
reactionary, and xenophobic reactionary. For a study with a sample of 25 units that is 
quite rational. But for the comparison of 4 units it seems reasonable not to reduce 
analytical dimensions too much.  
An ideological profile with 4-partitions representing 4 pillars that together they 
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make up 100 per cent can better highlight differences and similarities than contrasting 
pillars and minimizing unique ideological position to a very few parameters. Fig.9. 
illustrates this. The shares of ideological pillars in the profile of the National Democrats 
and of the Republicans are adopted from the research findings of Bruter and Harrison 
(Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 107), and represent the proportions of the 4 respective pillars 
in the discourse of the right-wing parties, counted as key words in the programs and 
manifests. The Part V will explain how the shares of ideological pillars were calculated 
for the Right and the PRO NRW. 
 
 
1.5. The Europe question 
 
 
The Europe question has two dimensions: European integration and European 
Union (Tab.7.). The right-wing radical parties have different opinions about the 
possibility of any cooperation between the European countries and about the European 
Union as a proper form of collaboration. Eurorejects encourage full national autonomy 
and reject any alliance; the Eurosceptics think that the countries must collaborate, but the 
single nations should remain independent and there is no supranational institution 
necessary. Euroenthusiasts accept both integration and existence of the EU. Normally, 
many parties used to be Euroenthusiasts in 1990s, since they saw the EU as an alternative 
to harmful globalizing processes. There are a few parties, who have an instrumental 
vision: they reject integration, but appreciate the EU as an unavoidable consequence of 
Realpolitik (Mudde, 2007: 162). Such parties are called Europragmatics. 
 
Table 7. Typology of the parties positions on the European integration (Mudde, 2007: 
162). 
 Support for the European integration 
Europhile Europhobe 
Support for 
the EU 
EU-optimist Euroenthusiasts Europragmatics 
EU-pessimist Eurosceptics Eurorejects 
 
Few other demarcation lines within the party family exist on this issue. For the 
parties it is important to define the type of constituting members of the united Europe. 
Some suggest it would be the nation states, the others say it must be nations or the peoples 
(Mudde, 2007: 167-168). The parties have also shown a little consensus over a list of the 
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members, in particular, regarding the inclusion of the East European countries (Mudde, 
2007: 169-171). Besides, the extent of the cooperation is to be clarified (Mudde, 2007: 
168-169). From the one side, the right-wing parties do not want to have any strong 
coordinating institutions above them and their unchallengeable leaders, but, from the 
other side, that would be inevitable part of what the integration actually means.  
The sub-issue of the European question is the definition of the common 
European security policy. As it was mentioned before, for the right-wing actors it is very 
important to have an enemy. When it comes to Europe, the list of enemies is quiet long.  
The perceived threat of the globalization has brought electoral success for many 
right-wing parties (Liang, 2008: 8), and obviously remains one of their important 
arguments. In the globalizing world it is hard to survive economically and keep the 
national and cultural identity. The right-wing populists argue that the globalization is 
guided by the US, who profit from it most of all (Liang, 2008: 8-9).  
There is another one, a "smaller" globalization that is dangerous as well. The 
declining support for the European Union, caused by the European Expansion and 
acceptance of new members outside the Central Europe, gave the right-wing parties one 
more impulse (Liang, 2008: 10-11). From country to country, different parties emphasize 
different sources of danger. Few parties employ conspiracy theories to warn about a real 
power behind the EU, but the idea of this power also varies; it can be Germany, France, 
the US, and the new Soviet Union (Liang, 2008: 12). The right-wing populists are 
concerned with the forthcoming decline of the European cultures. The parties strive for 
the "Europe for Europeans" and revival of the Holy Roman Empire (Liang, 2008: 12-17).  
The argumentation is often supported with the negative characteristics that the 
out-groups - migrants and especially Muslims - are believed to possess. The core element 
of the right-wing ideology - the inequality of the people - is camouflaged with the 
emphasis over the threat to social welfare and the growth of criminality that is caused by 
the outsiders.  
The European question occupies different parties to different extent, and can be 
a variable in a comparative analysis. 
 
 
1.6. The cascading activation model 
 
 
Following the description of the cascading activation model from the theoretical 
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part (Chapter 3), the present Chapter has specified what is supposed to be an input into 
the frame building process that the right-wing parties provide. Despite it remains hardly 
possible to formulate any media frames that are expected as an outcome, few remarks 
about these frames are necessary. 
The whole ideology is based on a key postulate that the people are not equal and 
the differences between them are natural and justify the right to treat people differently. 
The other way round, the different treatment is natural and is the only proper social 
behavior. Since the right-wing ideology has a bad historical reputation and is now quite 
marginal in most countries, the right-wing actors have to invent indirect arguments. Thus, 
it is unlikely to expect any “pure” right-wing statements in the media.  
There are 4 types of arguments - or 4 ideological pillars - that the right-wing 
parties would supposedly try to disseminate. One of them would promote xenophobia, 
the other would promote the discrepancy between the people and the ruling elites. The 
third one would promote an ideal right-wing society, and the last one would show the 
repressions against anything that prevents from reaching this ideal society.  
This demarcation echoes with the themes that McNamee et al. (2010) have found 
in the online radical communities. For instance, the communities also talk about history 
and future, identity, criticize mainstream politicians and media, and make xenophobic 
statements. The next Chapter will discuss how the right-wing ideology discloses itself in 
the form of personal attitudes. This is necessary to understand the place of the Facebook 
frames in the cascading activation model as well as to explain the theme analysis 
performed by McNamee et al. (2010).  
 
 
Chapter 2. Personal attitudes studies 
 
 
2.1. Personal attitudes studies 
 
Many studies investigate personal attitudes that fuel the rise of the right-wing 
parties (Decker & Brähler, 2006, 2008; Grau et al., 2012; Heitmeyer, 2012; Kitschelt, 
1995; Mansel et al., 2012; Roux, 2011; Spier, 2010; Stöss, 2010; Zick et al., 2012; Zick 
et al., 2011; Zick & Küpper, 2012). The individual perspective is significant for the 
research field for two reasons. First, it helps to understand the electorate of the right-wing 
party family and therefore to assess the attractiveness of the single ideological elements 
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that the parties offer. Second, the prejudice against particular groups is harmful, but 
deeply rooted in the society and even performs few important psychological functions. It 
provides social bonding, enhancement of the self-esteem, orientation and trust, offers 
control and legitimizes hierarchies (Zick et al., 2011: 32-33); empirically confirmed in 
(Zick & Küpper, 2012). 
 
“Prejudices are especially persistent when they fulfill social-psychological 
functions, meaning they have social and individual utility for groups and 
individuals. These functions are social because prejudices are relevant less for 
individuals than for the integration of individuals in groups, nations and cultures 
(Zick et al., 2009).” (Zick et al., 2011: 32) 
 
Thus, the individual perspective unveils the roots of the right-wing affinity that 
later evolves into the parties’ programs. 
Surveys and statistical models are typical for this kind of studies, since the 
scholars have been interested in discovering the motives of the group-focused enmity and 
its relationships with the second core idea of the right-wing extremism, the acceptance of 
authoritarian order. The literature can be divided in two groups: general attitudes studies, 
portraying modern right-wing extremism from the individual perspective, and specific 
attitudes (or specific factors) studies, which concentrate on the prejudices against specific 
groups or on the specific catalyzers of the prejudice. 
One of the biggest longitudinal studies was conducted by the team of researchers, 
supervised by W. Heitmeyer from 2000 to 2010 and is reported in 9 compilations 
(Heitmeyer, 2002-2012). The last book in the series reports the latest theoretical 
elaborations on the group-focused enmity - which was applied in many other studies - 
and delivers recent findings. 
The group-focused enmity is, simply speaking, a prejudice against a certain 
group of people, devaluation of outsiders in favor of the insiders. Heitmeyer and his 
colleagues developed a model with different types of prejudice and different causes of 
prejudice. They conducted few representative surveys and calculated factor loadings of 
the single elements of each type of prejudice (Zick et al., 2012: 69). It is worth mentioning 
that the model includes both the list of the mostly discriminated groups, types of 
devaluation (racism and xenophobia), and plausible causes of prejudice. Among them 
there is so-called perceived superiority, which is the result of supporting a strict social 
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hierarchy, the other way round, the dominance of some groups over the others as a proper 
social order. 
This research design has revealed that the most devaluated group are asylum-
seekers; and this is respectively the strongest component of the group-focused enmity. 
This component is followed by xenophobia as a type of prejudice, then by racism; by 
Islam as a perceived threat; by perceived superiority as a cause of prejudice; then by 
homeless and Sinti and Roma etc. (other factors’ loadings are less than 0,7). The second 
part of the research design evaluates the relationships between the single components of 
the group-focused enmity and possible catalyzers of the group-focused enmity. Zick et 
al. (2012: 79) declares that the following characteristics and attitudes are positively 
correlated with the right-wing personal affinity (used as independent variables in the 
regression model): 
a) Strong social or ethnical identity and perceived threat to this identity as a 
result of the arrival of newcomers or of a presence of the outsiders is positively correlated 
with the group-focused enmity. Identity is a necessary component of the life satisfaction 
and important for orientation, because it demarcates the community, to which a 
respondent belongs. 
b) Perceived threat to security and legal order. 
c) Relative deprivation as a result of comparing itself with others or of 
outstanding expectations that were not realized. 
d) Advocacy of a strict discipline, obedience and law-and-order-policy, 
authoritarianism. 
e) Loss of orientation, anomia. 
f) Perceived loss of control over the local politics and society (perceived loss 
of the role of the citizen). 
g) Self-estimated political identification. Respondents who identified them 
with the right pole tended to demonstrate stronger xenophobic and authoritarian attitudes. 
h) Dominance as acceptance of the strong hierarchical order in society. 
i) Demographics - age, sex, education, income - play different role (see 
Tab.8. ). 
 
The analysis has shown that the personal predisposition to a discipline, 
obedience and law-and-order policy, or authoritarianism most often correlate with 
different types of prejudice (Zick et al., 2012: 73-74). Tab. 8. summarizes findings of this 
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research team.  
The members of the Heitmeyer’s team have conducted few other big surveys 
under the umbrella project “Against Right-wing Extremism”, sponsored by the Friedrich-
Ebert-Foundation. The right-wing extremism has begun to transform from the marginal 
culture into the philosophy of the German middle class, as the scholars argue. For this 
reason, a need for another longitudinal study emerged.  
In 2006 Decker and Brähler (2006) published the first findings. The scholars 
evaluated 6 personal attitudes that are considered as components of the right-wing 
affinity. Tab.9. illustrates the findings within a time span from 2002 to 2008 (Decker & 
Brähler, 2006, 2008). It is quite outstanding that the ranking of the components has not 
changed over time. Decker and Brähler attempted to link the components with the data 
on demographics as well as with the self-assessments of the respondents, including their 
life satisfaction, social embeddedness, political trust and relationships with parents. The 
cluster analysis revealed 15 type of personalities, divided in 3 big groups, of low, middle 
and high right-wing affinity. In a nutshell, the more open the person is, and the better the 
relationships with parents were, the less tolerance to the right-wing ideals this person 
demonstrates. Another extreme is a person, who accepts violence and racial or ethnical 
inequality, and who used to have bad relationships with parents and is not good in 
establishing new social contacts. In the middle there is a neutral type that does not support 
either equality, or inequality and is quite passive. This study has shown that social capital 
and education play significant role in the prevention of the syndrome of the group-focused 
enmity. The influence of other demographics was proved to be the same as in the study 
of Zick et al. (2012). In a report published in 2008 Decker and Brähler used similar 
research design (only without the cluster analysis) and confirmed that the personal right-
wing affinity in Germany has declined from 2002 to 2008 and that the federal states differ 
significantly regarding this issue (Decker & Brähler, 2008).  
Zick et al. (2011) applied the group-focused enmity model to a big European 
survey with the special focus on political attitudes. The scholars were interested in 
answering the question “What kind of citizen is predisposed to the right-wing affinity?”, 
whereas the research question of the previous study would be “What kind of personality 
is predisposed to the right-wing affinity?” The data analysis shown significant 
correlations between the group-focused enmity and the following political attitudes 
(ranged from the strongest to the weakest (Zick et al., 2011: 103): support for death 
penalty, desire for a strong leader, perceived political powerlessness, right-wing political 
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self-identification, low interest in politics, negative attitude to the EU, weak participation 
in the elections. The study delivered a portrait of a passive citizen, predisposed to 
obedience and xenophobia. This finding is similar to those of Decker and Brähler (2008), 
but depicts rather a fusion of the middle and high-level-affinity groups. 
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Table 9. 6 most common types of the right-wing attitudes: German respondents 
(Decker&Brähler, 2008). 
Place Components of the 
right-wing attitude 
Single values over time Arithmetic 
mean 
  2002 2004 2006 2008  
1 Xenophobia 26,9 25,5 26,7 21,2 25,075 
2 Chauvinism 18,3 19 19,3 14,9 17,875 
3 Anti-Semitism 9,3 10 8,4 9 9,175 
4 Advocating 
dictatorship 
7,7 6,4 4,8 3,7 5,65 
5-6 Social Darwinism 5,2 6,4 4,5 3,1 4,8 
5-6 The Third Reich 
sentiments 
4,1 4,1 4,1 3,2 3,875 
 
Zick et al. made few interesting remarks in the overview of the research field 
(Zick et al., 2011: 30-33). Referring the study of Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), the 
authors explain that the prejudice can be overt and covert, where the latter is a hidden one 
that is never expressed in a direct way. 
 
“Prejudices may be expressed openly and directly or in subtle, indirect and 
hidden ways. One important example of the latter is the  rejection or refusal 
of sympathy for a particular out-group, or the exaggeration of alleged cultural 
differences (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Covert prejudices consist of a series 
of arguments that on closer examination turn out to be similar regardless of 
which target group they are directed against. The negative characteristics of 
overt and covert prejudices are always the same: stupidity, laziness and 
indolence, uncleanliness, physical weakness and psychological instability, 
criminality, deviousness and slyness.”  (Zick et al., 2011: 30). 
 
This remark helps to understand, why the negative, devaluating attitudes to other 
groups are gathered under the umbrella definition of the group-focused enmity. It is not 
so much important, which group is hated. It is important that some groups are perceived 
as a second sort in relation to others. A prejudice even against one single group is a clear 
sign of rejection of human rights and equality of people. 
There are two more survey reports representing the European population. The 
findings of both of them link the right-wing affinity with the right-wing voting. The data 
analysis compares two group of respondents: those, who vote for right-wing parties and 
those, who do not. These contributions attempt to portray a typical right-wing party voter. 
 The study of Kitschelt (1995) uses 6 groups of 17 variables to contrast right-
wing voters and voters of other parties as well as to compare ideological streams in 
different countries. It is difficult to make any conclusion about a typical right-wing voter, 
but he or she tends to: advocate economic inequality; respect the army and state 
repressions; hardly trust in the mainstream press; possess a strong national or ethnical 
identity; be intolerant to other races and advocate job priority for nationals; be male and 
earn less than the voters of other parties (Kitschelt, 1995: 74).  
Roux (2011: 70) concentrated on the dimensions of modern ethnical prejudice 
in Europe: (1) xenophobia; (2) denial of cultural diversity; (3) authoritarianism; (4) strong 
political identification; (5) Islamophobia; (6) biological racism (is not significant in the 
regression model with control variables). Such attitudes do effect the right-wing voting. 
Roux explains significant differences in the weight of the single components by citing 
Myrdal’s work (Myrdal, 1944), who shows on the example of the American ethnical 
prejudice that, even if the society appreciates the principle of racial or ethnical equality, 
there are always lots of existing negative stereotypes about other races or ethnicities, the 
influence of which cannot be simply overcome (Roux, 2011: 53). It is probably even more 
difficult dilemma, considering the functional dimension of the prejudices that was 
discussed in the very beginning.  
Roux has built his research design upon the concept of group-focused enmity. 
So did Grau et al. (2012). Like in the study of Decker and Brähler (2008), the scholars 
were interested in discovering the mechanism of the right-wing affinity formation. They 
concentrated on the youth and on the influence of the personal environment over the 
emergence of xenophobia and suggested a model taking into account both context effects 
and individual factors. If there is a high unemployment rate in a community, then the 
spirit of the relative deprivation and loss of orientation grows and forms a xenophobic 
climate in the community. At the individual level, personal deprivation and especially the 
perceived loss of orientation together with the contextual effects cause the rise of 
xenophobia.  
Mansel et al. (2012) delivered another contribution with the same data set, but 
with more focus on the poor social conditions as causes of the outbreaks of xenophobia. 
The scholars confirmed that perceived poverty can influence the growth of xenophobic 
attitudes. 
As one can see, perceived threat to the economic interest and political apathy are 
very popular and probably powerful explanations of xenophobic sentiments. Another 
 study integrates them into the causal chain of the big social transformations and the 
growth of the personal right-wing affinity (Spier, 2010). Spier presents a model with 
indicators of a decline of the personal welfare as independent variables, right-wing 
attitudes as intervening variables and the right-wing voting as the dependent variable. He 
confirms that the co-called losers of modernization - social groups, whose welfare became 
worse as a consequence of modernization - tend to vote for the right-wing parties, but 
only if they were already predisposed to the prejudice attitudes before. The other way 
round, the right-wing affinity and the right-wing voting are catalyzed by the decline of 
the social welfare, but the social welfare alone does not explain the right-wing voting.  
It becomes obvious that the main companions of the right-wing personal 
attitudes are personal disenchantment (in the own social and economic status; in politics; 
in people etc.) and “the authoritarian character” (Stöss, 2010). That’s why the right-wing 
parties use the rhetoric of decadence and strict social order in addition to their core points 
in order to make their programs more attractive (Lenk, 2005:21). Supposedly, this 
rhetoric is also typical for their communication strategies in social networks. 
 
 
2.2. Personal attitudes and the research model of the present study 
 
The right-wing ideology exists not only in the form of the party programs and 
other officially published and unofficially disseminated documents, but also as a set of 
the personal attitudes. Different scholars suggested different components of the so-called 
syndrome of the group-focused enmity, but all agree on at least two central components: 
aversion or xenophobia, and advocacy of a strict social order and hierarchical 
categorization of people, sometimes as approval of the dictatorship or authoritarian state. 
Some scholars add re-interpretation of the history and associated sentiments (Decker & 
Brähler, 2006, 2008) as important components, or separate different kinds of aversion to 
show that this phenomenon changes over time and absorbs contemporary developments 
(Ibid; Heitmeyer, 2012). 
The literature on the right-wing personal attitudes and the syndrome of the 
group-focused enmity also provides an overview of possible catalyzers of the syndrome, 
like, perceived poverty, low socialization etc. If those are catalyzers of the syndrome in 
the real life, then it is rational to expect that the radical actors would try to embed them 
as ideas in their discourse that they use to touch these sore spots and exploit them.  
The concluding section of this Chapter will discuss in more detail how the 
 literature on the right-wing extremism and right-wing personal attitudes contribute to the 
present study, and how it is integrated into the theoretical model originated in the frame 
theory.  
 
 
Chapter 3. Gate keeper's decision: communicating the right-wing ideology 
 
 
The cascading activation model presumes that the public provides feedback to 
the media. While deciding about the news and the news frames, the media take into 
account what they think could be the expectations of the public, and assemble the media 
coverage that “sells”. On Facebook, the right-wing political actors are intended to 
promote their ideologies, but they are aware of the public taste, and for them it would be 
better to publish news that are applicable to the audience frames. The gate keeper makes 
a decision: to match the public taste or try to communicate “pure” ideology - with the 
limitations that the range of news imposes.  
The present study, despite empirically driven, accepts as a starting point for the 
data analysis that the main competition regarding the choice of news frames happens 
between two factors: ideological distances between the parties and media frames in the 
form of individual right-wing affinity, or the group-focused enmity (GFE). Regardless of 
the definition of both ideological distances and the syndrome of the GFE, we are 
interested in the principle behind the news selection. Admittedly, the GFE should be the 
key factor in making the choice, since the news frames on Facebook undergo the influence 
of the audience feedback twice: once as the media frames in the mainstream media (see 
Fig.10.) (arrow 1) and once as the Facebook gate keeper makes his choice (arrow 2). From 
the other side, not the whole population in Germany suffers from this syndrome. It means 
that it is necessary to distinguish between the feedback from the entire public and the 
feedback from the part of the public that has demonstrated right-wing extremism affinity. 
This leads to the further modification of the model: we split off a part of the public. In 
general, the influence of the group-focused enmity over the news frames should reveal 
itself in the frames depicting particular groups as causal agents of the negative situations, 
whereas the situations should coincide with the factors of the personal prejudice that cause 
or catalyze the syndrome. The question is, if the feedback from the audience is more 
decisive than the input from the parties as frame sponsors. If yes, then the group-focused 
enmity should dominate Facebook news frames. The news coverage can include few 
 overarching frames, common for all parties. For the cascading activation model (Entman, 
2003) this means that cultural congruence is more substantial explanatory variable than 
motivation, power and strategy: the right-wing political actors try to make their 
communication more congruent with the public opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Further modifications of the cascading activation model (own figure based on 
Entman (2003)). 
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 If there are no overarching frames in the news coverage on Facebook, but rather 
different sets of frames, each typical only for one party, than one should speak about 
ideology as the most decisive gate keeping factor and motivation and strategy as more 
robust explanations. Power as an explanatory variable would unlikely play any significant 
role: the assumption of the study is that the parties are marginalized.
 Part V. Right-wing extremism in Germany 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Following a deductive logic, the previous Parts have gradually moved from the 
definition of the right-wing extremism that defined a lowest common denominator of what 
can be labelled as right-wing towards the historical development of the phenomenon and 
then to the latest comparative studies that catch the modern developments in the right-wing 
scene. The last stage of the literature analysis will discuss the place that the German right-
wing parties occupy in this plurality. It will help to specify the input that the respective 
parties provide for the cascading activation, make the input more country-specific, and 
limit few agendas that are typical for the German parties.  
The Part V has a two-folded aim. Apart from bringing the discussion of the right-
wing extremism to the logical end, the Part V will draw few conclusions that are necessary 
to explore the hypothesis from the previous Part. The entire study is supposed to trace 
factors of the gate keeping decision. We should understand in advance, what would be a 
sign of each factor. The concluding section of the previous Part has stated that, if parties 
disseminate general, overarching frames, then the group-focused enmity plays a decisive 
role in the gate-keeping decision. If the parties disseminate unique frames of 4 types, then 
the input from the parties is the most decisive factor. To be able to catch these differences, 
and separate the influence of the group-focused enmity from the pure ideologies, the 
present Part will compare German right-wing parties with each other, explore their 
similarities and distinctive features, and, in the end, will place them into the universal 
classification scheme from the previous discussion. Each party will become scores for each 
of the 4 ideological pillars. The empirical Part of the study will compare these 
classifications with the structure of the media coverage, and will make a conclusion about 
the role of each factor in the gate keeping decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 1. Right-wing parties in Germany: a common overview 
 
 
Aims and limitations of the overview 
 
 
As well as the previous Chapters, this one will skip the period of the greatest 
success of the German right-wing parties, and will focus on the post-war time. As many 
scholars noted (Becher, 2013: 68; Hainsworth, 2008: 6), the German right-wing political 
parties have never experienced the same prosperity again, but rather an “episodic and 
limited success” (Hainsworth, 2008: 6). From the scholarly literature it becomes clear that 
the right-wing leaders in Germany often migrate from one party to the other, sometimes 
changing more than two, or changing from the membership in the youth organization of 
one party to the membership in the rival party (Becher, 2013).  
The weakness of the German radical parties resulted from their fragmentation and 
poor organization, because they tried to exploit the glory of NSDAP (Hainsworth, 2008: 
55). The parties are not only disintegrated and reluctant to cooperate, but also highly 
marginalized (Hainsworth, 2008: 56). Besides, they missed their biggest recent 
opportunity, when in 2005 the outcome of the parliamentary elections has enabled the 
creation of the "grand coalition government" that included all main German political 
parties. An absence of any parliamentary opposition provided a chance for all radical 
parties to attract more supporters during the next elections, but the right-wing parties did 
not use it (Ibid). They demonstrated a strategic weakness by losing another good occasion, 
when the recent financial crisis caused lots of economic problems, as well as 
unemployment (Ibid) that could help to trigger the growth of the right-wig individual 
affinity among the population.  
This chapter will concentrate on the four modern right-wing German political 
parties and will sketch the literature on these parties in order to make an inference about 
their ideological differences. The structure of the chapter follows the chronological order 
of their foundation years as well as moves along the radicalization axe from the least to the 
most radical ones. Since the present research has been started in January 2012 and the data 
collection followed in 2014, only the parties that were registered at that moment, have 
become a part of the selection. After the data collection has been finished, one of the parties 
- the Republicans - vanished and is not active anymore. Besides, another party entered the 
official party competition: the Alternatives for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or 
AfD), which was not registered as a party at the time of the data collection. Since every 
 research project should have a beginning and an end limited in time, space, and amount of 
data, the latter one was not included. In general, the inclusion of the parties into the research 
project was based on the fact that they were labelled as right-wing parties in the scientific 
literature (see extensive publications of such scholars as Uwe Backes, Christoph Busch, 
Alexander Häusler, Armin Pfahl-Trauber etc, who write a lot about the German right-wing 
extremism and are cited by many other academics worldwide).  
 
 
1.1. The National Democrats 
 
 
The history of the National Democrats (die Nationaldemokraitsche Partei) started 
in 1964, or even before, since it was founded by the former members of the German Empire 
Party (die Deutsche Reichspartei), at that time vanishing, and since some activists were the 
members of the National Socialist German Worker's Party, also known as NSDAP that was 
the ruling party in the Third Reich (Pfahl-Traughber, 1993: 67-68). 
The new party has demonstrated a strong ideological affiliation with NSDAP 
(Pfahl-Traughber, 1993: 68). Nationalism and trivialialization of the NS-time as well as a 
robust opposition to democratic order were among its main sentiments in the very 
beginning. The party experienced a fast success right after the foundation, and then 
declined even faster (Pfahl-Traughber, 1993: 67-69).  
In the 1970s the party has adopted new agenda - xenophobia - as its main 
ideological point (Pfahl-Traughber, 1993: 70). The party inspired and even supported few 
local civic initiatives from the umbrella movement "Stop the foreigners" 
("Ausländersstop"). The xenophobic emphasis did not work first, but then helped the party 
to attract new supporters and to stay inside the main political scene as a visible actor from 
the 1970s up to the late 1980s (Pfahl-Traughber, 1993: 71). During the same time period 
the National Democrats established an alliance with another German right-wing party - the 
German People's Union (die Deutsche Volksunion, DVU). The alliance existed until 1990. 
In 1987, after the decade of a stable success in the local elections, the National 
Democrats have announced a new party program with much more softer statements in order 
to avoid being banned and to create a public image of the moderate right-wing party (Pfahl-
Traughber, 1993: 71). The real ambitions of the party were communicated through the 
magazine Deutsche Stimme that appears regularly since 1976 (Pfahl-Traughber, 1993: 72). 
This fact confirms that the communication channels, including Facebook, can say more 
 about the party than the party program. The dominant theme in the articles of Deutsche 
Stimme are xenophobia, attack on the democratic institutions, trivialization of the Nazi-
time. Later the National Democrats and the Deutsche Stimme experienced the influence of 
the New Right and incorporated such ideas as ethnopluralism, traditionalism, and mixture 
of capitalism9 and communism10. 
 After the re-unification of Germany in 1989, the party tried to establish a 
cooperation with few right-wing parties from the former West Germany, but failed to do 
it. In 1991 the party went through some serious internal controversies that ended up when 
the few key figures left the party and joined other right-wing organizations (Pfahl-
Traughber, 1993: 73-74). In the same year the party was vanished, but then was founded 
again and from now on it mainly advocates revisionism11 and xenophobic sentiments that. 
Pfahl-Traughber argues (Pfahl-Traughber, 1993: 74) that this is a bad strategy for the party, 
because it brings it back to the old program of 1970s and does not provide a step forward.  
Describing the National Democrats, different scholars suggest different keywords. 
Hainsworth (2008: 16) calls it "crypto-fascist", which means fascism that exploits political 
mythology. Bruter and Harrison (2011) have placed the National Democrats in the 
populist-repressive pillar of their classification scheme (see Chapter 1 of the Part I); and 
Minkenberg (2011: 49) considers them as both racist-ethnocentric and fascist-autocratic.  
The long history of the National Democrats, their survival in spite of the 
ideological fluctuations and long-lasting crisis makes them an interesting research object. 
The NPD supplied other parties with key personalities and remains an ideological bridge 
between the Old and the New Right in Europe. 
 
 
1.2. The Republicans 
 
The Republicans (die Republikaner) have started in 1983, and emerged as the right 
wing of one of the biggest German mainstream political parties, the Christian Socialist 
                                                
9 
  Capitalism as an ideology and economic and/or social system suggests three core elements: market 
economy, private property, and profit maximization as primary goal and motivation and value 
(Andersen, 2011). 
10 
  Communism refers to a political order where the collective interests are the primary value beyond the 
value of human, and where no private property exists (Esser, 2011). 
11 
  The term “revisionism” encompasses policies and political standpoints that promote revision of the 
state borders (Schubert & Klein, 2011: 251). 
 
 Union (Becher, 2013: 68). From the very first days the Republicans did not possess any 
strong organizational potential (Becher, 2013: 69). Their ideology was based on such 
elements, as ethnopluralism, authoritarianism and neoliberalism12 (Ibid). In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s they were successful in obtaining mandates in the local parliaments and 
even in the European Parliament, where they joined the Technical Group of the European 
Right, an alliance, that included also the French Front National and the Belgian Vlaams 
Block (the Flemish Block) (Haisnworth, 2008: 54). After the reunification of Germany the 
Republicans have notably declined, and in 1994 stepped into the more moderate ideological 
path (Haisnworth, 2008: 55).  
The scholars of the right-wing extremism tend to reckon that in the early 1990s 
there were too many right-wing parties in Germany at one time, including the National 
Democrats, the Republicans, the German People’s Union (DVU) as well as few minor 
parties and associations, so they competed with each other, but failed to create any strong 
alliance (Haisnworth, 2008: 54-55). Probably, there has been not enough demand for the 
radical solutions from the electorate to let all parties have a sufficient share of votes. 
Anyway, in the early 1990s the Republicans managed to enter few local parliaments, but 
now remains rather lethargic.  
Regarding their ideological positioning, the Republicans seem to be more 
pragmatic than the National Democrats (de Raadt, 2004: 19). They offer simple and 
realistic ideas. First, the public funds “should be reserved primarily or solely for “insiders” 
(Haisnworth, 2008: 78). Mudde names this argument “welfare chauvinism” (Mudde, 
2007). To support their xenophobic sentiments, the Republicans explicitly link 
immigration with the outbreak of criminality (Haisnworth, 2008: 76), and promote law-
and-order policy “including punitive sentencing, strengthening of police forces, the 
provision of tougher prison regimes, and the return of the death penalty for capital 
offenses …  (Haisnworth, 2008: 77). They also exploit the “foreigners invade labour 
market”- argument quite often (Bergsdorf, 2000). 
The Republicans challenged the National Democrats by delivering the clear 
picture of the ideal society and family relationships, and managed to attract voters, who 
felt socially disoriented. This factor proved to be influential for the personal right-wing 
affinity (Zick et al., 2012: 79). The party exploits all typical sentiments of the traditional 
society, like anti-abortion, homophobia, emphasis on the marriage as a primary aim of each 
                                                
12 
  Neoliberalism is a development in the liberal thought that tolerates state interventions into the market 
economy that should protect the principle of fair competition (Holtmann, 2000: 416). 
 
 person and the only acceptable kind of relationships between men and women. Trying to 
avoid any accuses in sexism, the Republicans depicted women as brave and lovely mothers 
and housekeepers. They advocate financial aid for women staying at home to raise their 
children (Haisnworth, 2008: 80).  
In the classification schemes from the Part IV the Republicans occupy diverse 
places. Bruter and Harrison (2011) says they are rather in the populist reactionary pillar. 
Minkenberg located them into the racist-ethnocentric group (Minkenberg, 2011: 49). De 
Raadt et al. (2004: 19) say that the program of the Republicans includes many references 
to people and they therefore must be considered as populist. Their version of populism is 
very particularistic and pragmatic one; it offers concrete solutions rather than the abstract 
values, also when it comes to the struggle against the establishment and abolishment of the 
direct democracy, although, the party has few romantic sentiments too. Being populist, the 
Republicans highlight not only the confrontation between people and elites, but also 
between social institutions and elites (Ibid), and that allows to label them as an anti-
democratic party (Hainsworth, 2008: 17).  
Wodak finds that the Republicans are not only nationalistic, but also Social 
Darwinistic, because they exploit the argument of the natural order (Wodak, 2013: 153). 
Nowadays, they also demonstrate strong anti-Muslim sentiments (Ibid).  
The attitude of the Republicans to Europe has changed over time. In the 1990s 
they used to be pro-EU, like many other European right-wing parties. They inherited this 
standpoint from the Christian Socialists, but then switched to being totally Eurosceptic, 
rejecting any forms of the European cooperation (Mudde, 2007: 162; Hainsworth, 2008: 
82). 
Having in mind that the National Democrats and the Republicans gave birth to 
other right-wing actors, including political parties, it is impossible to underestimate their 
influence over the right-wing scene. The next section will deal with the offspring of both 
parties and will try to trace ideological heritage of the former. 
 
 
1.3. The PRO NRW 
 
In 1996 few former members of the National Democrats and of the Republicans 
gave birth to a broad German anti-Muslim right-wing movement, which is known as the 
PRO-movement (die PRO-Bewegung). Three big associations constitute the movement: 
the oldest PRO Köln (founded in 1996), the PRO Deutschland (2005) and the PRO NRW 
 (2007), with the latter registered as political party. The party has managed to get a few 
mandates in the local parliaments of the North-Rhein Westphalia (Becher, 2013: 71). 
There are three peculiarities that distinguish the PRO NRW from the National 
Democrats and the Republicans. First of all, the PRO emphasizes the struggle against 
Islamization. Second, it is less advocative about the authoritative state and inequality in 
general. And, third, they are very active and successful in building international 
cooperations with other European Right (Backes, 2013). Initially, the leaders of the 
German PRO-Movement were solely against the illegal migrants from the Muslim 
countries and perceived the law-abiding Muslims as their possible allies (Backes, 2013: 
152). But then, following the common European trend, the PRO switched from the anti-
Islamization to anti-Islam sentiments, referring to the Muslims as Islamists and to Islam as 
equal to Islamization, which are both wrong. 
During this turn the PRO NRW dropped their typical anti-Semitic rhetoric, or at 
least pretended to do so to avoid suspicions in being too radical (Backes, 2013: 158). The 
anti-Islam agenda is probably exploited only as a strategic instrument to win new voters 
(Backes, 2013: 158). That seems to be a rational explanation, considering the high level of 
Islamophobia among the European population (Zick et al., 2012. The PRO-Movement and 
other European Right even established a cooperation with the Israeli right-wing parties 
(Backes, 2013).  
In the center of the whole anti-Muslim argumentation there is an old nationalistic 
idea of the “Abendland” (the Western World). Christianity and western society are in 
danger not only because of the possible overturn by other religion, but also because of the 
totally different social order and culture that are supposed to be an inevitable part of Islam. 
The PRO NRW announced their own diagnosis of decadence, in accordance to which 
Europe is gradually vanishing under the pressure of the Muslim invasion.  
The PRO NRW advocates exit of Germany from the euro zone, and is generally 
against the EU. It often tries to blame German and European governments in overprotecting 
the mythic Islamist lobby and repressions against those, who resist Islamization (Backes, 
2013).  
The party attempts to look rather moderate and not to attack personal freedoms, 
and do not promote the collective identity so much. The PRO NRW is an example of the 
trendy political strategies that beat their elder rivals by focusing on one concrete enemy 
and not on the abstract ideal future. It would be interesting to see, to which extent they 
inherited traditional nationalistic arguments and to what extent they have adopted the 
populist ones.  
  
1.4. The Right 
 
 
The Right (die Rechte) is the youngest German right-wing party and was founded 
in 2012 (Busch, 2014: 141). The real history of the Right, like of many others, started with 
the German People’s Party, that used to be rather a “phantom party” (Ibid).  
Like many other German right-wing parties, the Right is a leader party (Busch, 
2014: 145), a kind of a personal project; in this case of Christian Worch, who used to be 
inside the German People's Union, and then switched to the Free German Worker’s Party 
(die Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeitspartei). The latter was declared by the Constitutional 
Court of Germany as not meeting the requirements of a party (it did not try to take part in 
the elections), and then was banned in 1995. Worch was active in the neo-nationalistic (so-
called neo-Nazi) scene and then eventually founded his own party (Ibid).  
Busch (2014: 142, 143, 147) defines the general profile of the Right as neo-
nationalistic. The program is a slightly upgraded one of the German People's Union, with 
direct quotes from that of NSDAP. The program starts with the formal acceptance of 
democratic order, which, Busch says (Busch, 2014: 142) is simply a trick, but then it is 
followed with the populist sentiments, like strong critique of the establishment. The friend-
or-foe-scheme (“Freund-Feind-Denken”) belongs to the most important pillar of the 
program (Busch, 2014: 143). For instance, the program emphasizes ethnical homogeneity 
as an ideal order and depicts the other ethnic groups as homogeneous and as enemies. 
These groups are migrants and Muslims. The program supports its strong emphasis on the 
out-group identity with the specific diagnosis of decadence, by saying that Germany is 
occupied by migrants and by delivering the dramatic, but abstract, picture of its future 
(Ibid). The natural order postulates that the ethnical division is the result of the natural 
processes and changing it is dangerous and will surely lead to the decline of the mankind 
(Ibid). As a logical consequence of such combination, the Right also demonstrates a strong 
anti-US and anti-EU sentiments, rejecting any possible international cooperation.  
Since their foundation in 2012, the Right has reached little success, and solely at 
the local level. Busch points out that it was a result of the weak election campaigning 
(Busch, 2014: 147). The party has chosen rather deviating agendas, like solidarity with 
imprisoned right-wing activists, solidarity within the right-wing scene, and the 
confrontation with the state, with blaming it in oppressing the right-wing organizations. 
Besides, the party showed little effort in conducting the campaign as well as in maintaining 
 its presence in the media, even in social media (Busch, 2014: 146).  
The party places itself between the National Democrats that are more radical and 
the Republicans and the PRO NRW that are less radical than the Right. In fact, the Right 
can be considered the most radical right-wing party in Germany nowadays (Busch, 2014: 
144). It is also worth mentioning that the party has absorbed few associations that were 
banned and that the party highlights its mission as an organization that provides shelter to 
all right-wing activists “oppressed” by the state (Ibid). Therefore, the party has a strong 
anti-democratic profile and with it manifested sympathies for struggle and militarization it 
can be classified as a fascist one (Stöß, 2010).  
Other five key words that describe the party are autocratic, fascist, racist, 
ethnocentric and populist (Minkenberg, 2011). While the elder parties have managed to 
adapt to the realm of democracy, the Right seems to resume the struggle against it and 
occupied the most challenging position in the right-wing spectrum in Germany. 
 
 
1.5. 4 parties 
 
 
The German right-wing parties demonstrate both differences and similarities.  
First of all, they share a common past, and, therefore, cannot avoid talking about 
this past. Now this issue is weakly covered, since too much attention to the Third Reich 
would cause a drop in the voters’ support. The second common characteristic follows from 
the general passion of the right-wing actors for the anti-Islamization. There is no party 
among described four that would demonstrate no anti-Muslim sentiments. The difference 
is only in the extent to which the anti-Islamization pre-occupies single actors. For instance, 
for the PRO NRW this would be a core statement.  
The main demarcation line between parties lies not in the ideological area, but in 
their organizational strength and the degree of radicalization. The latter point still has to do 
with the ideology. Parties that are oriented toward electoral competition avoid radical 
arguments against the democratic order and human rights, like the National Democrats and 
the PRO NRW. The Right do not hesitate to publish such statements, but this party does 
not seem interested in being elected.  
The organizational weakness is common for all German right-wing parties. The 
National Democrats and the PRO NRW still invest time and money to get into office, 
whereas the Republicans are gradually vanishing, and the Right in more engaged in the 
 informal right-wing scene than in the mainstream politics.  
This has few implications for the current research. The presence of both 
differences and similarities in the ideological sphere gives an impulse to the comparative 
nature of the present study. If there are differences between the parties, to what extent are 
they reflected in the news frames? It seems quite reasonable to expect that the differences 
will blur, even if the choice of the news coverage is limited. Still, the parties might try to 
deliver a unique content, especially those that are particularly interested in electoral 
competition.  
There is a practical implication that concerns the data collection and data analysis. 
The strong parties are likely to produce a lot of a content, since nowadays the electoral 
competition also takes place on Facebook. Since the weak parties would probably produce 
less content, it is highly probable that this content, as a result of a weak and unmotivated 
effort, would provide fewer generalizable conclusions.   
 
 
Chapter 2. Comparing German parties 
 
 
2.1. Developing a right-wing parties’ classification for the media study 
 
 
The review made it clear that the right-wing extremism is extremely multifaceted. 
The authorities worldwide stay highly concerned with the prevention of hate and violence 
that the right-wing actors proliferate. Scholars try to contribute to this struggle by exploring 
the causes of success of the right-wing parties and of outbreaks of the right-wing attitudes 
among citizens. In the process of finding causalities, scholars often try to classify existing 
right-wing actors and allocate them among different dimensions that enable comparison 
and hypothesis testing. 
Classifications are essential for finding causalities. Fundamentally, developing a 
classification means choosing single dimensions that can represent ranking of the units of 
analysis (parties or other right-wing actors) that would be based on the measurements of 
their particular characteristics acquired through the comparable empirical data. For 
instance, the degree of radicalization as a dimension can be measured as a number of radical 
statements, counted in the interviews with the parties’ leaders. The other dimensions can 
be degree of xenophobia, degree of authoritarianism etc. The classification as a multi-
dimensional space provides overview of relations between certain characteristics and 
 shows that the measurements of two or more characteristics can demonstrate negative or 
positive correlations, though, increase or drop together or increase and drop in opposite 
directions. The multi-dimensional space can help finding clusters of cases (parties or other 
actors), if for some of them the same characteristics demonstrate similar measurements.  
The classifications can be seen as matrices of dependent and independent 
variables and relations between them. They may show relationships between characteristics 
of a study object, - a right-wing party – or they may test relationships between external 
environment and characteristics of the object (Flyvbjerg, 2006). There are studies that try 
to link, for example, electoral success with the ideological positions within the right-wing 
party family (Bruter & Harrison, 2011). A lot of studies look into the internal structures of 
the right-wing parties and try to understand their evolution over time (Bötticher, 2008).  
Other studies incorporate historical context. Roux (2011) suggests that one fruitful 
way to get significant results is to examine variations of a single characteristic over time. 
By doing this, Roux shows the varieties of the ethnocentrism within the right-wing party 
family and how the ethnocentrist dimension interacts with other dimensions of the right-
wing ideology, depending on the local and historical context. 
The personal attitudes studies mainly use factor and cluster analysis, but follow 
the same logic in elaborating the research design. They look for the correlations between 
characteristics, and whether there can be an influential factor behind these correlations. For 
instance, Zick et al. (2008, 2011, 2012) and Zick and Küpper (2012) used to group the 
questions in the surveys to reveal types of the xenophobic attitudes among the European 
citizens. The researchers supposed that the xenophobic attitudes can emerge together with 
the belief that foreigners are growing in number and that they are acquiring jobs that the 
natives could get in their absence. Therefore, the scholars used to identify what kind of 
perceived threat the foreigners are associated with. Xenophobia in general was a first 
dimension of the analysis, and the authoritarianism – the second one. The latter basically 
had two values: an approval for a strong state leader and approval for the strict social order 
(Zick et al., 2011). The factor analysis examined relationships between two dimensions. 
Results of the cluster analysis revealed types of personalities that demonstrate affinity to 
the right-wing ideology (Ibid). 
The previous Chapter has proved that comparing the right-wing parties in 
Germany can be a puzzling task. Whereas two of them - the National Democrats and the 
Republicans - have a long history and have changed a lot of agendas, the other two - the 
PRO NRW and the Right - emerged only recently as one-issue-parties. It poses a question 
of comparison dimensions that would catch the differences between all parties, but would 
 not eliminate the peculiarities of the one-issue-parties too much.  
It was decided to employ the comparison dimensions of Harrison and Bruter 
(Bruter & Harrison, 2011). The scheme has two underlying principles. First, 4 ideological 
pillars constitute ideology of every single right-wing party. Second, the pillars are paired, 
so that xenophobic and populist, and reactionary and repressive are mutually suppressive, 
and the dominance of only two pillars is possible for each party.  
 
 
2.2. Integration of the anti-Islamization sentiments 
 
 
The rise of the Right and the PRO NRW took place after the publication of the 
book of Bruter and Harrison, so they were not included in the analysis. As it was already 
mentioned before, there is a clear demarcation within the German right-wing party family, 
with the old parties having long history - the National Democrats and the Republicans - on 
the one side, and the new - the Right and the PRO NRW - one-issue-parties on the other. 
The current section will try to allocate the latter within the dimensions proposed by Bruter 
and Harrison. 
Bruter and Harrison (Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 4) have stated that “anti-
immigration parties” would be the best overarching depiction for the right-wing parties, 
since the “anti-immigration”- thesis has prevailed in the parties’ programs and manifest 
over the last 70 years. Yet, the anti-Islamization thesis of the newest right-wing parties 
goes far beyond the immigration control, since many Muslims have been living in Europe 
for quite a time, and they cannot be objectively treated as newcomers. Another significant 
turn was undertaken by the PRO NRW, when the party established cooperation networks 
with the right-wing activists from Israel, despite the anti-Semitism always played a central 
role in the right-wing extremist ideology. It can easily happen that the German right-wing 
parties will give up the anti-Islamization as their main thesis, as soon as the public will be 
fed up with it, and it stops bringing new voters, or when another attractive hot issue 
emerges. The anti-Islamization has become a popular trend after the 9/11, and was 
intensified by the so-called War on Terror, by military invasions and conflicts in the Middle 
East, and was heated up (probably, unintentionally) by the American White House. This 
must have few implications for the further analysis. 
The anti-Islamization thesis should not be assigned solely to the xenophobic pillar 
as a special case of xenophobia, since this would neglect some facets of the phenomenon. 
 The first idea, that comes into mind, is that, maybe, the xenophobic pillar is just a too 
general concept, and that just introducing types of xenophobia as further dimensions would 
solve the problem. But then it raises the question of how xenophobia should be treated and, 
therefore, how the scores for the xenophobic pillar should be calculated. Should the parties 
get less scores, because their aggression is directed toward sonly one single group, and they 
do not have anything against other groups? Or should they get more scores for expressing 
discrete sentiments, because more specialized xenophobia means more radicalization, since 
the aggression is more concrete and more affective? To answer this questions, one should 
think more broadly, and look at the anti-Islamization thesis as a possible component for 
each of four ideological pillars. Anti-Islamization thesis is multidimensional.  
Of course, the anti-Islamization includes a xenophobic argument in the first place. 
This increases the share of the xenophobic pillar. The next section will explain in details 
the differences between the two parties. Following their brutal argumentation, both the 
PRO NRW and the Right call for the physical suppression of the Muslim population and 
its deportation from Europe. This increases the share of the repressive pillar. As the parties 
depict Islam as a threat to the European culture (“christliches Abendland”), they indirectly 
communicate their idea of the ideal, homogeneous society. This allows to place few scores 
into the reactionary pillar. The populist pillar does not remain empty as well, since the 
parties often contrast mainstream politicians and ordinary citizens by criticizing the former 
for their lack of action against the threat of Islamization.  
Nevertheless, the PRO NRW and the Right do differ in their anti-Islamization 
sentiments, especially, in the degree of the radicalization of the proposed methods of the 
struggle against the cultural decline of Europe. 
 
 
2.3. Placement of the PRO NRW and the Right into the elaborated classification 
dimensions 
 
 
The task of the current section is to fill in with the missing scores the Fig.7. from 
the Chapter 2 of the Part IV. The identification of the ideological differences was based on 
the theoretical elaboration of Bruter and Harrison as well as the key words that they provide 
in their book (Bruter & Harrison, 2011). Since the German government exhibits a strong 
control over the local radical right-wing scene, and monitors all contents published by the 
right-wing actors, the official programs of the German right-wing parties cannot serve as a 
reliable data source for the analysis (Busch, 2014). For this reason, the secondary literature 
 was examined to match the definitions of the ideological pillars of Bruter and Harrison 
(2011) with the ideological positions of the two youngest German right-wing parties. Two 
most recent articles that scrupulously collected the most important evidences were chosen. 
The results are presented in the Tab.10., which gives examples of the key statements and 
counts the scores assigned on the basis of them. The Fig.9. illustrates scores of all parties. 
Both parties get a lot of scores for the xenophobic pillar. The parties express 
general negative attitude to the Muslims. However, the character of the Islamophobia is 
not identical for all parties. 
The Right demonstrates aversion to migrants, Jews, left activists and few other 
groups alongside with the aversion to Muslims. In addition to that, the party criticizes 
Americanization of the European and German culture. Furthermore, the Right differentiate 
between cultural threat, economic loss, shortage of the living facilities, and criminality as 
consequences of the immigration inflows and the co-existence with “Others”. 
The PRO NRW has a single emphasis. The party confuses such completely 
different phenomena as Islam, Islamization, and jihadism, convincing their adherents that 
these phenomena are inseparable (Backes, 2013). The PRO NRW particularly emphasize 
violent, totalitarian, and inhuman character of Islam and that the jihadism is an inevitable 
part of it (Ibid). The PRO NRW strongly contrasts locals and outlanders by portraying a 
homogeneous “We”-group, using the idea of “christliches Abendland” as their main 
argument (Ibid). 
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Figure 11. Quantitative shares of ideological pillars of the 4 German parties (own figure 
based on Bruter&Harrison (2011), Busch (2014) and Backes (2013)). 
 
Both parties are famous for advocating radical methods (see the repressive pillar). 
Despite they are both registered political parties, the Right is far less concerned with 
participating in the German politics through legal representation, and is reluctant to take 
part in the election campaigns (Busch, 2014). The Right is more known as the mediator of 
the disintegrated radical right-wing scene (Busch, 2014). Quite often it openly calls for 
violence, sometimes in the allegorical form that is, nonetheless, comprehensible for the 
audience. The Right often attacks mainstream politicians and public persons in its 
publications in a rather aggressive form (Busch, 2014). The PRO NRW, calling for the 
deportation of all Muslim population, often takes part in the umbrella initiatives as well as 
does not hesitate to make use of the institutionalized methods, like elections.  
Each party receives a very few scores for the populist pillar, yet, the Right gets 
more for menacing the mainstream politicians. 
The PRO NRW gets more scores for the reactionary pillar, since it speculates with 
the ideas of ideal society more often than the Right and in a more sophisticated form.  
The distribution of scores confirms the thesis of Bruter and Harrison that some 
ideological pillars are mutually suppressive. Thus, both parties demonstrate strong 
xenophobic and weak populist arguments. The couple reactionary-repressive also provides 
support for the thesis: the more repressive is the party the less it theorizes about the ideal 
society. In the end, both parties can be defined as xenophobic-repressive, with the 
difference that the PRO NRW has more predisposition to the reactionism.  
 
  
Conclusion 
 
As it was already mentioned, Bruter and Harrison investigated the link between 
the electoral success of the European right-wing political parties and their placement in the 
ideological space. Since some parties are more successful than the others, the authors 
scrutinized the variance of such success and its co-variance with the ideological differences 
between parties. Changes in the ideological placement that have happened over time have 
demonstrated the same pace as the trend of electoral victories and failures, so that Bruter 
and Harrison have concluded that there is a law of a proper ideological placement that can 
boost electoral success (Bruter & Harrison, 2011). 
Harrison and Bruter have drawn the inference that the “optimal location for a new 
party: [is] opposite to the historical party” (Bruter & Harrison, 2011: 115), where a 
historical party is the one that has existed for a while before the new one emerged. 
Considering that the National Democrats occupied the populist-repressive pillar, and the 
Republicans have settled in the populist-reactionary pillars, both the PRO NRW and the 
Right made a quite optimal choice by occupying the xenophobic-repressive niche. Fig. 9. 
illustrates this. The vectors of PRO NRW and the Right are quite opposite to that of the old 
parties. The placement is not perfect, since both parties occupied it and have to compete 
with each other. Besides, they are both challenged by the National Democrats, which also 
exploit repressive arguments, and which is the oldest right-wing party in Germany.  
The ideological niche is not only expressed in the parties’ programs. It is present 
in each manifest and each message that the party publishes. From this point of view, the 
Facebook communication is also a part of this struggle and should demonstrate the same 
trend as the other communication channel exploited by the parties. 
The present study investigates the relationships between ideological positioning 
and the content that parties choose from the mainstream media for publishing on Facebook. 
The logic of the study involves finding out the underlying principle behind the choice of 
the content that can explain the differences between Facebook frames. The Facebook 
frames either reflect the ideological distances between the parties, or the influence of the 
audience preferences measured as the syndrome of the group-focused enmity.   
 Part VI. Research questions and hypothesis 
 
 
The previous Parts has followed a guideline proposed in the Introduction and 
illustrated by the Fig.1. The Fig.1. has been a “row” model of the whole study. The Parts I 
to V had a task to convert the considerations from the Introduction into a research model. 
Facebook communication has a special meaning for the users. It not only provides them 
with information, but serves a platform for interpersonal communication and socialization. 
For this reason, the users feel quite involved in the life of this social network, and the 
informing function of Facebook goes beyond a simple information consumption, but 
provides users with digital artefacts (posts and links) that they share on the timelines and 
that become a part of their online identity and serve as an extension of their offline identity. 
The news coverage that appears on Facebook is more than just information: what the users 
read, is a building block of their identity. Moreover, if a user subscribes to a Facebook (fan) 
page, he makes a clear statement to his whole circle of friends, what his interests and 
affiliations are (Toma, 2013). Political parties can make use of this identity enlargement 
function of Facebook, and reach their voters and strengthen the affiliation of the latter by 
different methods, for instance, by re-posting a favorable media coverage.  
Facebook is a unique communication channel that has a potential to contribute 
significally to the expansion of the online radical communication. So far the radical 
political actors exploited online communication channels quite extensively, but Facebook 
would provide them with a possibility to involve their users more intensively, on a 
qualitatively new level. This happens because of the high social importance of Facebook 
as well as because of one particular function that is in the focus of the present study and 
that plays a remarkable role for the entire political communication. Media surveillance, or 
media monitoring, enabled by Facebook, helps radical parties to overcome their exclusion 
by the mainstream media. The social nature of Facebook as communication channel 
imposes restrictions on the extent, to which radical political parties are able to speak up 
and spread their ideologies. The study examines media frames that are embedded in the 
news coverage that the radical political parties re-post on Facebook. The study tries to find 
out the underlying principle of the news selection, and assumes that the selection is based 
on the intention to impose or strengthen particular cognitive structures that favor the right-
wing ideology. 
The cascading activation model, proposed by Entman (2003) and elaborated and 
modified in the present study perfectly embraces both opportunities and restrictions of 
 Facebook. The radical parties do get an opportunity to break into the frame building process 
that was usually moderated by the mainstream political actors and mainstream media, but 
that the radical parties still has to take into account the expectations of their target 
audiences. The interplay of these two factors – the input from the political parties in the 
form of their ideology, or the audience expectations in the form of the group-focused 
enmity – remains unclear. The modified cascading activations model helps to find out, 
which of them is more decisive. 
Three overarching research questions follow from the modifications made in the 
cascading activation model and embrace the phenomenon of the re-posted media coverage 
from the macro perspective:  
 
What role does Facebook play in the cascading activation?(RQ1) 
What role does Facebook play for the right-wing parties?(RQ2) 
What kind of frames do the right-wing parties disseminate via Facebook by re-posting the 
mainstream media coverage?(RQ3) 
 
From these general questions more detailed questions may be deducted which 
address the micro perspective of the frame building processes, and include few directions 
of analysis. The first question aims at reconstructing the manipulations with slots and 
default values, and how the right-wing parties maintain their frames.  
 
How do the right-wing parties assemble their frames out of the mainstream media 
coverage? (RQ4) 
 
Then it is important to look for the general causalities that the right-wing actors 
try to highlight, and how this advocates the right-wing ideology. Ideology is a normative 
portrait of reality (Sainsbury, 1980), whereas media frames are more fact-based, empirical. 
Media can promote ideologies in different ways, roughly speaking, by emphasizing rational 
or irrational - emotionally based - arguments.    
 
How does the re-posted media coverage legitimize the right-wing ideology?(RQ5) 
 - How does the re-posted media coverage rationalize the right-wing  
 ideology? (RQ5.1) 
 - How does the re-posted media coverage justify the right-wing  
 ideology? (RQ5.2.) 
 How does it reflect the ideal social order of the right-wing extremism? (RQ6) 
 
Further, the present study is interested in the constellations of frames and their 
relationships with the right-wing ideology as their cultural source. These constellations can 
appear either as four ideological pillars, or as a structure of the group-focused enmity, 
perhaps even some other principle, which the empirical data might unveil. 
 
How does the re-posted media coverage reflect the structure of the right-wing ideology? 
(RQ7) 
How does the re-posted media coverage reflect the four ideological pillars that constitute 
the right-wing ideology? (RQ8) 
How does the re-posted media coverage reflect the structure of the group-focused enmity? 
(RQ9) 
Does the structure of the re-posted media coverage demonstrate any other characteristics? 
(RQ10) 
  
In the end, it is rational to ask about the differences between parties to make sure 
that Facebook allows them to keep distance from each other, demonstrate their uniqueness, 
and that Facebook, therefore, reflects the ideological competition between the parties.  
 
Does the re-posted media coverage reflect the diversity of the ideological standpoints of 
different parties as well as ideological distances between the parties? (RQ11) 
 
The answer to RQ4 explains mechanisms of the frame building. It focuses on the 
frames as maintainable devices consisting of elements that in some other sequence would 
constitute another frame. RQ1 asks why and how the elements make up these particular 
right-wing frames. RQ 5-6 link the frame theory with the theories of ideology, and with the 
studies on the right-wing extremism on Germany, concretizing the German case and 
exploring its peculiarities. The RQs 7 to 11 deal with the gate keeping role of the Facebook 
pages of the right-wing parties, and try to explore the influence of different factors over the 
gate keeping decision. Such influence should be traceable if the frames can be classified 
on the basis of any similarities, or of a function that they perform. As an outcome, the study 
should provide answers to the overarching research question, and describe in smallest 
details how the Facebook pages are exploited by the right-wing parties for transmitting 
their ideologies and filtering the mainstream media cover
 Part VII. Empirical study 
 
 
Chapter 1. Data collection and data analysis 
 
 
1.1. Data collection and sampling 
 
 
The present study focuses on Facebook posts, published by the German right-wing 
political parties that include links to the online editions of the mainstream printed press. 
Thus, the study examines news articles from the mainstream media.  
The data sample, as it is usual for the studies on media coverage, was based on a 
time period that is identical for all entities producing the content. The study on the gate 
keeping role of Facebook followed this tradition in order to control the influence of the key 
events: if there are any key events then they are the same for selected Facebook pages. If 
the parties pay different amount of attention to the same key events, then it reveals the 
differences between their communication strategies. If the key events are given different 
amounts of attention this can help to make conclusions about the gate keeping role of 
Facebook.  
The data sample consisted of 213 articles published between 01.01.2014 and 
31.07.2014., and was collected during the first two weeks of August 2014. 
The time period was chosen for the following reasons. These reasons had to do limited 
resources as well as with the developments in the political life of Germany that were 
supposed to be reflected in the news coverage, and in the re-posted news coverage. It was 
decided to collect news articles that would report the up-to-date events and issues, but the 
time period should be free from campaign slogans, and show what the real agendas of the 
parties are. In the first part of 2014 no significant regional elections were held in Germany. 
Still, few important events, mainly conflicts, have taken place. During February and March 
Russia had annexed the peninsula of Crimea that belonged to the Ukraine. That was a result 
of a military invasion. The rise of the Islamic state was among the top news in 2014. In 
Germany, a local scandal occurred. One of the prominent politicians, who happened to be 
a head of the parliamentary committee that supervised an investigation against few right-
wing terrorists a while ago, was prosecuted as a holder of the child pornography, which is 
 illegal in Germany.  
Before the final data collection followed, few test samples were collected to 
decide between automatic and manual methods as well as to choose an optimal time period 
that would provide a data sample that is big enough, but requires no pre-selection of the 
news articles. These test samples have shown that one week provides almost no data, one 
month provides very few, and few months provide enough data to catch all peculiarities of 
it. A longer time period would not allow the scholar to include all the articles in the data 
analysis, because the qualitative data analysis prescribes to concentrate on fewer pieces 
that can be embraced in their entirety. That would be impossible with a very big data set. 
The data set consisted of 15 articles posted by the Right, 100 posted by the 
National Democrats, 80 by the PRO NRW and 17 by the Republicans. The mainstream 
media included 19 national newspapers like die Welt, der Spiegel, Bild etc. and few 
transcripts from the national TV companies, like WDR. Less important media were 
excluded from the data analysis.  
The data was collected automatically with the help of Netvizz, a Facebook-
integrated application. The application is accessible through the search field on the top of 
any Facebook page (registration as a Facebook user is necessary). It delivers the data in the 
form of three files: two Excel tabs and one Gephi-file for the network analysis. Netvizz 
allows either to choose a time span, during which the content was posted, or a certain 
amount of the latest posts that should be collected. The first method was used for this study. 
The Excel tabs, one with posts only, and the second one with posts and users’ comments 
to them, provided an exhaustive information about each post, including the date and time 
of the publication as well as the link to the article attached. The Excel tab of the first type 
was the primary source of the data. A filter was applied to the column “type of post” to sort 
out posts containing links to the news articles. All rows, except with the posts of a “link” 
type, were deleted. The rest was filtered again, this time manually. Only the nationwide 
mainstream printed press was included in the final data set. The posts were numbered. 
Afterwards, each link was accessed one by one, and the news articles were saved as PDF-
files with respective numbers.  
 
 
 
 
 1.2. Coding procedures 
 
1.2.1. Proceedings 
 
The content analysis was conducted using the MAXQDA software package. The 
PDF-files containing the articles were imported to a new MAXQDA project, and 
distributed within four data sets, one for each party, to make possible individual 
calculations. Since the present study presumes that few right-wing frames are possible in 
one news article, the articles could not be treated as units of analysis. This would have 
reduced the number of frames in the data, and cause a distortion in the proportional shares 
of ideological pillars. For this reason, the so-called propositional units were considered as 
the units of analysis. They could be paragraphs, or sentences, or single words (Stemler, 
2001). Working with propositional units means “breaking down the text in order to 
examine underlying assumptions” (Ibid). Propositions are the simplest one-dimensional 
statements that can be true or false. The paragraphs or sometimes whole articles were 
treated as context units; they give meaning to the propositional units, and allowed to decide 
about applicability of the codes to the coding units.  
 
Table 11. Propositional units in the empirical data. 
 Propositional 
Units 
News articles Propositional units 
per news article 
(average) 
NPD 259 100 2,59 
REP 69 17 4,06 
RD 57 14 4,07 
PRO 255 80 3,19 
 
The content analysis included an a priori coding (Weber, 1992), emergent coding 
(Haney et al., 1998), and open coding procedures (Strauss, 1997). During the multiple 
readings of the empirical data the new codes were added, then, finally, some of them were 
merged into bigger categories, especially those, that were found only a very few times in 
the data sample. As a result of multiple interactions with the empirical material, it was 
decided to add not only new codes, but new categories of social objects and relationships 
between them.  
  
Table 12. Mainstream media. 
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After the open coding has been finished, the axial and selective coding followed. 
The next Chapters will show that the categories that resulted from the open coding were 
merged into bigger categories on the basis of their ability to represent the most important 
third-level-meanings, described in theoretical Chapters as well as on their quantitative 
measures in the data. Roughly speaking, the axial and selective coding should reveal the 
patterns of relationship between the coding units.  
 
 
1.2.2. Origin of codes 
 
 
The coding procedures aimed at capturing slots-values-configurations. The 
existing literature on the media coverage of xenophobic assaults, election campaigns and 
 collective action frames provided ideas of the most common slots and configurations of 
slots, whereas default values emerged from the empirical data. and existing empirical 
studies on the right-wing extremism in Germany. 
The categories from the research on the media coverage of xenophobic assaults in 
the early 1990s in Germany (Scheufele, 2003) were widely exploited in the present study. 
Scheufele based his coding procedures on the instructions for semiotic analysis as outlined 
by Früh (1998). Scheufele, although interested in the framing of violence, has displayed a 
strong interest in the way the xenophobic nature of the assaults was mentioned in the news. 
However, the research design was built around the assaults as events, thus, narrowing its 
application in a study that aims to reveal generic, or event-independent, frames (de Vreese, 
2001). Still, Scheufele´s analysis delivered categories for the content analysis that helped 
to systematize media frames.  
Scheufele differentiates between three groups of categories. He calls the first 
group “social objects”, that are the “fact-stressing” categories (Scheufele, 2003: 93), such 
as events, actors (persons, groups, institutions etc.), actions, interactions, and problems 
(Scheufele, 2003: 128-132). The second group of categories - called “classification 
dimensions” - makes an object more specific. “Attributes” denote the characteristics of the 
objects. For instance, as in the study of Scheufele (2003), asylum-seekers as actors can 
have specific social or physical characteristics (Scheufele, 2003: 130), and the problems 
can have cultural, economic, or moral character. Objects can have causal relationships with 
each other, meaning that one object can cause the presence of the other, or cause any (good 
or bad) consequence for the other. The causal relationships can also appear as responsibility 
of the actor, or as causal connection between non-actors. The latter case means that two or 
more objects are related, but do not affect each other, or do not cause any consequences for 
each other.  
The “Friend-or-foe”- scheme is a very important component of the right-wing 
ideology that says that there always should be a foe, against whom you are fighting. This 
fact places a foe in the center of each frame. As a result, the frames are always arranged 
around an actor, and the framing analysis was guided by the idea of the central role of the 
actor-slot. The framing analysis started with identifying an actor.  
The literature on collective action frames - frames produced by social movements 
- also convinces to the idea that all frames should be arranged around the actors (Benford 
& Snow, 2000; Gerhards, 1995; Koopmans, 2004; Snow & Benford, 1988). The German 
 right-wing extremism, despite the existence of officially registered political parties, is more 
a social movement than a valuable player in the parties’ competition. The second important 
implication of the literature on collective action frames is that configurations of actor-slots 
and problem-slots play a fundamental role for understanding ideological variety in the 
right-wing party family.  
The last inspiration came from the study conducted by Schlipphak (2011) on the 
complex relationships between ideologies of German political parties, media frames, and 
the voters’ preferences. Schlipphak measured the extent to which the media are able to 
adequately transmit parties’ ideologies as well as ideological distances between parties. He 
got a list of statements showing positions of the parties on different issues - which kind of 
policies they advocate, and which not.  By coding configurations of actor-slots, problem-
slots, and slots depicting attitude of an actor to the problem he unveiled the media frames 
and then compared them (by means of a quantitative research model) with the ideological 
positioning to make a conclusion about the adequacy of the media coverage of the 
ideological distances. 
The empirical data confirmed that the choice of categories was accurate. The list 
of the slots proposed here was able to embrace all facets of the news stories.  
 
 
1.3. Working with MAXQDA: elaborating a grounded theory 
 
 
1.3.1. Interface and coding 
 
 
MAXQDA is a computer software that facilitates content data analysis, helps to 
sort textual data, and develop theories grounded in the empirical data. The interface of 
MAXQDA includes the control panel on top, the document browser on the left side, the 
document system and the code system on the right   side.  
In the document browser one can see the document - an electronic file containing 
collected empirical data - that is undergoing the coding procedure. The user marks a piece 
of text, and then drags and drops one or more codes from the code system panel into the 
highlighted piece. That is how the coding happens. The marked pieces remain visible; the 
assigned code appears in the left field of the document browser, right opposite the 
 respective coding unit. 
The code system consists of a list of codes. Each code receives one score, after it 
has been applied to a coding unit. The code system makes visible, how many scores each 
code has. This makes the structure of the empirical data highly transparent even before any 
evaluations have been started. Different manipulations with codes are possible. The codes 
can be grouped as well as ungrouped, or merged. When the codes are merged into one, the 
coded segments are moved to the new code. It saves time, since it is not necessary to repeat 
coding procedures. Codes can be organized into so-called document variables, where each 
code becomes a value of a variable: a category that is subject to variations.  
There is a long list of the features that MAXQDA, namely, the code system, 
includes. Two of them were of much help for the present study. It is possible to attach 
memos - short notes - to each code. The code system can be exported together with these 
memos as an Excel tab. The memos can serve as a notebook, but also as a compilation that 
can be easily transformed into the code book. The second useful feature is a possibility to 
assign color to a single code or a group of codes. This makes the structure of the document 
even more transparent, and speeds up the coding process, since the codes become flashier 
and easy to drag with the mouse. The assignment of colors is also necessary for some 
evaluation procedures. 
The document system also has important functions. Sorting documents allows to 
organize the data in the best way and simplifies the work. There is no need to retrieve the 
data base each time you need it: it is imported into the MAXQDA project in the very 
beginning. The documents can be grouped. The data evaluation can be performed 
separately for each group of documents. In this study, the documents were divided into 
four groups, one group for each party. Still, the evaluation of all documents together as 
well as the evaluation of single documents remains possible. To use the latter option one 
should activate documents that are to be evaluated by choosing this function from the 
context menu.  
 
 
1.3.2. Data evaluation 
 
 
Data evaluation in MAXQDA is an important part of the research design of the 
present study. The software assisted in sorting text segments and moving from the open 
 coding to the axial and selective coding procedures. MAXQDA helped to structure the data 
and explore relationships between pre-defined or newly emerged categories of analysis.  
Some evaluations, made in MAXQDA, serve as illustrations of the study results 
(see next Chapter), but most of them were used for the intermediate decisions.  
 
 
1.3.2.1. Statistic of codes 
 
 
The main advantage of the data evaluation in MAXQDA is that the evaluations 
are possible during the coding progress, and not only after the coding is finished. It enables 
easy revisions of the code system, and makes it so attractive for qualitative researchers. 
The user do not need to additionally manipulate the data set to enter new codes. The codes 
can be managed inside the MAXQDA project.  
The first basic evaluation tool is called “statistic of subcodes”. It provides the 
information about the amount of times a single code has been applied. It is possible to get 
such statistic for all codes and all documents at the same time as well as for selected codes, 
and group of codes, and document groups. It helps to decide, which codes are worth to be 
left as independent categories, and for which codes it makes sense to create an umbrella 
category, if they appear quite seldom, or appear only together with few particular codes, 
and cannot be considered as independent. The statistic of subcodes can be exported as an 
Excel tab, and further manipulated.  
In this particular project, the first reading of the data gave birth to 8 group of codes 
that would represent slots, and 97 codes that would represent default values. This was due 
to the intention to catch all possible differences between the news re-posted by the parties. 
For instance, the news often depicted people of different nationalities, and presented them 
in the negative light. In the beginning each new nationality became a new code. It resulted 
in 18 codes for the category “Others”. In the end, most of them were mentioned only very 
few times. On the contrary, the code “migrants” was applied 77 times in the entire 
MAXQDA project. Since mentioning a certain nationality in a certain context often 
supposed that they are migrants, it was decided to merge nationality codes with the code 
“migrants” and transfer the coded segments to the new code “Others”. Only Muslims and 
Turks were left as they are, since both the former and the latter often appear as independent 
research object in German and international media studies (see, for instance, Trebbe, 2009; 
 Gemi et al., 2013; Triandafyllidou, 2013). Since each other nationality appeared very few 
times in the news, there is no tendency that a party would post negative news about some 
particular minority. Thus, the nationality of the causal actor could not reflect any significant 
differences between parties. This point will be illustrated and discussed in detail in the 
concluding section of the dissertation.  
 MAXQDA includes an opportunity to compile an Excel tab with coded segments 
and codes applied to them. This option provides an overview of the coding units. The 
second reading of the coded segments often led to the understanding that, for instance, 
some actors tend to appear in the similar situations all the time, so that it would make sense 
to create a code (or even a category) for that kind of situation and further look for the deeper 
structures behind these co-occurrences.  
 
 
1.3.2.2. Exploring frames and differences between parties 
 
 
The tool “Code matrix browser” delivers an overview of distribution of codes in 
the form that visualizes the differences between groups of documents, and between the 
respective parties. It makes more sense to use this tool after the axial coding is finished, 
and there are fewer codes left. Otherwise, there are too many codes, and it is hardly possible 
to catch the whole picture at one sight. 
 Code matrix browser exports a table with codes as rows and documents or 
document groups as columns. For the present study the document groups were chosen as 
columns. Fig.10. was created with this instrument (the format had to be adjusted a bit). The 
Tab.13. outlines results of the open and axial coding. 
MAXQDA can create a visualization of the code matrix with the values in the 
cells depicted as either squares, or points. The size of them depends on the respective value. 
Unfortunately, this illustration cannot be exported. The Fig.12. is a screenshot of such 
figure. Since the parties have published different amount of news articles, it caused 
differences in the amount of the text segments assigned to a code. Further manipulations 
were necessary to make the values comparable. The values had to be weighted, or 
standardized. Each value in the tab was divided by the amount of propositional units coded 
for the respective party. Then each value was multiplied by 100 to make it more readable, 
since few values were less than zero.  
 It becomes immediately clear how the parties differ in their agendas. For instance, 
the National Democrats depicted politicians and parties as evils most often (see Tab.13.). 
This will be discussed more in detail in the concluding part.  
The next step is to catch media frames. Of course, several readings of the data 
already give an idea of what kind of frames to look for. The color codes proved their 
usefulness here. While scrolling the documents, it became obvious, what colors - i.e. codes 
- occur in the same text segments. Categories that are present in the same proposition, or – 
rarely – in the same context unit were considered as slot-values-configurations, or frames. 
To select the right-wing supportive frames, basically, for each couple of categories the 
same question was asked: can this causality, or an aspect of the reality, be embedded in the 
normative picture of the right-wing extremism, or play an instrumental role to boost the 
normative prescriptions of the right-wing ideology? 
In the present study the media frames were explored by means of the 
manipulations with Excel tabs, exported as code matrices. Two more instruments, 
incorporated in MAXQDA, helped to sort codes before these final manipulations followed. 
The “Code relations browser” produces a table with codes as both rows and 
columns, thus, providing an overview of co-occurrences of them. This operation can be 
performed for all documents and all codes at the same time as well as for selected codes 
and documents - after the most common pairs of codes were identified. Furthermore, if a 
group of co-occurring codes was explored, one can use a tool “Configuration table”, and 
compare, how often the codes appear together in comparison with their distribution in the 
entire data set. Fig.13.-14. provide examples of the code relations browser and 
configuration tab. 
 
  
 
Figure 12. Code matrix browser in MAXQDA: visual solution. 
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1.3.3. MAXQDA: limitations and disadvantages 
 
It is also necessary to talk about the disadvantages of MAXQDA. First of all, 
contrary to, for instance, SPSS, it offers no protocol of the working progress. The scholar 
has to notice any single operation manually, and it can seriously distract from the process. 
That also means that each data evaluation has to be saved one by one. Thus, the scholar 
has to think about some standards of organizing the data, how to name exported files etc., 
which is not the case with SPSS, where all evaluations are saved in one file with a table 
of content and information about any action performed with the data. 
MAXQDA is often advertised as a new generation of the data analysis. One 
should understand it with caution: the intuition of the researcher is still much more 
important than the technical features. Besides, most of the visualization tools and data 
evaluation instruments were developed for a qualitative data analysis, and are rather 
suitable for the small data sets. 
There are few more technical problems that this particular study has revealed. A 
lot of useful functions - for instance, document comparison chart - are available only if 
the empirical data is imported as Word files, but downloading Internet content as PDF 
files is less time-consuming. The propositional units and not the whole articles served as 
units of analysis in this study, but the news articles were imported in the MAXQDA 
project as entire pieces. This made such functions as code matrices and code relations 
matrices useless, since in MAXQDA a table with results would be based on the 
documents. 
Besides, a working version for Mac OS were released only in the end of 2013, 
so the analysis had to be done on two different machines. It also caused some delays 
because of re-saving the project. Even after the Mac OS version was updated several 
times, the data evaluation tools are still far from being perfect. While exporting code 
matrices, the empty categories - the codes that have not been applied at all - simply 
disappear from the table. If the scholar is still interested in them, he has to add them 
manually. In addition to that, the formatting of the exported tables takes a lot of time. This 
fact seriously spoils a general positive impression from the interface of MAXQDA. For 
these reasons, only simple evaluations were performed in MAXQDA, and the data 
evaluation results were further manipulated manually in Excel. 
The last thing to add, MAXQDA projects have a size of around 150 MB, which 
causes the problem of the free space on the hard drive. 6 MAXQDA projects were created 
for this research project. 
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1.3.4. Counting frames: further manipulations with the MAXQDA outputs 
 
 
The section describes previously mentioned manipulations with the Excel tables 
to explore the news frames in the empirical data. 
The category “actors” was the starting point for identifying frames. The task was 
to look for other categories that appear in the same text segments (or context units). The 
only way to find linkages between actors and other social objects was to create and export 
from the MAXQDA project an Excel table with coded segments and codes applied to 
them, all parties and all codes in one file. Tab.14. is a short abstract from this table and 
gives an idea of how it looks like. 
 Then unnecessary columns, such as length, data, time etc., which MAXQDA 
adds automatically, were deleted. The propositional units were numbered manually. Then 
7 columns, each representing a slot in the frame, were created. The codes from the rows 
were manually transferred into the columns.  
Then the trick was to sort all actors that appear more than 1 time, so that each 
row represented an actor-based frame: a configuration of an actor and other social 
object(s). In the example (Tab.15.), actors were matched with the type of damage, they 
are associated with. The next step was to give names to each of these frames and assign 
them to the respective ideological pillars, and then count the amount of frames in each 
pillar. In the following example the configuration consisting of the European Union as a 
causal actor and an economic damage was named “Economic populism”. This decision 
is based on the discussion of the attitude of the right-wing parties to the European Union 
and European integration in general (see section 1.5., Chapter 1 of the Part IV).  
The same operation including the calculations was performed with all other 
possible pairs of codes. On the next stage the differences between ideological pillars of 
the parties and in the news coverage were estimated.
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Table 15. Example of manipulations with Excel tabs: identifying the actor-threat type of 
frame for the Republicans party. 
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(Abbreviations: ACT=actor, THRT=threat, eu_ec_pop=anti-EU economic populism, 
anti-sys=anti-system opposition, pop=populism) 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. Discussion of the results and conclusions 
 
 
2.1. Structure of the news: main issues, actors and themes 
 
 
2.1.1. Xenophobia in the news 
 
 
2.1.1.1. Overview of the main figures in the news stories 
 
 
The study revealed two types of actors. The frames with the mainstream political 
actors as central figures depict the attitude of the right-wing to the former as well as they 
reflect the ideal of political system. These frames represent populist, repressive and 
reactionary pillars. The frames with minorities, foreigners, and other “Others” represent 
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xenophobic elements of the right-wing ideology. This is the most important demarcation 
line in the empirical data that separates the xenophobic pillar from the rest of the pillars. 
The current section will summarize the findings on the xenophobic arguments in 
the news: who appears in the stories, how these actors are depicted, how the news stories 
are related to the right-wing ideological statements; what new we can learn about the role 
of Facebook in political communication of right wing parties. 
The open coding has identified 16 types of “Others”. Tab.16. provides an 
overview of mostly mentioned minority groups.  
 
Table 16. Overview of mostly cited actors (Others); all parties. 
 
Name Frequency 
Muslims 78 
migrants 77 
Turks 30 
Romanians 28 
Bulgarians 23 
asylum-seekers 20 
foreigners 20 
Arabs  16 
Africans 8 
Sinti and Roma 7 
Greeks 7 
Jews 6 
East Europeans 5 
Islamists 5 
Balkan countries 2 
Southeast Europeans 1 
Total 346 
 
 
In the beginning it was expected that different parties concentrate on different 
kinds of xenophobia, thus, on different minority groups. For this reason it was decided to 
create a single code for each actor. It is remarkable that most of the actors are mentioned 
very few times, whereas Muslims and migrants clearly outweigh other categories. This 
already shows the direction for the axial and selective coding procedures: it is obvious 
that this type of actors should build an independent category and the other codes should 
be either added to this one, or maybe merged into another group. Tab. 17. shows that 
differences in xenophobic attitudes can be detected. The values in the cells are 
standardized to make them comparable, and represent percentages of mentions of 
particular actors in the whole amount of mentions of any actors.  
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  PRO REP RD NPD 
Africans 2 0 0 4 
Arabs 7 3 14 2 
Asyl-seekers 4 3 0 9 
Balkan countries 1 3 0 0 
Bulgarians 4 12 0 9 
East Europeans 1 6 0 2 
Foreigners 2 6 29 10 
Greeks 1 9 0 2 
Islamists 3 0 0 0 
Jews 3 0 0 1 
Migrants 22 15 29 26 
Miscellaneous 2 9 0 0 
Muslims 31 12 29 16 
Romanians 5 12 0 11 
Sinti and Roma 1 6 0 2 
Southeast 
Europeans 
0 0 0 1 
Turks 14 3 0 5 
 
 
Table 17. Mostly cited actors: overview of the differences between parties (standardized 
values; absolute values divided by the amount of the mentions of all actors for each 
respective party). 
 
 
It can be noticed that Romanians and Bulgarians always appear together - 
without any single exception. Journalists also tended to confuse Romanians with Sinti 
and Roma, so that only from the context it became clear which code was to apply. Few 
actors were quoted only by particular parties, for instance, Balkan countries - by the 
Republicans, Southeast Europeans -by the National Democrats (quoted once, so the 
weighted value turned into zero), Greeks - by the Republicans, and Jews only by the PRO. 
What could be depicted as racism - Africans as main negative characters in the news 
stories - are typical only for the PRO and the National Democrats. In general, the 
Republicans mentioned Bulgarians and Romanians more often than the other parties. 
Probably, it has to do with the latest (regarding the date of the data collection) 
enlargement of the European Union, when Romania and Bulgaria were accepted as a 
member, but remained “outsiders” in the public perception. Besides, after these countries 
became EU members, a good amount of citizens from both of them moved to other 
European countries, including Germany. This resulted in negative news coverage about 
Romanian and Bulgarian migrants that the right-wing parties made use of. The news 
stories re-posted by the Right demonstrate a very narrow range of actors.   
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It seems quite obvious that most of the news focus either on Muslims, or on the 
other “Others”. It coincides with the demarcation in the scholarly literature: there are a 
lot of studies that deal with either Muslims, or migrants in the news (Gemi et al., 2013; 
Trebbe, 2009; Triandafyllidou, 2013), but no study compares depiction of Muslims and 
other “Others”. This would be one more valuable contribution of the present study.  
It was decided to merge such codes as “Muslims”, “Islamists”, and “Arabs” into 
a bigger category “Muslims”. It is rational if one looks at them from the perspective of 
the right-wing parties. The right-wing ideology tends to generalize, to confuse definitions 
and create slogans and catch-up-phrases. For an Islamophobe, these three categories 
would have the same connotation. “Muslims” seems to be the most generous category 
among all three: all Arabs and Islamists are Muslims, but not only Arabs are Muslims, 
and not all Muslims are radical.  
The category “Turks” was left independent. In the German media, Turks can be 
both an ethnic minority and migrants, so it would be confusing to merge them with either 
“Others” or “Muslims”. The studies on the media coverage of Turks as both migrants and 
ethnic minority has a big share in the German literature. The same is true for the migrants: 
there are lots of studies examining how they are represented in the mass media. Thus, all 
other foreigners and migrants - all who can be called “newcomers” or “Others” - were 
merged into a category “Others”. 
“Muslims” and “migrants” are the only codes shared by all parties. Let us 
compare the frames depicting Muslims, migrants, and Turks.  
 
 
2.1.1.2. Threat and dominance frames 
 
The first type of the actors - the Others - tended to appear in the news together 
with the following categories. 
The studies on the group-focused enmity do not say it explicitly, but their main 
finding is that the negative attitude to "Others" grows either from a perceived threat13 that 
the Others supposedly cause, or from the idea of the superiority of the local nation over 
                                                
13 
 Sociologists use the term “perceived” to show a subjective attitude, and to contrast it to the real 
condition. For instance, there are real and perceived poverty. The respondents of the surveys assess 
their economic conditions, whereas scholars try to give an objective assessment of it by comparing 
income, education level etc. “Perceived threat” means that this is an idea about the presence of any 
threat and the size of it, which not necessarily has anything to do with the reality. 
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the newcomers or minorities. Except perceived threat and perceived superiority, 
sociologists have identified other factors and intervening variables: (perceived) poverty, 
low self-esteem, low level of socialization etc. (Decker & Brähler, 2006, 2008). The 
empirical findings of the present study have identified these categories as media frames. 
The demarcation between the threat and superiority is important to show the differences 
between the two kinds of the ideological argumentation in the media discourse: 
rationalization and justification. 
By the “threat” I understand negative consequences that have happened or are 
expected to happen. For instance, the studies on the group-focused enmity often show 
that persons having financial problems or problems with informal communication and 
socialization tend to (unconsciously) turn their frustration into the negative attitude to so-
called out-groups, like migrants and minorities (Decker & Brähler, 2006, 2008; Grau et 
al., 2012; Heitmeyer, 2012; Kitschelt, 1995; Mansel et al., 2012; Roux, 2011; Spier, 2010; 
Stöss, 2010; Zick et al., 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012; Zick & Küpper, 2012). By the 
“dominance” I understand negative characteristics of the out-group members that justify 
the dominance of the in-group members. Since the studies on the group-focused enmity 
show that the negative characteristics of the out-group members legitimize aversion and 
prejudice (Zick et al., 2009), it was also important to trace them in the empirics. 
The Tab.18. sketches open, axial and selective coding processes to show the 
origins of the final categories of analysis.  
In the end it was decided to merge all negative characteristics into one category 
- the dominance - and to distribute all types of the threat among 7 categories. The codes 
“freedom of expression” and “nation-state” were left as they are, since they do not fit into 
any other category, but were too important for the ideological debates to be merged into 
other categories.  
One can see that the perceived threat is the number one argument that is linked 
with out-groups as causal actors. This is a very simple way for the right-wing parties to 
get support, since they provide “facts”. If a journalist is reluctant to investigate an issue 
properly, and talks about single facts as generalizable ones, than the news coverage 
transmits strong xenophobic statements, and it becomes dangerously uncontrollable.  
But these findings can be an evidence of the news values as a decisive gate 
keeping factor. Explaining the results of their study on the news making practices, Gemi 
et al. (2013: 270-271) say that “Migrant good news is bad news of course. … Negative 
coverage and ‘‘jump on negative stories’’ constitute ‘‘news’’ when migrants are 
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concerned”. Another report on the same study draws the inference that “Although various 
studies of immigration and media have observed positive trends, it is commonly accepted 
that the media continue to contribute to the reproduction of the negative image of 
immigrants and social racism (Triandafyllidou, 2013: 243)”. 
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2.1.2. Mainstream politics in the news: agency, opposition and support frames 
 
 
What I called mainstream politics in the theoretical part is represented in the 
empirical data through 7 types of actors.  
 
Table 19. Mainstream politics in the Facebook news coverage (all parties). 
 
Political actors in the news coverage Amount of coded segments 
Personalized politics (politicians and 
parties) 
103 
State institutions 57 
European Union 52 
Right-wing actors 39 
Miscellaneous 38 
The United States 19 
Mass media 11 
Total  319 
 
Mentions of politicians and parties were merged into one category, since the name 
of the politician is always accomplished by his party identification in the brackets. As “state 
institutions” I coded the mentions of all actors that represent state and executive power, 
like police, court, parliament, government, ministers, officials etc.  
It was important to differentiate between personalized politics and “anonymous” 
state institutions. Parties and politicians fight for the power (even if they are already in the 
office), and the state institutions are always there, independently of the political 
personalities. For the right-wing parties, being in opposition to the politicians as 
competitors in a struggle for votes is different from being in opposition to the state 
institutions. Those are different arguments in the right-wing ideology, and have to do not 
only with the assignment of a frame to an ideological pillar, but also to the degree of 
radicalization that a party demonstrates. Controversies with political opponents do not go 
beyond the democratic order; the right-wing parties challenge political actors, not the 
principle of the electoral competition. Showing state institutions as causal agents of any 
losses may be a sign of an anti-systemic positioning of the party. Being against the 
democratic order and democratic state in general means a higher degree of radicalization, 
and brings another dimension into the discussion.  
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Despite the list of political actors remaining stable through all news coverage for 
all parties, the actors appeared in different roles. The axial coding has revealed that there 
are three types of such roles. The mainstream politics can act independently, can act as an 
opponent of other causal agents, mainly, the Others, and can act as a supporter of the 
Others. In the first case, the mainstream politics can appear in the news where no minorities 
or migrants are mentioned, and where the politicians or state institutions are criticized for 
their low performance. Such frames are used by the right-wing parties as a populist 
argument, and show mainstream politics as failing to represent interests of the voters, 
sometimes even intentionally, like misusing public funds etc. The populist argument is also 
hidden in the frames where the mainstream politicians support other causal actors, since 
they are supposedly against the citizens. But if the mainstream politics - this mainly applies 
to state institutions as actors - acts as a punisher or regulator, then it contributes to the 
repressive ideological pillar.  
 
Table 20. Different faces of the mainstream politics in the news coverage. 
 
Political actors as causal agents Coded segments 
Personalized politics (politicians and 
parties) 
44 
European Union 27 
United States 19 
Miscellaneous 18 
State institutions  10 
Media 7 
Right-wing actors of all kind 
 
0 
Political actors as opposing causal 
agents 
Coded segments 
Right-wing actors of all kind 39 
State institutions  32 
Personalized politics (politicians and 
parties) 
21 
Miscellaneous 16 
European Union 8 
United States 0 
Media 0 
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Political actors as supporting causal 
agents 
Coded segments 
Personalized politics (politicians and 
parties) 
38 
European Union 17 
State institutions  15 
Media 4 
Miscellaneous 4 
United States 0 
Right-wing actors of all kind 0 
 
 
Re-posting negative news about migrants can enforce and legitimate xenophobic 
attitudes, but it can weaken the oppositional positioning of the party, since the mainstream 
politicians often appear in these news in the role of the opponents of the causal agents. 
Nevertheless, the news coverage about migration-related problems - or where migrants and 
other minorities act as “evils” - quite often depicts mainstream politicians, parties, or state 
institutions as supporters of the causal agents, for instance, in regarding to the distribution 
of the public goods, where politicians used to promote equality in supplying social aid. In 
the second case the oppositional role of the party is strengthened, since the negative 
depiction of the mainstream politicians as lobbying the interests of “Others” is emphasized. 
Such complicated relationships between Others as causal agents, the party, and the 
mainstream politics appear in the form of frames with 5 slots: two actors, a relationship 
between them, and a problem, caused by the causal actor (normally, by one of the Others, 
a member of the out-group).  
It causes a dilemma of allocating these frames in the suitable ideological pillar to 
secure correctness of the further calculations. Since each frame starts with an actor, and 
there are two of them in this case, then it is reasonable to make a conclusion that such dual 
frames must be taken into account in more than one pillar.  
All dual frames must be multiplied by 2, when the total amount of the frames is 
calculated, since the assignment of a frame to a pillar is based upon the actor-slot. 
If any “Other” acts as a causal agent, then the frame must be counted as a 
contribution to the xenophobic pillar. When it comes to the second actor in the frame, the 
allocation decision becomes awkward. “Mainstream politics” is too common description 
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for the variety of actors, who can appear in the news. Depending on the degree of 
personalization of the actor, the news coverage can contribute to the re-enforcement of 
different kinds of attitudes, and must be, therefore, assigned to different ideological pillars.  
It was important to differentiate between political actors and not code all of them 
generally as “mainstream politics”, because it would only confuse the understanding of the 
assignment of the responsibility in the media coverage, which is significant to catch the 
role of the media in the pro- and contra-migration debates. In addition to the mainstream 
political actors, citizens and other right-wing extremists, the right-wing parties themselves 
appeared in the dual frames. The Tab.21. explains, why the presence of particular actors in 
a frame gave scores to one of the four ideological pillars. The following assumption was 
that, from the perspective of the right-wing ideology, what is depicted in the news will be 
taken for granted by the audience and perceived as a guide to action and an example of the 
proper behavior. For instance, news about police and court punishing migrants put through 
the right-wing lenses create an impression that the state undertakes measures against 
minorities, and that the repressions should be directed against the Others. 
While comprehending this logic one should also remember that the right-wing 
parties publish their content for the target audiences that used to think in right-wing
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causal actors, then it suits into a picture of the ideal w
orld 
w
here the right-w
ing actors play the leading role.  
T
he party (ow
ner of the 
F
acebook page) 
 terms. So, some propositional units were interpreted in a way that does not seem quite 
obvious. That is a guideline of a semiotic analysis. A news article becomes provocative 
only if one looks at it through the right-wing lenses. The media frames are supposed to 
reinforce existing right-wing affinity of the audiences rather than create such frames. This 
statement is especially important for understanding the allocation of the frames that include 
supportive relationships between the Others and the mainstream politics. If the mainstream 
political actors act as opponents of the causal agents, then it aligns with the idea of the need 
to resist the threat coming from the Others. If the same actors occur to “lobby” the interests 
of the Others then it emphasizes the confrontation between the people and the elites.  
From the Tab.21. one can see that the news coverage re-posted by the parties on 
Facebook barely provides any input to the reactionary pillar.  
 
 
2.1.3. Ideal society in the news coverage 
 
 
All previous considerations suggested that the third level meaning - the ideology 
- in the text is recognizable through particular combinations of social objects. But the 
empirical data also demonstrated a specific kind of ideological hints in the form of the 
frames that cannot be described as slot-value-configurations. Still, they recall certain right-
wing ideological statements. There are two frames of this kind: nation-state (which 
nevertheless comes with an actor) and the diagnosis of decadence. Both of them belong to 
the reactionary pillar.  
The idea of the nation-state belongs to what Lenk (2005) has called the level of 
the ideal society. In the terminology of Bruter and Harrison (2011) this is exactly the 
missing reactionary pillar: the archetypal political system. As it was discussed in the 
theoretical part, nation-state refers to the prescription for each nation to live within one 
state. This prescription has two consequences: each country is only for one nation, and one 
nation should hold together, and not disperse and settle in other countries. The nations, 
separated by the international agreements, mainly after the WWI and WWII, should have 
an opportunity to unite. The borders can and should be revised: this is an important political 
standpoint that basically all right-wing actors defend, and that contradicts with the norms 
of international law. 
During the selected time period that the empirical data represents the international 
 news coverage reported a lot about the conflict around the Crimean Peninsula. The main 
argument of the President of Russia, who sanctioned the accession of the Ukrainian 
territories, is that the majority of the Crimean population is Russian. The case of the 
invasion of the Crimean Peninsula is the example of the viability of the nation-state 
sentiment, and for the right-wing parties the best chance to show that some political leaders 
share their standpoints and even call them into life. Despite the term of the nation-state was 
not mentioned in each news article that the right-wing parties re-posted on Facebook, such 
news coverage definitely contributes to its firmness. 
The presence of the nation-state frame in the empirical data demonstrates in the 
best way the influence of the key events over the news coverage as well as the ambiguous 
role that they play. The key events can support any ideology by providing an example of 
successful implementation that it advocates. Key events can impose limitations by fueling 
only one ideological pillar.  
The diagnosis-of-decadence-frame is another 1-slot-frame that is not made up of 
few elements, but rather a kind of background that particular news can imply with without 
explaining this idea directly. This second 1-slot-frame originates in the archetypical 
conception of the perfect society having no evils: no crimes, no out-groups etc. The 
reactionary pillar, therefore, emphasizes the present of those evils in the real society. For 
instance, in some cases, it was impossible to code any particular causal actor, but the 
damage or threat was still there. Such negative news without any actors were considered 
as hints of the diagnosis-of-decadence-frame. The grey colors of modernity are supposed 
to make the right-wing past or the right-wing future more attractive. The majority of the 
news coverage of this kind reported about the growth of criminality. Fewer news reported 
about poverty, child abuse etc. 
The propositional units that are contained in any one of these frames were coded 
with only one code representing the frame, with few exceptions, when the actors, 
challenging the nation-state, were present in the coding units. The propositional units of 
this kind were mainly quite long, sometimes the entire news article, sometimes paragraphs 
in the news that also contained other frames. As it was mentioned, both types of the 1-slot-
frames were assigned to the reactionary pillar. Nevertheless, it should not mean that each 
1-slot-frame originates in this pillar. The allocation can only follow on the basis of the 
careful judgment. 
 2.2. News frames and ideology 
 
 
2.2.1. Right-wing generic frames in the empirical data 
 
In general, the understanding of the frames revealed by the qualitative content 
analysis is only possible if one starts to think within the "friend-or-foe"-paradigm. This 
helps to penetrate into the logic and argumentation of the right-wing actors, and to 
understand, how they could make use of the statements that would seem totally harmless 
in any other context. Frames are the stories that the right-wing parties tell to their audiences, 
even if the news article has another core statement.  
As we know from the studies on the right-wing extremism and on the hate 
communication online, the right-wing actors prefer simple and short slogans. The empirical 
data have shown that they also prefer quite “primitive” frames that consist of very few 
slots. Compared to the media frames on the right-wing violence (Scheufele, 2003) that 
included up to 11 slots and a huge amount of default values, the media frames that transmit 
right-wing ideological statements are quite simplified. Another reason for this may be that 
the diffusion of such ideologies is not the main motive of the mainstream media, but only 
a by-product of the media content that “sells”.  
Tab.22. provides an overview of all frames that were identified in the empirical 
data by the method described in the Chapter 1 (manipulations with the categories 
summarized in the Excel tabs and a control question). The second column includes the 
name of the frame as well as a short explanation of how a particular combination of slots 
and default values was interpreted from the right-wing ideology point of view. The 
following six columns represent slots with default values.  
Tab.23. delivers an overview of the frames diversity. It shows which parties are 
using particular frames, and how many types of frames each party exploits.  
At the first sight it becomes clear that the parties that post a lot of content tend to 
demonstrate a greater diversity of the frames than those that do not post much: the very 
case when quantity also means quality as heterogeneity of the arguments.  
Populist pillar is the most diverse one. Of course, that also has to do with the 
choice of codes: more codes produce more frames. But, from the other side, all codes are 
originated in the data, so the diversity does take place. 
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Table 23. Frames diversity: how many types of frames were found in the empirical 
data (for each pillar and for each party). 
Pillars Amount of types of frames in the media coverage re-posted by 
each party 
 NPD REP PRO RD 
Populist 22 9 13 9 
Reactionary 4 1 5 2 
Repressive 4 3 7 2 
Xenophobic 8 6 9 1 
 
 
The frame analysis has undergone procedures similar to the axial and selective 
coding. Few overarching types of frames emerged as a result of such considerations. It 
mainly relates to the representation of xenophobic arguments. The demarcation line 
between xenophobia as a general aversion to any outsider and Islamophobia as a strong 
negative attitude to Muslims is easy to see. There is no any other out-group that is 
mentioned so often as Muslims. The empirical data have shown that both xenophobia 
and Islamophobia appear in three general forms: economic, cultural and security-based. 
The phobias differ in the kind of threat or consequence that they are supposed to cause. 
This can be economic consequences; bad cultural influence or cultural inferiority; threat 
to the security in the form of criminality outbreaks. Prejudices are connected with the 
examples of negative consequences (economic, cultural, relater to security), examples 
of dominance (cultural, educational etc.) as well as with the examples of actions 
undertaken against the out-groups. While frames in the first two cases include causal 
actor as the main actor, frames of the third kind are organized around the category 
“opponent of causal actors”. 
It is interesting to see that such typical generic media frames - for instance, 
widely known “economic consequence” frame (de Vreese, 2005) - could be an 
overarching one for many different right-wing frames that include economic threat as a 
default value. The hints of the “conflict” frame (de Vreese, 2005) can be seen in all 
populist frames depicting the conflict between any actors. This confirms the main 
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assumption of the frame theory (Scheufele & Scheufele, 2010) that different 
interpretations of the same information are subject to the variations in the context. The 
news articles alone are harmless, but posted on the Facebook page by a right-wing actor 
they become a new meaning, since the context of the message has changed. 
 
 
2.2.2. Deviations between party programs and news coverage 
 
 
The next step is to compare the shares of ideological pillars in the official 
documents of the parties and in the re-posted news coverage. 
Deviations between the programs and the news coverage were calculated by 
means of the Chi-square test. Tab.24. shows the results, and Tab.25. additionally 
illustrates them in the form of simple calculations of the aggregated differences between 
shares. In the Tab.25. the differences are the result of deduction of the respective shares 
calculated in absolute values.  
One can see that the deviations between political programs and re-posted 
news coverage are enormous. A political science scholar would say that the right-wing 
parties never express their real intentions in the programs (Busch, 2014). In some 
countries, like in Germany, a very radical statements assaulting or challenging 
democratic order can lead to the prohibition of the party, so that the right-wing actors 
are cautious in publishing anything that can cause any legal consequences for them.  
Nevertheless, the findings raise the following question: what has been 
influencing the re-posted news coverage if the total deviations are so huge? It could 
make one doubt the rational of the chosen research model based on dividing frames into 
the pillars. But we still need these pillars to be able to confirm or reject the role of the 
official programs in communicating their ideological distances. 
Of course, it becomes pretty clear that the programs of the right-wing parties 
do not provide a significant input into the cascade of the frames activation. But it should 
not be immediately considered as inability of the parties to exploit their Facebook pages 
as the news gates. The next section will discuss, what kind of other factors could play a 
role: an intention of the parties to adapt to the audience taste, or the logic of the media 
frame building. But, anyway, since the right-wing parties are able to choose such content 
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that could create a unique picture of reality and help them to transmit political statements 
that are excluded from the official political debates, then they can be considered as gate 
keepers .  
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2.2.3. Under- or overrepresentation of partitions 
 
 
Since the deviations are quite big, it makes sense to look for any systematic 
variations to find out what makes up the news coverage, and whether the group-
focused enmity provides the main inspiration for it. 
Tab.26. shows clearly that the repressive and reactionary pillars are both 
underrepresented (O is for overrepresented, U is for underrepresented). Their shares 
in the media frames are limited in comparison with their shares in the programs and 
official documents. Besides, the diversity of these two kinds of frames is insignificant.  
 
Table 26. Over- or underrepresentation of ideological pillars in the news coverage 
(compared with their shares in the programs). 
 
Pillars Under- or overrepresented 
 NPD REP PRO RD 
Populist O O O O 
Reactionary U U U U 
Repressive U U U U 
Xenophobic O O U O 
 
 
The xenophobic pillar seems to be the very biggest one for almost all parties 
(except for the Right). Xenophobia is the main component of the group-focused 
enmity. It convinces to believing that the group-focused enmity as a feedback loop 
from the audience plays a decisive role in the frame building, and determines the 
choice of the news frames. 
Let us try to compare the structure of the re-posted media coverage with the 
structure of the group-focused enmity.  
From the first sight, the group-focused enmity should have been rejected as 
an alternative factor of the gate keeping decision, since the overview of the main 
averted groups has shown that the most “hated” groups from the studies on personal 
right-wing affinity are different from those that were identified in the news coverage, 
or, to say it more precise, their shares are different. For instance, Heitmeyer (2012) has 
found that asylum-seekers suffer from the aversion more than any other. In the 
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empirical data the refugees appear only very few times. But, if one goes deeper, then, 
by merging single codes into the categories, few interesting observations indicating 
the influence of the group-focused enmity over the choice of the re-posted media 
coverage become visible. In the first place, the overwhelming presence of Muslims as 
averted group as well as of such categories as economic threat, criminality, dominance 
etc. demonstrate the link between the news coverage and the group-focused enmity.  
One should go back to the Chapter 3 Part IV, and look at the causal models 
that the scholars suggested to explain the rise of the right-wing personal affinity. 
Obviously, the scholars do link the right-wing personal attitudes with precarious 
economic situation, or with frustration and deprivation, or with perceived poverty of 
the respondents (Mansel et al., 2012). This means that it would be reasonable for the 
right-wing actors to try to push this leverage, and appeal to the economic consequences 
caused by the Others. This explains the dominant position of the economic threat in 
the news, and confirms the relationships between the group-focused enmity and the 
re-posted news coverage.  
The explanatory models of the group-focused enmity often include 
disappointment in the mainstream politics as a catalyzer of the syndrome (Zick et al., 
2009, 2011). This means, the respondents feel that there is a discrepancy between 
citizens and politicians. The emphasis over such discrepancy is exactly what is known 
as populism.  
Populist sentiment, xenophobia, economic deprivation are the milestones of 
the syndrome of the group-focused enmity. The re-posted news coverage has the same 
structure. Still, one should not forget that in the cascading activation model there is not 
only a place for the input from the alternative political actors and the feedback loop 
from the audience, but there is also a place for the internal factors of the media frame 
building.  
The value of the news that encapsulate the right-wing frames differs 
significantly. There can be few explanations of the overrepresentation of the populist 
and xenophobic pillars from this point of view. The reactionary and repressive 
sentiments are too “extreme” for the mainstream media. The media like scandals and 
sensations, and bad news, but they do not want to go beyond the democratic order, 
which actually enables and secures the existence of free press and the freedom of 
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expression. Besides, what is repressive for the right-wing actors, like police 
successfully punishing someone, is not negative for the average reader, it cannot “sell”, 
and often came as a secondary frame in the main story. Eventually, the reactionary 
pillar is about the ideal society in the right-wing imagination: it does not interest the 
mainstream public, who would not go and vote for the right-wing parties anyway. On 
the contrary, the populist sentiments definitely possess a good value as news. They 
depict celebrities - the mainstream politicians - in the negative light. What else could 
be better for sales? The overrepresentation of the xenophobic pillar is caused by the 
common tendency in the media to make news out of any happening where “outsiders” 
occur to take part. The studies on the media coverage on Muslims and migrants 
confirm this (Gemi et al., 2011, 2013; Trebbe, 2009; Triandafyllidou, 2013). 
Still, it is better to say that all three factors - input from the parties, feedback 
from the audience, and news values - play a role, and that the re-posed news coverage 
is the result of their interplay.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The main conclusion of the empirical study is that Facebook provides an 
opportunity to promote radical political standpoints by selecting news coverage that 
integrates such statements as a whole or in the form of separated elements. The 
selection process - the gate keeping decision - assembles these elements into the right-
wing generic frames. 60 types of generic frames were found. Four ideological pillars 
that characterize right-wing ideology and demarcate it from other ideologies were 
identified in this pool of frames. Those pillars are repressive, reactionary, populist and 
xenophobic. Nevertheless, the two latter ones are overrepresented in the media 
coverage. This fact as well as an overwhelming presence of the certain actors and 
situations led to the conclusion that the gate keeping decision of the right-wing parties 
is under the strong influence of the preferences of their audiences, since the so-called 
syndrome of the group-focused enmity is closer to such distribution of frames as the 
pure parties’ ideology. 
The gate keeping decision and its factors represent a macro perspective on the 
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cascading activation model. The present study also paid attention to the micro 
perspective. Frames are configuration of stable und changeable elements, slots and 
default values, respectively. 5 types of slots are typical for the right-wing generic 
frames: causal actor, supporter of the causal actor, opponent of the causal actor, threat 
and dominance. Each frame is assembled of two slots from this list. The next Part will 
discuss the connection between the macro and micro level of analysis in more detail 
and conclude with a new research proposal.
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Part VIII. Conclusions and prospects
 
 
A micro-level model of the gate keeping decision 
 
 
The present study considered frames as maintainable schemata. Frames consist of 
stable and changeable elements, or slots and default values. The ideology is considered as 
an origin of both slots and default values. But ideology is not a frame, it is a cultural source 
for the specific kind of frames (Snow & Benford, 2005). Ideology is a set of political 
statements divided into four pillars. It is not equal to the media frames.  
The modified cascading activation model assumes that the input from the political 
actors is transmitted through the media frames, and that each actor is able to make his 
standpoints visible and influential to a certain extent. For this purpose, the actors promote 
particular configurations of slots and default values in the media and in the public sphere 
in general. Political actors assemble ideologically rooted frames out of the slot-value-
configurations diffused by the mainstream media by selecting certain news. The Fig.15. 
illustrates these considerations.  
A newspaper or a magazine publishes news articles. These articles incorporate 
slot-value-configurations. By selecting articles, political actors sort out certain slots-
values-configurations. Thus, some slots and values become more visible in the re-published 
news coverage. A new frame emerges. It emerges as a result of the gate keeping decision 
that is reflected in the choice of the slots and default values. The new frames make some 
“aspects of reality” (Entman, 1993: 53) - in this case, the right-wing ideological pillars - 
more manifest. The upper part of the Fig.15. depicts a news frame. Each single news frame 
consists of few slots, let’s say 4, just as an example. Each slot can be filled with 3 different 
default values, but the journalists and editors have already chosen values for each of them 
(the unused values are struck through on the picture). In this form, the slots-values-
configuration will appear in the media coverage14.   
                                                
14
 
  In the Fig. 15. the final default values in the Facebook news frames are numbered after their origin 
frames and respective default values. All numbers are random and only serve to provide an example. 
For instance, “V_30_4” depicts a default value that comes from the slot number 4 of the news frame 
number 30. 
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Figure 15. The micro-level model of the gate keeping decision: a generalized illustration 
of the frames as slot-values-configurations. 
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Figure 16. The micro-level model of the gate keeping decision: the right-wing frames and 
their slots. 
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The most important finding of this study in that the right-wing parties exploit 5 
types of slots: causal actor, supporter of the causal actor, opponent of the causal actor, 
threat and dominance. The parties choose news that could help to fill at least two of these 
slots and in a way that would promote one of the four main ideological pillar. The Fig.16. 
illustrates the case of the right-wing communication on Facebook. The Fig. 15. is a more 
generalized case, and can be directly applied for any further research. 
 
 
Research questions and answers: a macro-level model 
 
 
The controversy that inspired this study lies in the fact that the German 
mainstream media ignore local right-wing actors, but the right-wing actors do copy news 
from the mainstream media. This fact raised a question whether the former still can profit 
from the mainstream media coverage and led to the assumption that the mainstream media 
probably incorporate the right-wing ideology in quite a loose form, and, when the right-
wing actors select certain news, they create a media coverage that emphasizes their political 
standpoints.  
The research questions endeavored to embrace from different perspectives the 
phenomenon of the news coverage re-posted by the German right-wing political parties on 
Facebook. The present section will sketch the answers and conclude the study results with 
an enhanced research model.  
The first research question dealt with the role of Facebook as a news gate. In 
general, the gate keeping models reconstruct decisions of journalists and editors that they 
make to choose news for publication. A lot of different factors that influence this decision 
have been discovered. Some of them are about overcoming the limits imposed on the gate 
keeper, like the lack of time, news values, organizational issues, and other kinds of 
pressure. Still, the gate keepers are considered as playing an active role in the public 
opinion formation, because they have access to a wide range of news and can formulate 
their messages in the way they want. The editors of the Facebook pages use the media 
coverage published by other media, and can choose among a limited range of news and 
news frames. They play more passive role by forwarding the news from the mainstream 
media. They still can be called gate keepers, because they decide about the content of their 
pages. Thus, the gate keeping model and models that derived from it can be applied to the 
Facebook pages of the right-wing actors. The present study focuses on the probable factors 
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that effects the Facebook gate keeping decision. These factors are different from the kind 
of the limits that journalists and editors normally experience.  
The existing studies on ideology and media gave a clue that the ideology can play 
a supreme role in the gate keeping decision. This is also quite predictable, since the 
Facebook pages are a part of the communication strategies of the parties, and it is unlikely 
that they would have a function different from transmitting the ideology. Yet, the ignorance 
that the mainstream media demonstrate towards the right-wing scene in Germany should 
have consequences for the re-posed media coverage. The limited choice of the news should 
lead to a distorted transmission of the ideology. This means that some standpoints can be 
excluded. The other tricky thing about the right-wing ideology is that it can exist in the 
form of official documents of the right-wing political parties, and in the form of personal 
attitudes of the citizens. Both forms advocate the same social practices, but demonstrate 
different relationships between the single components. The two forms of the ideology were 
incorporated into the gate keeping model. The qualitative content analysis left a space for 
maneuver and exploration of other peculiarities of the news coverage. But, basically, as the 
starting point of the analysis, two factors, and their respective hints were considered as 
mostly influential. The parties either fully replicate their ideologies including all basic 
standpoints, or they can only replicate the feedback loop from the audience in the form of 
the group-focused enmity. The impact of each factor manifests itself in the media frames 
and their constellations. The frames and their constellations either replicate the structure of 
the right-wing ideology, or the structure of the group-focused enmity.  
The genuine theoretical considerations as well as the existing literature led to the 
idea that the following characteristics of the empirical data will be the evidence of the 
presence of each respective factor. If the first factor exhibits the biggest influence, then the 
media frames in the Facebook news coverage can be allocated alongside four ideological 
pillars that constitute the right-wing ideology. The pillars emphasize prejudice to different 
groups, repressive measures against them, an ideal society, and the status-quo with a 
discrepancy between mainstream politics and citizens. The shares of each pillars in the 
official documents and in the re-posted news coverage are identical. The ideological 
distances between the parties are identifiable in the news coverage. If the second factor is 
more influential, then the structure of the re-posted news coverage reproduces the structure 
of the syndrome of the group-focused enmity. The group-focused enmity emphasizes: 
prejudice against different groups, migrants in the first place, lack of trust toward 
mainstream politics, and the acceptance of the authoritarian order as personal dictatorship 
and/or strict social hierarchies.  
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The present study has demonstrated that the case of the German right-wing parties 
is quite a complicated one. 
The first important finding is that no article among all re-posted news was free 
from any ideological statements. It confirms that the parties manipulate the news 
intentionally. It also assures the accuracy of the modifications made in the cascading 
activation model. Facebook enables radical political actors excluded from the mainstream 
discourse to enter the cascading activation, and play a role of the gate keepers. The right-
wing parties select news that can have an ideological meaning, and can help to legitimize 
their statements. The limitation is that these actors cannot give any authentic input, but 
have to work with the existing content. Of course, they can post their own content, but if 
they want to quote a respected source - a mainstream newspaper - they have to post the 
content as it is, no changes are allowed (except for the status posts). We know that in the 
cascading activation the mainstream politicians give input to the mainstream media. The 
right-wing parties can sort out the output - the media frames - but cannot control the input. 
They are in the subordinate position in the cascading activation (in relation to both media 
and the mainstream parties). They also experience a pressure from below, and, as the study 
has confirmed, they can transmit their ideologies only to the extent to which it matches 
with the syndrome of the group-focused enmity, or with the existing attitudes of their 
audiences. This is another limitation of Facebook as a gate. 
The relationships between the right-wing ideology and the re-posted media 
coverage appeared somewhat tricky.  
It was possible to trace all four ideological pillars that are authentic for the right-
wing ideology - repressive, reactionary, xenophobic, and populist - in the form of the 
frames listed in the Tab.22. Yet, the proportions of the pillars in the official documents of 
the parties and in the news coverage are far from being identical. The news coverage is 
mainly shaped by xenophobic and populist frames. Besides, Islamophobic frames make up 
a big share of the xenophobic pillar. The overrepresentation of these two pillars and the 
underrepresentation of the other two led to the conclusion that ideology as a political 
manifest of the parties cannot be considered as a key factor of the gate keeping decision.  
The over- and underrepresentation of xenophobia and populism cannot be alone 
treated as an evidence that the group-focused enmity plays a dominant role in the gate 
keeping decision. The distortions in the representation of the ideology can be caused by the 
simple fact that xenophobic and populist statements are more valuable as news; they sell 
better. Yet, the overrepresentation of certain actors and situations confirms a leading role 
of the group-focused enmity. These findings confirm the main idea behind the cascading 
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activation model: that the interplay of the factors determines the news frames. 
An important argument for the superior role of the group-focused enmity is that 
Facebook is a social network, and not a mass medium in its pure form, so, it is “closer” to 
the audience than the mass media in the cascading activation. This turns us back to the 
general discussion about the role of social networks in political communication. What has 
been treated as a limitation - the limited choice of news to re-post - can be seen as an 
advantage, since the social networks can spread an impression that the mainstream media 
are supportive of the right-wing attitudes. This fact advocates the existence of a big 
potential for the social networks to change political communication in a qualitative way.  
In general, the study made an important contribution to the cascading activation 
model. The study has shown the role of the social networks in political communication, 
and took a moderate position between the enthusiastic and pessimistic perspective on the 
influence of social media that was described in the Part I. The social networks have a 
mediatory mission: they help the right-wing parties to promote their standpoints, but only 
to the limited extent, which does not go beyond the level of the right-wing attitudes that 
both the mass media and the audience already incorporate. The social networks can make 
these standpoints more visible, but only for the followers of the Facebook pages of the 
right-wing parties. At this point, the present study comes to its limitation. The Facebook 
news frames reflect the attitudes of the audience, but were produced by the mainstream 
media. So, it remains unclear, where these frames have their origin: in the media or in the 
audience. 
The present research project made a contribution to the semiotics studies on the 
ideology in media. The study was focused on rationalization and justification as two faces 
of the legitimization of the radical ideologies in the media. The results have shown that the 
“rational” arguments are based on the facts and committed actions, thus, linking any threat 
or damage with the migrants, Muslims, or mainstream politicians. Typical damage would 
be crimes, economic consequences, and low performance of the elected officials. The 
irrational arguments are more emotional, less supported with facts, and often present a kind 
of subjective opinion, or assessment, or cultural cliché. They include the statements about 
inferiority of the Others, which supposes the cultural domination of the natives, that can 
appear in the form of different educational levels, professional qualifications and skills, 
predisposition to violence as typical characteristics of the Others. The irrational arguments 
are also based on the so-called diagnosis of decadence: fact-based examples that everything 
is bad and becoming worse, where such arguments is quite obviously exaggerated. The 
existence of two types of arguments in the media frames makes us believe that the danger 
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of the Facebook radical pages should not be underestimated.  
The study has revealed a controversy that could fuel future research. The findings 
have demonstrated that xenophobia and populism dominate the Facebook news coverage. 
The study of Bruter and Harrison (2011) that provided an important input for this study, 
has argued that, normally, the parties would emphasize either xenophobia, or populism, but 
never both of them together.  
Another important contribution is that the study tried to link the macro- and micro-
perspective that still exist quite apart from each other. The original cascading activation 
model emphasizes the role of the single entities - political actors, media, and audiences - 
in the modifications that the frames produced by the mainstream political actors undergo. 
The present study delivered a closer examination of such modifications on the micro level.  
 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
 
Apart from the limitations, mentioned in the previous section, the study would 
have been more fruitful, if the following disadvantages would not have taken place.  
First, the empirical data was collected during a fixed period of time. It means that 
the news coverage was influenced by the political agendas that were important during that 
time. Of course, any qualitative study is not about the statistical representativeness, but 
about the interpretation of the meaning. Still, the fact of timely limitations could cause 
presence of the media frames that would not have been there a decade ago, or will vanish 
in a decade. For instance, the Islamophobic frames, even being a generic one, have become 
so noticeable after 2001, and some the German right-wing parties have been founded long 
time before. On the contrary, one of the parties - the PRO NRW - has been created as an 
anti-Islamist party. Thus, if a scholar refuses from a longitudinal study or limits the time 
period of the data sample, then he always faces a danger of overrepresentation of particular 
phenomena.  
Second, the data sample was limited to the news articles linked to the Facebook 
posts, but the status posts that are attached to them were not included. The comments of 
the users that followed after each post, were not collected as well, despite they would 
probably change the interpretation of the news articles. Two reasons were behind this 
decision. The main reason was that the recording units in the data should be identical, and 
possess equal characteristics, among them - authorship. Maybe, that would make sense to 
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compare the journalist style of writing with the style of the audience, but this would raise 
the question of the research ethics, since it would mean collecting personal data on users, 
data about their opinions, frequency of commenting etc. It would also require a new 
research design, with different research questions. The minor reason was a pragmatic one: 
some posts, especially in the newsfeeds of the most active parties, have attracted a lot of 
attention, and inspired thousands of comments. The comments were not simple lists of 
messages, but represented online discussions, where the users interacted not only with the 
party, but also with each other. This excluded the opportunity of the random sampling of 
such comments, since the whole conversion was a network of the utterances. 
Third, because of the differences between the parties in their posting activity, the 
samples were not equal, and two of them - for the National Democrats and for the PRO 
NRW - were quite big for a qualitative study. This made a pure semiotic analysis not 
possible. The content analysis was a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
The interpretation of the meaning did play a supreme role, but few statistical methods were 
applied as well to sketch the most common characteristics of the data. The quality of the 
study maybe lost in both directions: as a quantitative study it was not a representative one, 
and as a qualitative study it simplified the interpretation and the relationships between 
different statements in the text too much. 
Finally, the cascading activation model has such a wide scope that makes the 
direct application quite difficult. Normally, a qualitative study is expected to provide an 
input for a quantitative one. In this case, I would say that few directions of quantitative 
research are possible, but none of them would be conducted in the same framework and 
make use of the cascading activation model. Nevertheless, the model was helpful and the 
study provided an important contribution to it. The next section will sketch directions for 
a further research that would address and overcome the limitations of the present study. 
 
 
Proposal for the future research 
 
 
A qualitative study is more valuable, if it provides an input for the quantitative 
one. The present study can easily become a starting point for the new research. The new 
research model could test the influence of the factors over the gate keeping decisions by 
means of the quantitative variables. The research model of the present study already made 
use of ideological pillars as quantitative measures. Any new study would have to clarify 
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the variables that would estimate the tendencies in the news frames, and propose a more 
precise operationalization of the input. For instance, it is necessary to find a common 
measure for the syndrome of the group-focused enmity and the ideology that would make 
the calculations of the influence of the group-focused enmity independent from the shares 
of ideological pillars.  
The following proposals would help to overcome the limitations of the present 
study. 
The restricted period of time has caused the overrepresentation of certain frames, 
like Islamophobia and populism. This distortion could be eliminated in two ways. One 
method would be to extend the time period. In this case it would make sense to apply 
quantitative methods, if the data sample appeared to be too big for qualitative methods. 
This is quite risky, since it is hard to define, where the anti-Islamic sentiments started to 
dominate. The rise of populism can be linked with the latest financial crisis, but not only. 
More productive way would be to collect less data, maybe just few articles, and go for a 
deeper interpretation, and look for the relationships between ideological pillars, and not at 
their quantitative shares. This method would also help to overcome another limitation, 
mentioned in the previous section. Since for some parties the data sample was quite big, 
some data reducing techniques were applied. A compromise would be to collect the data 
on a day, when all four parties have posted at least one article, and conduct a deeper 
examination of these articles following the guidelines of the semiotic analysis. 
The content analysis could be extended to either Facebook status posts, or users’ 
comments, or both. That would shed light on the attitudes of the audience, and on the 
grassroots frame building. The analysis of the posts and users’ activity would probably lead 
to a new interpretation of the news articles. However, this interpretation would probably 
drift us away from the understanding of the relationships between the mainstream media 
and social media that were in the focus of this study. 
Independently from the limitations of the present study, another fruitful direction 
would be a user-centered research. The Part I and Part II have discussed what kind of 
intervention Facebook enables for the radical political actors as well as limitations that it 
imposes. The radical actors can perform a so-called media surveillance, and sort out 
specific mainstream news coverage creating a picture of the world that originates in the 
radical ideology. The media surveillance appears to be a way to transmit the ideology, but 
it probably can only affect the audiences that are predisposed to the right-wing attitudes. 
First of all, the users have to subscribe to the Facebook page, if they want to receive updates 
from it. It is not much likely that the audiences with no right-wing attitudes would love to 
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stay in touch with the right-wing parties. The phenomenon of selective exposure protects 
users from receiving any unwished information (Hartmann, 2009). Secondly, even if the 
audience was forced to receive such information, for instance, via the friends’ newsfeeds, 
it is very hard to change existing attitudes, if there is no need for the individual to change 
it (Katz, 1960). A new research could test whether and how the radical actors overcome 
mechanisms of selective exposure. 
Another user-centered research could focus on the information seeking motives 
of the Facebook use. The radical parties have no big chance to get new audiences, but they 
can easily stay in touch and re-enforce adherence of the old ones. The understanding of the 
motives for subscribing to the Facebook page of radical parties can shed a light over the 
role of social networks in transmitting radical ideologies. The present study would be a 
good starting point for such new research. 
  
  190 
REFERENCES 
 
Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain 
and the Netherlands. Journalism, 12(8), 931–945. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1464884911415972 
Altheide, D. L., & Schneider, C. J. (2013). Qualitative media analysis (2. ed.). Sage. 
Althusser, L. (2001). Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New ed.). New York: 
Monthly Review Press,U.S. 
Andersen, U. (2011). Kapitalismus. In D. Nohlen (Ed.), Kleines Lexikon der Politik 
(Lizenzausg., 5., überarb. u. erw. Aufl., pp. 294–296). Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung. 
Anderson, J. R. (1990). Cognitive psychology and its implications (3. ed.). Freeman. 
Antón-Mellón, J. (2013). The Idées-Force of the European New Right. A New Paradigm? 
In A. Mammone, E. Godin, & B. Jenkins (Eds.), Varieties of Right-Wing 
Extremism in Europe (pp. 53–68). Taylor and Francis. 
Arendt, F. (2013). Dose-Dependent Media Priming Effects of Stereotypic Newspaper 
Articles on Implicit and Explicit Stereotypes. Journal of Communication, 63(5), 
830–851. http://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12056 
Avraham, E., Wolfsfeld, G., & Aburaiya, I. (2000). Dynamics in the News Coverage of 
Minorities: The Case of the Arab Citizens of Israel. Journal of Communication 
Inquiry, 24(2), 117–133. http://doi.org/10.1177/0196859900024002002 
Backes, U. (1989). Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - 1 : 
Literatur. Nottbeck. 
Backes, U. (2013). Muslimfeindlicher Rechtsextremismus? Pro-Bewegung als Teil eines 
internationales Netzwerks. In U. Backes, A. Gallus, & E. Jesse (Eds.), Jahrbuch 
Extremismus & Demokratie / (E & D) (Vol. 25, pp. 150–161). Nomos-Verl-Ges. 
Backes, U., & Moreau, P. (2011). The Extreme Right in Europe : Current Trends and 
Perspectives. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Barlow, A. (2007). The Rise of the Blogosphere. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Barlow, A. (2008). Blogging America: The New Public Sphere. Greenwood Publishing 
Group. 
Barthes, R. (1994). Elements of semiology (7. print.). Hill and Wang. 
Barthes, R. (2009). Mythologies. Vintage Classics. 
Becher, P. (2013). Rechtspopulismus. Papyrossa. 
Bendel, P. (2011). Konservatismus. In D. Nohlen (Ed.), Kleines Lexikon der Politik 
  191 
(Lizenzausg., 5., überarb. u. erw. Aufl., pp. 327–329). Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung. 
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. 
Benkler, Y. (2006). The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets 
and Freedom. Yale University Press. 
Bergsdorf, H. (2000). Ungleiche Geschwister / die deutschen Republikaner (REP) im 
Vergleich zum französischen Front National (FN). Lang. 
Bohman, J. (2004). Expanding dialogue: The Internet, the public sphere and prospects for 
transnational democracy. In N. Crossley & J. M. Roberts (Eds.), After Habermas: 
New Perspectives on the Public Sphere (1 edition, pp. 131–155). Oxford, UK ; 
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Bormann, E. G. (1972). Fantasy and rhetorical vision: The rhetorical criticism of social 
reality. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58(4), 396–407. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00335637209383138 
Bornschier, S. (2010). Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right : The New Cultural 
Conflict in Western Europe. Temple University Press. 
Borz, G. (2012). Extreme-right parties in Romania after 1990. Incumbency, organization 
and success. In A. Mammone, E. Godin, & B. Jenkins (Eds.), Mapping the 
Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe : From Local to Transnational (pp. 173–
188). Taylor and Francis. 
Bösche, A. (2001). Rechtsextremismus im Internet / die Schattenseiten des www. 
Berenkamp. 
Bosch, T. (2013). Youth, Facebook and politics in South Africa. Journal of African Media 
Studies, 5(2), 119–130. http://doi.org/10.1386/jams.5.2.119_1 
Bos, L., van der Brug, W., & de Vreese, C. (2011). How the Media Shape Perceptions of 
Right-Wing Populist Leaders. Political Communication, 28(2), 182–206. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2011.564605 
Bötticher, A. (2008). Warum Neonazis? / radikale alte und neue Rechte - ein 
Ideologievergleich (1. Aufl.). Tectum-Verl. 
Boulianne, S. (2009). Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of 
Research. Political Communication, 26(2), 193–211. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600902854363 
Bouvier, G. (2012). How Facebook users select identity categories for self-presentation. 
Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 7(1), 37–57. 
  192 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2011.652781 
Boyd, D. M., & Ellison, N. B. (2007). Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13(1), 210–230. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00393.x 
Brinkmeier, K. (2012). Rechtsextremismus im Netz. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München, Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft und Medienforschung, 
München. 
Brosius, H.-B., & Eps, P. (1995). Prototyping through Key Events News Selection in the 
Case of Violence against Aliens and Asylum Seekers in Germany. European 
Journal of Communication, 10(3), 391–412. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323195010003005 
Brosius, H.-B., & Esser, F. (1995). Eskalation durch Berichterstattung? / Massenmedien 
und fremdenfeindliche Gewalt. WestdtVerl. 
Brundidge, J. (2010). Encountering “Difference” in the Contemporary Public Sphere: The 
Contribution of the Internet to the Heterogeneity of Political Discussion 
Networks. Journal of Communication, 60(4), 680–700. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01509.x 
Bruner, J. S., & Leigh, A. (1955). Perceptual identification and perceptual organization. 
Journal of General Psychology, 53, 21–28. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1955.9710133 
Bruter, M., & Harrison, S. (2011). Mapping Extreme Right Ideology : An Empirical 
Geography of the European Extreme Right. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bryant, E. (2008). A Critical Examination of Gender Representation on Facebook Profiles. 
Conference Papers -- National Communication Association, 1. 
Bucher, T. (2012). Want to be on the top? Algorithmic power and the threat of invisibility 
on Facebook. New Media & Society, 14(7), 1164–1180. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1461444812440159 
Bucher, T. (2013). The Friendship Assemblage Investigating Programmed Sociality on 
Facebook. Television & New Media, 14(6), 479–493. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1527476412452800 
Burke, M., Kraut, R., & Marlow, C. (2011). Social Capital on Facebook: Differentiating 
Uses and Users. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems (pp. 571–580). New York, NY, USA: ACM. 
http://doi.org/10.1145/1978942.1979023 
Busch, C. (2008a). Rechtsradikale im Web 2.0 - “... take up positions in ‘Mainstream’ 
  193 
groups.” In U. Dittler & M. Hoyer (Eds.), Aufwachsen in virtuellen Medienwelten 
– Chancen und Gefahren digitaler Medien aus medienpsychologischer und 
medienpädagogischer Perspektive (pp. 223 – 238). München: kopaed Verlag.  
Busch, C. (2008b). Rechtsradikales eCampaigning am Beispiel der Anti-Islam-Kampagne. 
In GI Jahrestagung (1) (pp. 443–448). 
Busch, C. (2014). „Die Rechte“ – alter neonazistischer Wein in neuen parteipolitischen 
Schläuchen. Mitteilungen Des Instituts Für Parteienrecht Und Parteienforschung, 
20. Jhrg., 141–150. 
Caers, R., Feyter, T. D., Couck, M. D., Stough, T., Vigna, C., & Bois, C. D. (2013). 
Facebook: A literature review. New Media & Society, 15(6), 982–1002. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1461444813488061 
Caiani, M., & della Porta, D. (2010). Extreme Right and Populism: A Frame Analysis of 
Extreme Right Wing Discourses in Italy and Germany. IHS Political Science 
Series No. 121, July 2010 (Working Paper) (p. 34). Retrieved from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/14454/ 
Cammaerts, B. (2009). Radical pluralism and free speech in online public spaces. The case 
of North Belgian extreme right discourses. International Journal of Cultural 
Studies, 12(6), 555–575. http://doi.org/10.1177/1367877909342479 
Campbell, A. (2006). The search for authenticity An exploration of an online skinhead 
newsgroup. New Media & Society, 8(2), 269–294. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1461444806059875 
Camus, J.-Y. (2003). Strömungen der europäischen extremen Rechten Populisten, 
Integristen, Nationalrevolutionäre, Neue Rechte. In U. Backes (Ed.), 
Rechtsextreme Ideologien in Geschichte und Gegenwart (pp. 235–260). Böhlau. 
Casteltrione, I. (2014). Facebook and Political Information in Italy and the UK: An 
Antidote against Political Fragmentation and Polarisation? Online Journal of 
Communication & Media Technologies, 4(1), 27–49. 
Chau, M., & Xu, J. (2007). Mining communities and their relationships in blogs: A study 
of online hate groups. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 65(1), 
57–70. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2006.08.009 
Chen, G. M. (2015). Why do women bloggers use social media? Recreation and 
information motivations outweigh engagement motivations. New Media & 
Society, 17(1), 24–40. http://doi.org/10.1177/1461444813504269 
Cippitelli, C., & Schwanebeck, A. (2004). Die neuen Verführer? : Rechtspopulismus und 
Rechtsextremismus in den Medien. München: R. Fischer. 
  194 
Dahlberg, L. (2007). The Internet, deliberative democracy, and power: Radicalizing the 
public sphere. International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics, 3(1), 47–64. 
http://doi.org/10.1386/macp.3.1.47_1 
Dean, J. (2002). Publicity’s Secret: How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Dean, J. (2010). Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits of Drive. Polity. 
Decker, F. (2006). Populismus in Europa / Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches 
Korrektiv? (Lizenzausg.). Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. 
Decker, O., & Brähler, E. (2006). Vom Rand zur Mitte ([Electronic ed.]). Berlin: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, Forum Berlin. 
Decker, O., & Brähler, E. (2008). Bewegung in der Mitte ([Electronic ed.]). Berlin: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Forum Berlin. 
De Raadt, J., Hollanders, D., & Krouwel, A. (2004). Varieties of Populism: An Analysis of 
the Programmatic Character of Six Europena Parties (Working Paper No. 04). 
Free University of Amsterdam, Department of Political Science. 
De Vreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: Theory and typology. Information Design Journal 
& Document Design, 13(1), 51–62. 
De Vreese, C. H., Peter, J., & Semetko, H. A. (2001). Framing Politics at the Launch of 
the Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News. Political 
Communication, 18(2), 107–122. http://doi.org/10.1080/105846001750322934 
Dijck, J. van. (2012). Facebook as a Tool for Producing Sociality and Connectivity. 
Television & New Media, 13(2), 160–176. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1527476411415291 
Douglas, K. M., Mcgarty, C., Bliuc, A.-M., & Lala, G. (2005). Understanding Cyberhate 
Social Competition and Social Creativity in Online White Supremacist Groups. 
Social Science Computer Review, 23(1), 68–76. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0894439304271538 
Dryzek, J. S. (2002). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations 
(reprint edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Duffy, M. E. (2003). Web of Hate: a Fantasy Theme Analysis of the Rhetorical Vision of 
Hate Groups Online. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 27(3), 291–312. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0196859903252850 
Elter, P. D. A. (2013). Interaktion und Dialog? Eine quantitative Inhaltsanalyse der 
Aktivitäten deutscher Parteien bei Twitter und Facebook während der 
Landtagswahlkämpfe 2011. Publizistik, 58(2), 201–220. 
  195 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11616-013-0173-1 
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of 
Communication, 43(4), 51–58. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-
2466.1993.tb01304.x 
Entman, R. M. (2003). Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 
9/11. Political Communication, 20(4), 415–432. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600390244176 
Esser, F., Scheufele, B., & Brosius, H.-B. (2002). Fremdenfeindlichkeit als Medienthema 
und Medienwirkung / Deutschland im internationalen Scheinwerferlicht (1. 
Aufl.). WestdtVerl. 
Esser, J. (2011). Kommunismus. In D. Nohlen (Ed.), Kleines Lexikon der Politik 
(Lizenzausg., 5., überarb. u. erw. Aufl., pp. 309–310). Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung. 
Fenske, H. (1993a). Der Nationalsozialismus und seine Quellen. In H.-J. Lieber (Ed.), 
Politische Theorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (2., durchges. Aufl., pp. 
802–820). Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. 
Fenske, H. (1993b). Faschismus und benachbarte Bewegungen. In H.-J. Lieber (Ed.), 
Politische Theorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (2., durchges. Aufl., pp. 
781–801). Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. 
Ferree, M. M. (2002). Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in 
Germany and the United States. Cambridge University Press. 
Fiske, J. (1994). Introduction to communication studies (2. ed., repr.). Routledge. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 12(2), 219–245. http://doi.org/10.1177/1077800405284363 
Fourie, P. J. (2001). Media Studies: Institutions, theories, and issues. Juta and Company 
Ltd. 
Früh, W. (2011). Inhaltsanalyse / Theorie und Praxis (7., überarb. Aufl.). UVK-Verl-Ges. 
Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. H. (1965). The Structure of Foreign News The Presentation of the 
Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers. Journal of 
Peace Research, 2(1), 64–90. http://doi.org/10.1177/002234336500200104 
Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). Research in political sociology. In R. B. 
Braungart & M. M. Braungart (Eds.), The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action 
(pp. 137–177). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Gandiwa, E., Sprangers, S., van Bommel, S., Heitkönig, I. M. A., Leeuwis, C., & Prins, H. 
H. T. (2014). Spill-over effect in media framing: Representations of wildlife 
  196 
conservation in Zimbabwean and international media, 1989–2010. Journal for 
Nature Conservation, 22(5), 413–423. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2014.03.009 
Geden, O. (2006). Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus / Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs und Schweizerische Volkspartei zwischen Opposition und 
Regierungsbeteiligung (1. Aufl.). VS Verlfür Sozialwiss. 
Gemi, E., Ulasiuk, I., & Triandafyllidou, A. (2013). Migrants and Media Newsmaking 
Practices. Journalism Practice, 7(3), 266–281. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2012.740248 
Gerhards, J. (1995). Framing dimensions and framing strategies: contrasting ideal- and 
real-type frames. Social Science Information, 34(2), 225–248. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/053901895034002003 
Gerhards, J., & Schäfer, M. S. (2010). Is the internet a better public sphere? Comparing old 
and new media in the USA and Germany. New Media & Society, 12(1), 143–160. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1461444809341444 
Gerstenfeld, P. B., Grant, D. R., & Chiang, C.-P. (2003). Hate Online: A Content Analysis 
of Extremist Internet Sites. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 3(1), 29–
44. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2003.00013.x 
Gieber, W. (1956). Across the Desk: A Study of 16 Telegraph Editors. Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly, 33(4), 423–432. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/107769905603300401 
Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2012). Social Media Use for News and Individuals’ Social Capital, Civic 
Engagement and Political Participation. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 17(3), 319–336. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-
6101.2012.01574.x 
Glaser, J., Dixit, J., & Green, D. P. (2002). Studying Hate Crime with the Internet: What 
Makes Racists Advocate Racial Violence? Journal of Social Issues, 58(1), 177–
193. http://doi.org/10.1111/1540-4560.00255 
Glaser, S. (Ed.). (2009). Erlebniswelt Rechtsextremismus / Menschenverachtung mit 
Unterhaltungswert ; Hintergründe - Methoden - Praxis der Prävention (2. Aufl.). 
Wochenschau-Verlag. 
Glaser, S., & Schneider, C. (2012). Zielgruppe Jugend: Rechtsextreme im Social Web. Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte : Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, 62(18-
19), 40–46. 
Glaser, S., & Schneider, C. (2013). Viraler Hass - wie Neonazis Jugendliche im Internet 
ködern. AJS-Informationen, 49(2), 14–16. 
  197 
Glazier, R. A., & Boydstun, A. E. (2012). The President, the Press, and the War: A Tale of 
Two Framing Agendas. Political Communication, 29(4), 428–446. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2012.721870 
Glynn, C. J., Huge, M. E., & Hoffman, L. H. (2012). All the news that’s fit to post: A 
profile of news use on social networking sites. Computers in Human Behavior, 
28(1), 113–119. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2011.08.017 
Goh, D., & Pang, N. (2012). Online and on Track? Political Party Use of Websites and 
Facebook During Singapore’s 2011 General Elections. In Conference Papers -- 
International Communication Association (pp. 1–39). Sheraton Phoenix 
Downtown, Phoenix, AZ.  
Göhler, G., & Klein, A. (1993). Nationalismus. In H.-J. Lieber (Ed.), Politische Theorien 
von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (2., durchges. Aufl., pp. 611–656). 
Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. 
Gorp, B. V. (2005). Where is the Frame? Victims and Intruders in the Belgian Press 
Coverage of the Asylum Issue. European Journal of Communication, 20(4), 484–
507. http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323105058253 
Grau, A., Gross, E., & Reinecke, J. (2012). Abgehängte Sozialräume. Die Bedeutung von 
Jugendarbeitslosigkeit für Orientierungslosigkeit und Fremdfeindlichkeit. In W. 
Heitmeyer (Ed.), Deutsche Zustände (Vol. 10, pp. 129–151). Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Gulati, G. J., & Williams, C. B. (2013). Social Media and Campaign 2012 Developments 
and Trends for Facebook Adoption. Social Science Computer Review, 31(5), 577–
588. http://doi.org/10.1177/0894439313489258 
Habermas, J. (1992). The structural transformation of the public sphere / an inquiry into a 
category of bourgeois society. Polity. 
Hagen, L. M. (1993). Opportune Witnesses: An Analysis of Balance in the Selection of 
Sources and Arguments in the Leading German Newspapers’ Coverage of the 
Census Issue. European Journal of Communication, 8(3), 317–343. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323193008003004 
Hainsworth, P. (2008). The extreme right in western Europe (1. publ.). Routledge. 
Haney, W., Russell, M., Gulek, C., & Fierros, E. (1998). Drawing on Education: Using 
Student Drawings To Promote Middle School Improvement. Schools in the 
Middle, 7(3), 38–43. 
Hänggli, R., & Kriesi, H. (2010). Political Framing Strategies and Their Impact on Media 
Framing in a Swiss Direct-Democratic Campaign. Political Communication, 
27(2), 141–157. http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600903501484 
  198 
Hänggli, R., & Kriesi, H. (2012). Frame Construction and Frame Promotion (Strategic 
Framing Choices). American Behavioral Scientist, 56(3), 260–278. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0002764211426325 
Hartmann, H. (2006). Rechtsextremismus und Medien – Informieren statt Moralisieren. 
Zur Notwendigkeit einer verbesserten Berichterstattung über Rechtsextremismus 
(pp. 14–25). Presented at the Ideologie und Strategien des Rechtsextremismus – 
Wie geht man als Journalist/in damit um? Dokumentation des E&C-
Werkstattgesprächs am 8. Mai 2006, Berlin. 
Hartmann, T. (2009). Media choice: A theoretical and empirical overview. New York and 
London: Routledge. 
Hatleb, F. (2005). Rechtspopulistische Parteien (No. 143). Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 
Häusler, A. (2008). Rechtspopulismus als “Bürgerbewegung” / Kampagnen gegen Islam 
und Moscheebau und kommunale Gegenstrategien (1. Aufl.). VS Verlfür 
Sozialwiss. 
Hayes, D., & Guardino, M. (2010). Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and 
the March to War in Iraq. Political Communication, 27(1), 59–87. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/10584600903502615 
Heitmeyer, W. (2002-2012). Deutsche Zustände (Vol. 1-10). Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Hilgartner, S., & Bosk, C. L. (1988). The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas 
Model. American Journal of Sociology, 94(1), 53–78. 
Hille, S., & Bakker, P. (2013). I like news. Searching for the “Holy Grail” of social media: 
The use of Facebook by Dutch news media and their audiences. European Journal 
of Communication, 28(6), 663–680. http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323113497435 
Hindman, M. (2008). The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton University Press. 
Holtmann, E. (2000). Politik-Lexikon (3., völlig überarb. und erw. Aufl.). Oldenbourg. 
Iyengar, S. (1994). Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). News that matters: television and American opinion / 
Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jacobson, S. (2013). Does Audience Participation on Facebook Influence the News 
Agenda? A Case Study of The Rachel Maddow Show. Journal of Broadcasting 
& Electronic Media, 57(3), 338–355. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2013.816706 
Jamin, J. (2013). Two Different Realities: Notes on populism and the extreme right. In A. 
Mammone, E. Godin, & B. Jenkins (Eds.), Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in 
  199 
Europe (pp. 38–52). Taylor and Francis. 
Jesse, E. (2011). Extremismus. In D. Nohlen (Ed.), Kleines Lexikon der Politik 
(Lizenzausg., 5., überarb. u. erw. Aufl., p. 167). Bundeszentrale für Politische 
Bildung. 
Jung, M. (2000). Ausländer und Migranten im Spiegel der Presse : ein diskurshistorisches 
Wörterbuch zur Einwanderung seit 1945. WestdtVerl. 
Karlsen, R. (2015). Followers are opinion leaders: The role of people in the flow of political 
communication on and beyond social networking sites. European Journal of 
Communication, 30(3), 301–318. http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323115577305 
Katz, D. (1960). The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes. Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 24(2), 163–204. http://doi.org/10.1086/266945 
Kepplinger, H. M. (1989). Instrumentelle Aktualisierung. In M. Kaase & W. Schulz (Eds.), 
Massenkommunikation (pp. 199–220). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.  
Kepplinger, H. M., & Bastian, R. (2000). Der prognostische Gehalt der Nachrichtenwert-
Theorie. Publizistik, 45(4), 462–475. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11616-000-0143-2 
Kepplinger, H. M., Brosius, H.-B., & Staab, J. F. (1991). Instrumental Actualization: A 
Theory of Mediated Conflicts. European Journal of Communication, 6(3), 263–
290. http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323191006003002 
Kietzmann, J. H., Hermkens, K., McCarthy, I. P., & Silvestre, B. S. (2011). Social media? 
Get serious! Understanding the functional building blocks of social media. 
Business Horizons, 54(3), 241–251. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2011.01.005 
Kitschelt, H. (1995). The radical right in Western Europe / a comparative analysis. Univof 
Michigan Press. 
Kleinnijenhuis, J., Schultz, F., & Oegema, D. (2015). Frame Complexity and the Financial 
Crisis: A Comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in 
the Period 2007–2012. Journal of Communication, 65(1), 1–23. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12141 
Koopmans, R. (2004). Movements and media: Selection processes and evolutionary 
dynamics in the public sphere. Theory and Society, 33(3-4), 367–391. 
http://doi.org/10.1023/B:RYSO.0000038603.34963.de 
Lampe, C., Vitak, J., Gray, R., & Ellison, N. (2012). Communicating Information Needs 
on Facebook. Conference Papers -- International Communication Association, 1–
34. 
Larsson, A. O. (2015). Pandering, protesting, engaging. Norwegian party leaders on 
Facebook during the 2013 “Short campaign.” Information, Communication & 
  200 
Society, 18(4), 459–473. http://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2014.967269 
Lee, E., & Leets, L. (2002). Persuasive Storytelling by Hate Groups Online Examining Its 
Effects on Adolescents. American Behavioral Scientist, 45(6), 927–957. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0002764202045006003 
Lenk, K. (2005). Rechtsextreme “Argumentationsmuster.” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte : 
Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, (42), 17–22. 
Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in Group Dynamics II. Channels of Group Life; Social 
Planning and Action Research. Human Relations, 1(2), 143–153. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/001872674700100201 
Lewis, S. C., & Reese, S. D. (2009). What Is the War on Terror? Framing Through the 
Eyes of Journalists. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 86(1), 85–
102. 
Liang, C. S. (2008). Europe for the Europeans : The Foreign and Security Policy of the 
Populist Radical Right. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Lippmann, W. (1997). Public Opinion (Reissue). New York: Free Press. 
Macafee, T. (2013). Some of these things are not like the others: Examining motivations 
and political predispositions among political Facebook activity. Computers in 
Human Behavior, 29(6), 2766–2775. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2013.07.019 
Machin, D., & Van Leeuwen, T. (2010). Branding the self. In R. Iedema & C. R. Caldas-
Coulthard Dr (Eds.), Identity Trouble: Critical Discourse and Contested Identities 
(pp. 43–56). Basingstoke England; New York: Palgrave. 
Mammone, A., Godin, E., & Jenkins, B. (Eds.). (2013). Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism 
in Europe. Taylor and Francis. 
Mansel, J., Christ, O., & Heitmeyer, W. (2012). Der Effekt von Prekarisierung auf 
fremdfeindliche Einstellungen. Ergebnisse aus einem Drei-Wellen-Panel und 
zehn jährlichen Surveys. In W. Heitmeyer (Ed.), Deutsche Zustände (Vol. 10, pp. 
105–128). Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1953). Die deutsche Ideologie / Kritik der neuesten deutschen 
Philosophie in ihren Repräsentanten, Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner, und des 
deutschen Sozialismus in seinen verschiedenen Propheten. VerlDas Neue Wort. 
Matthes, J. (2009). Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Preference for 
Dispositional Attributions and the Effects of News Frames. Communication 
Research Reports, 26(1), 82–86. http://doi.org/10.1080/08824090802637114 
McNamee, L. G., Peterson, B. L., & Peña, J. (2010). A Call to Educate, Participate, Invoke 
and Indict: Understanding the Communication of Online Hate Groups. 
  201 
Communication Monographs, 77(2), 257–280. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/03637751003758227 
McNamee, L., Peterson, B., & Pena, J. (2008). Fairy Tales or Fighting Words? Analyzing 
Hate Group Communication Online. Conference Papers -- National 
Communication Association, 1. 
Meyer, T. (2011). Fundamentalismus. In D. Nohlen (Ed.), Kleines Lexikon der Politik 
(Lizenzausg., 5., überarb. u. erw. Aufl., pp. 193–196). Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung. 
Minkenberg, M. (2011). Die radikale Rechte in Europa heute: Trends und Muster in West 
und Ost. In Europa auf dem “rechten” Weg? Rechtsextremismus und 
Rechtspopulismus in Europa (pp. 39–57). Berlin: Nora Langenbacher und Britta 
Schellenberg für die Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Forum Berlin. 
Mondon, A. (2013). The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia : A 
Populist Hegemony?. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Morin, D. T., & Flynn, M. A. (2014). We Are the Tea Party!: The Use of Facebook as an 
Online Political Forum for the Construction and Maintenance of in-Group 
Identification during the “GOTV” Weekend. Communication Quarterly, 62(1), 
115–133. http://doi.org/10.1080/01463373.2013.861500 
Morozov, E. (2011). The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate The World. Penguin UK. 
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. 
Myrdal, G. (1944). An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy 
(One Volume Ed. edition). Harper & Bros. 
Neuman, W. R., Just, M. R., & Crigler, A. N. (1992). Common knowledge / news and the 
construction of political meaning. Univof Chicago Pr. 
Nickels, H. C. (2007). Framing Asylum Discourse in Luxembourg. Journal of Refugee 
Studies, 20(1), 37–59. http://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fel029 
Obermann, L., & Dijkink, G. (2008). Reframing international conflict after 9/11. Journal 
of International Communication, 14(2), 159–181. 
Park, N., Kee, K. F., & Valenzuela, S. (2009). Being immersed in social networking 
environment: Facebook groups, uses and gratifications, and social outcomes. 
Cyberpsychology & Behavior: The Impact of the Internet, Multimedia and Virtual 
Reality on Behavior and Society, 12(6), 729–733. 
http://doi.org/10.1089/cpb.2009.0003 
Percy-Smith, J. (1995). Digital democracy: Information and communication technologies 
in local politics (No. 14). London: Commission for Local Democracy. 
  202 
Pettigrew, T. F., & Meertens, R. W. (1995, January 1). Subtle and blatant prejudice in 
western Europe. European Journal of Social Psychology, 25(1), 57–75. 
Pew Research Center. (2015a). State of the News Media 2015. 
Pew Research Center. (2015b). The Evolving Role of News on Twitter and Facebook. 
Pfahl-Traughber, A. (1993). Rechtsextremismus / eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme nach 
der Wiedervereinigung. Bouvier. 
Pfahl-Traughber, A. (2012). Extremismusintensität, Ideologie, Organisation, Strategie und 
Wirkung. Das E-IOS-W-Schema zu Analyse und Vergleich extremistischer 
Organisationen. In A. Pfahl-Traughber (Ed.), Jahrbuch für Extremismus- und 
Terrorismusforschung 2011/2012 (Vol. I, pp. 7–27). Brühl. 
Pfeiffer, T. (2009a). Menschenverachtung mit Unterhaltungswert. Musik, Symbolik, 
Internet - der Rechtsextremismus als Erlebniswelt. In S. Glaser (Ed.), Erlebniswelt 
Rechtsextremismus / Menschenverachtung mit Unterhaltungswert ; Hintergründe 
- Methoden - Praxis der Prävention (2. Aufl., pp. 36–52). Wochenschau-Verlag. 
Pfeiffer, T. (2009b). Uraltes Denken in High-Tech-Medien. Rechtsextreme Entecken den 
Computer. In S. Glaser (Ed.), Erlebniswelt Rechtsextremismus / 
Menschenverachtung mit Unterhaltungswert ; Hintergründe - Methoden - Praxis 
der Prävention (2. Aufl., pp. 87–97). Wochenschau-Verlag. 
Pfeiffer, T. (2009c). Virtuelle Gegenöffentlichkeit und Ausweg aus dem „rechten Ghetto“. 
Strategische Funktionen des Internets für den deutschen Rechtsextremismus. In S. 
Braun (Ed.), Strategien der extremen Rechten / Hintergründe - Analysen - 
Antworten (1st ed.). Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwiss. 
Polat, R. K. (2005). The Internet and Political Participation Exploring the Explanatory 
Links. European Journal of Communication, 20(4), 435–459. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323105058251 
Quan-Haase, A., & Young, A. L. (2010). Uses and Gratifications of Social Media: A 
Comparison of Facebook and Instant Messaging. Bulletin of Science, Technology 
& Society, 30(5), 350–361. http://doi.org/10.1177/0270467610380009 
Reese, S. D., & Lewis, S. C. (2009). Framing the War on Terror The internalization of 
policy in the US press. Journalism, 10(6), 777–797. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1464884909344480 
Reuter, G. (2009). Rechtspopulismus in Belgien und den Niederlanden / Unterschiede im 
niederländischsprachigen Raum. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Rheingold, H. (1993). The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. 
MIT Press. 
  203 
Ross, C., Orr, E. S., Sisic, M., Arseneault, J. M., Simmering, M. G., & Orr, R. R. (2009). 
Personality and motivations associated with Facebook use. Computers in Human 
Behavior, 25(2), 578–586. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2008.12.024 
Roux, G. (2011). Dimensions of Ethnic Prejudice and Extreme Right-Wing Voting. In U. 
Backes & P. Moreau (Eds.), The Extreme Right in Europe : Current Trends and 
Perspectives (pp. 51–74). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Sainsbury, D. (1980). Swedish social democratic ideology and electoral politics 1944-
1948: A study of the functions of party ideology. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International. 
Saris, W. E., & Sniderman, P. M. (2004). Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, 
Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change. Princeton University Press. 
Schafraad, P., d’ Haenens, L., Scheepers, P., & Wester, F. (2012). The evolution of a media 
image: Newspaper attention to the Flemish far right 1987–2004. Acta Politica, 
47(4), 356–377. http://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2012.12 
Scheufele, B. (2003). Frames - Framing - Framing-Effekte / theoretische und methodische 
Grundlegung des Framing-Ansatzes sowie empirische Befunde zur 
Nachrichtenproduktion (1. Aufl.). WestdtVerl. 
Scheufele, B. (2004). Framing-effects approach: A theoretical and methodological critique. 
Communications, 29(4), 401–428. 
Scheufele, B., & Scheufele, D. A. (2010). Of spreading activation, applicability, and 
schemas: Conceptual distinctions and their operational implications for measuring 
frames and framing effects. In Paul D’Angelo, Jim A. Kuypers, Paul D’Angelo, 
& Jim A. Kuypers (Eds.), Doing News Framing Analysis : Empirical and 
Theoretical Perspectives (pp. 110–134). Taylor & Francis. 
Scheufele, D. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of Communication, 
49(1), 103–122. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x 
Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The 
Evolution of Three Media Effects Models. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 9–
20. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00326.x 
Scheufele, D., & Iyengar, S. (2012). The State of Framing Research: A Call for New 
Directions. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication. Oxford 
University Press. 
Schlipphak, B. (2011). Framing Ideology / die Kommunikation ideologischer 
Positionierungen zwischen Parteien, Wählern und Medien (1. Aufl.). Nomos. 
Schubert, K., & Klein, M. (2011). Das Politiklexikon / Begriffe, Fakten, Zusammenhänge 
  204 
(5., aktualisierte und erw. Aufl., Lizenzausg.). Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung. 
Semetko, H., & Valkenburg, P. (2000). Framing European politics: a content analysis of 
press and television news. Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93–109. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02843.x 
Sheldon, P. (2008). Student Favorite: Facebook and Motives for Its Use. Southwestern 
Mass Communication Journal, 23(2), 39–53. 
Sheldon, P., & Honeycutt, J. M. (2008). A Structural Equation Model of Oral 
Communication and Facebook Use. NCA 94th Annual Convention, San Diego, 
USA.  
Siri, J., Melchner, M., & Wolff, A. (2012). The Political Network: Parteien und politische 
Kommunikation auf Facebook. kommunikation @ gesellschaft, 
13(Sonderausgabe), 29. 
Slevin, J. M. (2001). The Internet and society. In Sociology: Introductory readings. (pp. 
289–293). Polity Press.  
Sniderman, P. M., & Theriault, S. M. (2004). The structure of political argument and the 
logic of issue framing. In W. E. Saris & P. M. Sniderman (Eds.), Studies in public 
opinion: Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error, and change (pp. 133–165).  
Snow, D. A. (2004). Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields. In D. A. Snow, 
S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements 
(pp. 380–412). Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  
Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant 
mobilization. International Social Movement Research, 1(1), 197–217. 
Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (2005). Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and 
Ideology in the Study of Social Movement. In H. Johnston & J. A. Noakes (Eds.), 
Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective (pp. 205–
212). Rowman & Littlefield. 
Snow, D., & Byrd, S. (2007). Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist 
Movements. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 12(2), 119–136. 
http://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.12.2.5717148712w21410 
Soriano, C. R. (2011). Debating Muslim separatism online. Rethinking agonistic pluralism 
in the case of extreme speech discourses in Philippine blogs. Conference Papers 
-- International Communication Association, 1–31. 
Spier, T. (2010). Modernisierungsverlierer? / Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistischer 
Parteien in Westeuropa. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
  205 
Stemler, S. (2001). An overview of content analysis. Practical Assessment, Research & 
Evaluation, 7(17), 137–146. 
Stöss, R. (2010). Rechtsextremismus im Wandel (3., aktualis. Aufl.). Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Forum Berlin. 
Stöss, R., & Niedermayer, O. (1998). Rechtsextremismus, politische Unzufriedenheit und 
das Wählerpotential rechtsextremer Parteien in der Bundesrepublik im 
Frühsommer 1998 (Arbeitspapiere des Otto-Stammer-Zentrums No. 1). Berlin: 
Freie Universität Berlin. 
Strauss, A. L. (1997). Grounded theory in practice. SAGE Publ. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Republic.com (With a New afterword by the author edition). 
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Toma, C. L. (2013). Feeling Better But Doing Worse: Effects of Facebook Self-
Presentation on Implicit Self-Esteem and Cognitive Task Performance. Media 
Psychology, 16(2), 199–220. http://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2012.762189 
Toma, C. L., & Hancock, J. (2011). Affirming the Self Online: Motives and Benefits of 
Facebook Use. International Communication Association, Boston, USA.  
Tippelt, F., & Kupferschmitt, T. (2015). Social Web: Ausdifferenzierung der Nutzung - 
Potenziale für Medienanbieter. Ergebnisse der ARD/ZDF-Onlinestudie 2015. 
Media Perspektiven, (10), 442–452. 
Trebbe, J. (2009). Ethnische Minderheiten, Massenmedien und Integration: Eine 
Untersuchung zu massenmedialer Repräsentation und Medienwirkungen. 
Springer-Verlag. 
Triandafyllidou, A. (2013). Migrants and the Media in the Twenty-First Century. 
Journalism Practice, 7(3), 240–247. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2012.740213 
Turner, J. C., & Oakes, P. J. (1986). The significance of the social identity concept for 
social psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social 
influence. British Journal of Social Psychology, 25(3), 237–252. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1986.tb00732.x 
Udris, L. (2011). Politischer Extremismus und Radikalismus / Problematisierung und 
diskursive Gelegenheitsstrukturen in der öffentlichen Kommunikation der 
Deutschschweiz. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Valenzano, J. M. (2009). Framing the War on Terror in Canadian Newspapers: Cascading 
Activation, Canadian Leaders, and Newspapers. Southern Communication 
Journal, 74(2), 174–190. http://doi.org/10.1080/10417940802441785 
  206 
Van Eimeren, B., & Frees, B. (2014). 79 Prozent der Deutschen online – Zuwachs bei 
mobiler Internetnutzung und Bewegtbild. Ergebnisse der ARD/ZDF-
Onlinestudie 2014. Media Perspektiven, (7-8), 378–396. 
Van Leeuwen, T. (2013). The representation of social actors. In C. R. Caldas-Coulthard & 
M. Coulthard (Eds.), Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis 
(p. 32?70). Routledge. 
Vissers, S., & Stolle, D. (2014). The Internet and new modes of political participation: 
online versus offline participation. Information, Communication & Society, 17(8), 
937–955. http://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2013.867356 
Waldherr, A. (2014). Emergence of News Waves: A Social Simulation Approach. Journal 
of Communication, 64(5), 852–873. http://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12117 
Warren, R., & Wicks, R. H. (2011). Political Socialization: Modeling Teen Political and 
Civic Engagement. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 88(1), 156–
175. 
Weber, R. P. (1992). Basic content analysis (2. ed., 3. pr.). Sage. 
Weiß, H.-J., & Spallek, C. (2002). Fallstudien zur Fernsehberichterstattung über den 
Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland 1998-2001. Landesanstalt für Medien 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
White, D. M. (1950). The Gate Keeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News. Journalism 
Quarterly, 27, 383–390. 
Wodak, R. (2013). Right-Wing Populism in Europe : Politics and Discourse. Bloomsbury 
Publishing. 
Wörner-Schappert, m. (2009). Was macht Hass-Seiten attraktiv? Fallbeispiel: Musik als 
virtuelle Propagandawaffe. In S. Glaser (Ed.), Erlebniswelt Rechtsextremismus / 
Menschenverachtung mit Unterhaltungswert ; Hintergründe - Methoden - Praxis 
der Prävention (2. Aufl.). Wochenschau-Verlag. 
Yilmaz, F. (2007). The Success of Right-Wing Populism in Danish Public Discourse. 
Presented at the International Communication Association, Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada.  
Zick, A., Hövermann, A., & Krause, D. (2012). Die Abwertung von Ungleichwertigen. 
Erklärung und Prüfung eines erweiterten Syndroms der Gruppenbezogenen 
Menschenfeindlichkeit. In W. Heitmeyer (Ed.), Deutsche Zustände (Vol. 10, pp. 
64–86). Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Zick, A., & Küpper, B. (2012). Zusammenhalt durch Ausgrenzung? Wie die Klage über 
den Zerfall der Gesellschaft und die Vorstellung von kulturellen Homogenität mit 
  207 
Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit zusammenhängen. In W. Heitmeyer 
(Ed.), Deutsche Zustände (Vol. 10, pp. 152–176). Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Zick, A., Küpper, B., & Heitmeyer, W. (2009). Prejudices and group-focused enmity: a 
socio-functional perspective. In A. Pelinka, K. Bischof, & K. Stögner (Eds.), 
Handbook of Prejudice (pp. 273–302). Amherst, NY: Cambria.  
Zick, A., Küpper, B., & Hövermann, A. (2011). Intolerance, Prejudice and 
Descrimination. A European Report. Berlin: Nora Langenbacher, Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung Forum Berlin. 
Zick, A., Wolf, C., Küpper, B., Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Heitmeyer, W. (2008). The 
Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with 
Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data. Journal of Social Issues, 64(2), 363–
383. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00566.x 
Žižek, S. (2008). The sublime object of ideology (New ed.). Verso. 
Zywica, J., & Danowski, J. (2008). The faces of facebookers: Investigating social 
enhancement and social compensation hypotheses; predicting FacebookTM and 
offline popularity from sociability and self-esteem, and mapping the meanings of 
popularity with semantic networks. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 14(1), 1–34. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2008.01429.x 
 
